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*Interstate Initiative Group To Discuss Unification Issues

954E0725A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 16 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by Viktor Khamrayev under the rubric "Uniters": "'Technical Difficulties' Have Appeared for the First Time on the Path of the '4 Plus All' Campaign—The Laws of the Former Union Republics Have Fundamentally Diverged"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The December initiative of the International Congress of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs on conducting a survey of Russian citizens, Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Kazakhs regarding the topic of their attitude toward the idea of the economic, political, and defense integration of the four independent states was organizationally formalized in Moscow yesterday in the form of the first meeting of the Interstate Initiative Group To Prepare and Hold the Appropriate Referendums.

The leading role in the political action being undertaken, which is entitled "4 Plus All," has been assigned to the Russian side. This accounts for its broad representation in the initiative group, which includes the leaders of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Agrarian Union, the "To a New Accord" forum, the "People's Alliance" patriotic movement, and others. Only the two cochairmen of the Party of the Majority figure on the rolls of the interstate group as leaders of strictly political Russian organizations.

The Ukrainian side is grouped around the "Civic Congress of Ukraine" party (headquartered in the city of Donetsk). Among the Belorussian advocates of union integration, the People's Movement of Belorussia has assumed the main burden. The Kazakh party in the initiative group is smallest in number but most impressive: the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of Kazakhstan to the RF, Mr. Mansurov, is mentioned first in the list of three people.

Discussed at yesterday's meeting was the draft wording of the question for citizens—"Do you want Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to reunite into a single economic, political, and defense union based on the cultural-historical legacy of the peoples," well as certain technical and legal features and obstacles of conducting a campaign to collect signatures to hold the referendums.

The chairman of the People's Movement of Belorussia [NDB], Sergey Gaydukevich, made the proposal that in each particular state, the "question" must be worded in a particular way taking into account the laws in effect in that state. In Belorussia, before the Supreme Soviet and the president give the "go-ahead" to hold a referendum, a procedure has been envisioned for checking the "question for compliance with the constitution." This is done by Tsentrizbirkom [Central Electoral Commission], which determines whether to allow signatures to be collected. Thus, last year's attempt by the NDB to collect signatures for a referendum on denouncing the Belovezhskiy Agreements was a fiasco since the wording of the question was declared "unconstitutional."

In Ukraine the referendum cannot take place at all for the simple reason that the Ukrainian constitution, according to the leader of the "Civic Congress" party, Aleksandr Bazilyuk, permits a nationwide poll only under "three nominations": the resignation of the president, the disbanding of the Supreme Soviet, and repeal of the constitution. So the Ukrainian "integrators" will have to give the results of the poll the form of an appeal to the Supreme Soviet and afterward put public pressure on the legislature; under the effect of that pressure, as Mr. Bazilyuk assumes, the Ukrainian deputies, despite "Rukh-Ukrainian separatist" sentiments, will probably begin to move along the "4 Plus All' action track.

Kazakhstan, whose president has already made "integration" proposals more than once, has its own problems: there is no law on a referendum there. So the Kazakh advocates of the initiative will first have to collect signatures demanding that such a law be adopted.

In Russia there are no legal obstacles to collecting signatures, and the former law of the RSFSR on referendums has not been formally repealed. Nonetheless, the possibility of a nationwide poll will become real only after the adoption of a new law, the first readings of which have already been held in the State Duma.

In short, after telling one another "what ails whom," puzzling over the problem of coordinating actions in conditions of differing legislative principles, and especially making up their minds to seek material-financial reinforcement of the action conceived, the participants in the first meeting returned to their own states having decided to meet again in May and continue the discussions.

*MFA Consultative Council of Federation Subjects Meets

*Report on First Session

954Q0147A Moscow DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK in Russian No 1, Jan 95 [Signed to press 23 Jan 95] pp 58-59

[Report on the first meeting of the RF MFA [Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Consultative Council of Russian Federation Subjects on International and Foreign Economic Relations, held on 15 December 1994 in Moscow: "International and Foreign Economic Relations of Subjects of the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first meeting of the RF MFA Consultative Council of Russian Federation Subjects on International and Foreign Economic Relations was held on 15 December 1994 in Moscow.

The council was created for the purpose of developing the mechanism of coordinating foreign relations of Federation subjects in the interests of ensuring a unified political line of the Russian state in relations with foreign countries and international organizations.

All 89 Federation subjects expressed willingness to participate in the work of the Consultative Council. Among the council members were: The head of administration of Ryazan Oblast, the chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Chuvash Republic, the Vice President of Tatarstan, deputy chairmen of governments and foreign relations ministers of republics, deputy heads of oblast and kray administrations, heads of foreign relations administrations, and heads of representations of Federation subjects in Moscow.

Representatives of 74 Federation subjects participated in the work of the first session of the council. First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic R. Chimayev was present in the capacity of observer. Officials of the Administration of the Russian Federation President, the government apparatus, the federal organs of executive power, and deputies of the Federation Council and the State Duma were presented. First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia I. S. Ivanov was appointed chairman of the Consultative Council.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia A. V. Kozyrev spoke at the Consultative Council session. In his speech, he placed the emphasis on the formation of a system of federalism in Russia as a contemporary model of state arrangement which corresponds in the greatest degree with the requirements of building a democratic legal state with consideration for the specific interests of the various regions of Russia. In this context, he touched upon questions of development of international and foreign economic ties of subjects of the Federation, their coordination, as well as provision of aid to them on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In accordance with the agenda, the primary goals and tasks of the Consultative Council were discussed, as well as the legal aspects of international and foreign economic relations of Federation subjects, and there was an exchange of opinions on the practice of their implementation. Questions of the activity of representations of the MFA of Russia in subjects of the Federation were examined. First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Council Chairman I. S. Ivanov presented a report on the primary directions of the Consultative Council's work. Reports were also presented by Director of the Department on Relations with Federation Subjects, Parliament and Social-Political Organizations A. V. Blokhin, Director of the Consular Service Department V. V. Vinogradov, and First Deputy Director of the Legal Department Ya. P. Ostrovskiy.

The meeting of the Consultative Council took place in a business-like and constructive atmosphere. All the speakers in the debates unanimously supported the initiative of creating the council, and noted its importance and current nature, especially for the current conditions of Russia, when there is an ongoing process of formulation of new, truly federative relations. There was a frank and interesting discussion regarding the forms of interaction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and subjects of the Federation in the international sphere, and their participation in the implementation of a unified foreign policy course of Russia. The members of the Consultative Council were unanimous in their opinion that the council meetings should be held on specific questions. It cannot be turned into an arena for political discussions.

Based on the results of the first meeting of the Consultative Council, the decision was adopted to develop a specific plan of measures, which includes the discussion and introduction of coordinated proposals to the Government of the Russian Federation on the preparation of federal draft laws regulating international and foreign economic relations of Federation subjects, participation in the development of a conception of border cooperation of the regions, and development of forms and methods of promulgating the experience of interaction of the two levels of power in the implementation of international relations.

The practice of involving Federation subjects in international negotiations conducted by Russia on matters concerning them, as well as in preparation of draft treaties and agreements, will be expanded. There are also plans to expand the training and advanced training of workers of the regional services engaged in questions of international and foreign economic relations. At the present time, as I. S. Ivanov noted in his report, by recommendation of the executive organs of power of Federation subjects, 19 students are studying at MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of International Relations], and 38 auditors at the Diplomatic Academy of the RF MFA.

Among the first priority tasks noted at the council meeting was the need for organization of a systematic mutual exchange of information. For this purpose, the decision was made to arrange for the issuance of a special information bulletin, which aside from publicizing the meetings of the Consultative Council would regularly inform the Federation subjects about vital foreign policy questions, and generalize and disseminate positive experience of the regions in this field.

As necessary, representatives of other federal ministries and departments will be involved in the work of the Consultative Council. Specifically, it was proposed that interaction be established with the Coordinating Council of the MFER [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] of Russia.

The first meeting of the Consultative Council became an important step toward creating a reliable mechanism of interaction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the regions, and establishing a rational and clear delineation of the powers and competencies in the international sphere between the Federation and its subjects. The primary tonality of the council meeting was the desire of all of its participants to strengthen the unity of the multi-national Russian Federation, and to aid in every possible way in increasing the international authority of Russia and the effectiveness of its implemented foreign policy course.

Presented below are the introductory speech given by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. V. Kozyrev, the speech of First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs I. S. Ivanov, and the Statute on the Consultative Council of Russian Federation Subjects on International and Foreign Economic Relations under the MFA of Russia.

The speeches of meeting participants and the concluding speech of I. S. Ivanov will be published in the next issue of DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK.

*Kozyrev Speech

954Q0147B Moscow DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK in Russian No 1, Jan 95 [Signed to press 23 Jan 95] pp 59-60

[Introductory speech of Chairman A. V. Kozyrev, presented at the first meeting of the RF MFA Consultative Council of Federation Subjects on International and Foreign Economic Relations, held on 15 December 1994 in Moscow]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Honorable colleagues! I am pleased to greet the participants of the first meeting of the Consultative Council of Russian Federation Subjects on International and Foreign Economic Relations under the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of Russia.

We have been long in coming toward this event. The subjects of our Federation may much more actively participate in the formulation of Russian foreign policy, so that it will be perceived by them as their own, so that it will more greatly reflect the economic, cultural, and purely human interests of residents of specific regions. Moreover, we must help the Federation subjects themselves in implementing the constitutionally provided right of establishing direct relations with foreign partners. In this respect, we have accumulated definite experience. Unfortunately, there is some negative experience, but there is also rather sizeable positive experience on which we can rely and which we can develop.

In the Russian Federation there is an understanding that it is necessary to stop the inertia of disintegration which has arisen after the destruction of the totalitarian model of the state, to start the process of consolidation of Russian statehood and the strengthening of constitutional law and order over the entire territory of the country. I am sure that this corresponds to the interests of every region. We are all citizens of Russia, we all have equal rights, and primarily the right to life and security. The state must ensure these rights, even if it is necessary to use force to disarm gang formations, be it in Lyubertsy or in some other region of Russia, and then to resolve all the questions by political means. No state has any other choice. All the disputed questions between the center and the republics, between the Federation subjects and the state as a whole or between each other, the Federation subjects can and must resolve by peaceful means on the basis of the Constitution, on the basis of the Federative Treaty.

The Consultative Council of Russian Federation Subjects on International and Foreign Economic Relations was created with the full approval of President of the Russian Federation B. N. Yeltsin. The purpose of creating the council was to develop the mechanism of interaction of the regions, establishing rational and clear delineations of powers and competencies in the international sphere between the Federation and its subjects, and increasing the effectiveness of international and foreign economic activity of Russia as a whole.

The Russian Federation is comprised of subjects, and this means that the foreign policy of Russia must also be the foreign policy of each region and at the same time the integral, summarized policy of the Federation—that is, all the regions taken together. We have outstanding experience in interaction with regions, say, in the Far East. There has never yet been a case where the president, the minister of foreign affairs or other leaders of the country set off for China, Japan or Korea without consulting with the appropriate regions. Not a single question is resolved today without the participation of representatives of Federation subjects. This is true also of the northwest, as well as the other regions adjoining the boundaries of Russia. Recently the president visited Pskov Oblast, which was not a random choice. Pskov Oblast is a typical example of a region which previously was located in the heartland of the country and which today has become a border area. We have extensive boundaries with Ukraine, and there are many problems there. The situation in the Northern Caucasus is even more serious. I believe that this question deserves close attention. We must develop a conception of border cooperation, including a draft law on the status of a border kray, oblast or republic within the make-up of the Russian Federation. This really is a large field for our interaction.

Finally, economic interests. I know that the majority of those present have questions on the specific development of the border. These questions are easier to resolve by relying on the powerful Russian state. I believe that the illusions to the effect that it is enough to proclaim sovereignty, and all questions will resolve themselves, have faded into the past. In fact, integration ties and historical priorities remain. The process of collection and the process of integration is presently going on also in the CIS on a new basis. Undoubtedly, no one intends to infringe upon the sovereignty of the CIS countries, but economic questions, of course, are more easily solved in an economic union with Russia. As concerns the Russian Federation, here practical experience convinces us that any region, when it acts in reliance on the entire strengt of the Russian state—political, economic, military, etc.—has qualitatively different capacities for solving its problems.

And the last thing which I would like to point out. Unfortunately, we receive information not only on the difficulties associated with the central bureaucracy. I must say that I, as a deputy from Murmansk Oblast, am familiar with these problems. In an hour I am flying back to my constituents in Murmansk, and I know how difficult it is to cut through the bureaucratic tape from there—this is a big problem. But I must say that even in the regions themselves, it is also necessary to develop interaction with the international community. Here is a fresh example. At the decision of the central and local organs, UN experts were called in to evaluate the ecological damage caused by the rupture of the oil pipeline near the city of Usinsk in the Republic of Komi. But, to this day, they have not been able to get permission from the republic's government for access to the accident site. As a result, the UN placed responsibility on the Russian side, and now our country will have to assume the expenditures of paying for the expert assistance.

Taking your wishes into consideration, the Consultative Council Secretariat will prepare a draft agenda for the second meeting and will develop a plan of measures which includes the discussion and submission of coordinated proposals to the Russian Federation Government on preparation of federal draft laws on questions of delineation of powers and authorities between the Russian Federation and its subjects in the sphere of international foreign economic relations; the development of recommendations for improving the system and structures of administration of the international and foreign economic activity of the regions; the development of forms and methods of promulgating the experience of interaction of the two levels of power in the implementation of international relations, and the utilization of international experience in coordination of foreign relations of the regions, along with other questions.

*Speech by Council Chairman Ivanov

954Q0147C Moscow DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK in Russian No 1, Jan 95 [Signed to press 23 Jan 95] pp 60-62

[Speech by I. S. Ivanov, chairman of the Consultative Council of Federation Subjects on International and Foreign Economic Relations, presented at its first meeting on 15 December 1994 in Moscow]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today's meeting is an extraordinary event for us. It signifies the beginning of activity of a new agency—the Consultative Council of Russian Federation Subjects under the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of Russia. The initiative of creating the council came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and received the full support of the President of the Russian Federation. We are deeply gratified by the fact that the idea of creating the council was met with interest by the Federation subjects themselves. The high level of representation at today's meeting is clear evidence of this fact. On behalf of the ministry leadership, I would like to welcome all the representatives of our regions and federal state structures who are participating today in the work of our meeting.

What did our ministry use as a guideline in speaking out with such an initiative?

First of all, we proceeded from the fact that the problem of interrelations of federal organs of power and subjects of the Federation, the clear definition and delineation of their competencies, including in the sphere of international and foreign economic relations—is one of the most current and crucial problems in the overall endeavor of building Russia as a unified, independent, democratic and legal state.

At the same time, we clearly recognize how difficult this task is and what great effort, patience and persistence are required in order to continuously progress toward the set goal. There are more than enough objective difficulties along this path, and the representatives of the republics, krays, oblasts and cities which are subjects of the Russian Federation know about this very well. There are, however, difficulties of a subjective character as well, which we encounter practically everywhere and on an everyday basis. The uniqueness of Russian experience in democratic transformations consists of the fact that it is necessary to simultaneously implement radical reforms in practically all spheres of life, with very little time allocated for this task.

The formulation of federalism in many countries of the world occurred over a period of decades, and sometimes even centuries. We, however, must begin with a clean slate on many things and travel this most complex path in just a few years. Under these conditions, it is unlikely that anyone may aspire to the truth in the final instance. The painstaking joint effort of all the interested parties is required. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs feels the need for expanding such constructive dialog with the subjects of the Federation, for the joint development of a stable mechanism of mutual communication for preparing proposals on questions entering into its sphere of competency, as well as for the solution of practical problems. We believe that such interaction corresponds also to the interests of the Federation subjects. Specific questions arise every day: Solutions are needed which correspond to the specific interests of the Federation subjects, as well as to the goals of implementing a unified foreign political line of Russia. Especially since the international relations of the regions, their foreign economic activity, are developing at an increasingly rapid rate. This is quite regular, since it is evoked by objective necessity. We are proceeding from the fact that the expansion of foreign relations of the Federation subjects, provided, of course, that they are implemented within constitutional guidelines, ultimately corresponds to the interests of the regions themselves and those of the Russian state as a whole, as well as the cause of strengthening international stability. In recent years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has accumulated definite experience in work with Federation subjects in the sphere of international relations. This work was built along the following basic directions:

—determination of the overall spectrum of foreign policy interests of the Federation subjects, consideration of these interests in the development of the conception of Russian foreign policy, as well as in the practical activity of Russian diplomacy;

—provision of coordinated actions of the federal authorities and the Federation subjects in the matter of implementing international treaties and agreements concluded by the Russian Federation; seeing that international and foreign economic relatons of Federation subjects were implemented strictly within the channel of the general foreign policy line of Russia and its international obligations;

—analysis and generalization of world experience in the sphere of foreign relations at the regional level; creation of conditions which would enable subjects of the Russian Federation to familiarize themselves with this experience and to take it into consideration in their own activity;

—informing the Federation subjects about the most important international actions planned and implemented at the federal level; their orientation on the most important problems of the world situation;

—finally, provision of assistance in training of qualified specialists in various spheres of foreign relations for the regions, including with the application of the ministry's system of higher professional education.

These are the main directions. It is true, we should self-critically admit that work is not being performed effectively enough on all of the above-mentioned directions. For example, we believe that more effort should be directed toward informational work and, I believe, we will try to correct the situation here.

Nevertheless, on the whole we may say that a certain interaction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the subjects of the Russian Federation already exists, and that, where it is successfully developing, it is giving fairly good results. As an example, we may cite even our recent contacts with Yakutiya, Krasnodar Kray, Moscow and Leningrad Oblasts, as well as other regions.

This year alone, we implemented such interesting and useful measures as Russian-Canadian seminars on problems of international and foreign economic relations of Federation subjects for the regions of the central oblasts of Russia (October, Moscow Oblast), for the regions of the Northwest (October, Leningrad Oblast), for the regions of the Far East (December, city of Khabarovsk), as well as a Russian-German seminar on the same topic for the regions of Siberia and the Far North (October, city of Yakutsk). An entire series of such measures is planned.

A program for joint action with the Council of Europe has been developed in this sphere.

At the end of last month, the meeting of the RF MFA Collegium specifically discussed the question of the ministry's activity in providing assistance to Russian regions in utilizing international potential for solving the problems which are facing them.

The collegium's review of the experience of cooperation within the boundaries of the Barents region, as the most dynamically developing region, showed that there is considerable positive potential here for interaction of the MFA of Russia with Russian Federation subjects. This concerns not only the application of experience of cooperation in the Barents region for participation of Russian federal and regional structures in other organizations of this type, but also for involving structures of the UN, the European Union, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, etc. in the projects of regional cooperation, utilizing MFA capacities.

The materials which we have prepared for the participants of today's meeting contain a report on cooperation in the Barents region. Obviously, these same problems are of interest also for other regions of Russia. I believe, if such is your wish, the Council could discuss these problems, including also on the basis of positive experience of cooperation in the Barents region, in greater detail at one of its subsequent meetings.

Practically all the subdivisions of our ministry, functional as well as territorial, participate in the realization of this complex and rather voluminous work. The coordinating role belongs to the Department on Relations with Federation Subjects, Parliament and Socio-Political Organizations, which was especially created for this purpose. Our representations within the subjects of the Federation fulfill an important role. The decision was made to open 40 such representations. Today there are 16 representations and two branches in operation, and another 18 representations and one branch are in the stage of formulation. Considering the fact that we will probably not be able to open such representations in all the subjects of the Federation, and perhaps this is not even required, we should evidently think about having some of them cover several regions in their activity. Such experience has become quite widespread in international practice. I would like to especially stress that our ministry gives first priority importance to the question of training cadres for the appropriate structures of subjects of the Federation. At the present time, at the recommendation of the organs of executive power of regions of the Russian Federation, there are 19 students studying at the Institute of International Relations, and 38 auditors in our Diplomatic Academy. We not only do not feel a false sense of jealousy in regard to the diplomatic cadres of the Federation subjects, but, on the contrary, are interested in seeing that such training is conducted on a planned basis. The higher professional level we all have, the easier it will be for us to solve problems, and the more readily we will find mutual understanding. The current initiative of creating the Consultative Council of Russian Federation Subjects also lies within the channel of general approaches by the ministry to the problems of interaction with the regions. I would first of all like to stress that this council, according to the plans of its initiators, in no way has the goal of trying to somehow regulate the foreign relations of Federation subjects, of introducing a new level of control over these relations, or of establishing additional patronage. The position of the MFA of Russia consists of further strictly adhering to the sphere of its competency, of acting within the guidelines which were defined by the statutes of the Russian Federation Constitution and the effective legislation. The primary task of the Consultative Council is seen in ensuring the coordinated functioning and interaction of the organs of state power of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation on questions of coordinating international and foreign economic relations of the Federation subjects. It is specifically on the MFA of Russia, as we know, that the RF President has placed the functions of coordination and control for provision of a unified political line of the Russian Federation in relations with foreign states. I would like to immediately stipulate that our council will deal with foreign economic relations exclusively within the limits of its competency. We proceed from the fact that the basic part of practical questions in this sphere will be reviewed at the Coordinating Council on Foreign Economic Relations which has been created under the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of Russia. I am convinced that, between our two councils, we will be able to regulate interaction in the interests of the cause in such a way that will be convenient for the subjects of the Federation. All the participants of our meeting have in their hands the statute on the Consultative Council, which defines the primary directions, as well as the procedure of its operation.

The Consultative Council, in our opinion must, on one hand, facilitate the strengthening of working contacts between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other state structures directly engaging in problems of the federal arrangement of Russia with the regions, with their executive authorities. On the other hand, the Consultative Council could also become an additional channel for including the subjects of the Federation in formulation of the course of the foreign policy of Russia and its positions on vital international problems. We are referring specifically to the fact that the representatives of the regions will express their opinions and wishes on various aspects of Russian foreign policy at the council meetings. These expressions, obviously, will be carefully analyzed, reported to the leadership of the ministry, and duly considered in our practical work. At the same time, it is obvious that no statute can encompass that multiplicity of problems which is dictated by life. Therefore, we are very much counting on the fact that the council will become a place for truly interested and informal exchange of opinions on questions which are of interest to all of us. And, as we all know very well, there is a great multitude of such questions. After all, there are entire strata of our life which for various reasons have been pushed into the background. Our very rich multinational culture. Should we not mutually think about how to open international expanses before it? For example, our institutions abroad are ready to actively include themselves in this work. The council meetings must also become a place for exchange of experience. After all, many Federation subjects have already travelled a certain path, along which there were successes as well as failures. The study of this experience, of course, would increase the effectiveness of our work. We propose holding the council meetings no less than once every 6 months. However, nothing hinders us from meeting more often, if such a need should arise.

The main thing for us is not quantity, but quality. We really want such meetings to enrich us with new ideas and thoughts, to give us the correct reference points. Therefore, a convincing request is not stifled, and when we deserve it—criticize us, focus attention on our errors. In the course of practical work in this direction, we have become convinced that numerous miscalculations and errors occur not because of ill intent, but due to the lack of experience, necessary information, or proper coordination between various organs of state and federal power. In conclusion, I would like to thank the participants of the first meeting of the Consultative Council for the lively interest which they have exhibited in responding to our invitation. We are now at the very beginning of our path, and it depends entirely on us, whether this initiative will become another bureaucratic measure, or whether it will become a useful undertaking in the process of developing the constitutional structure of our state on a democratic federal basis. This is specifically what we want, this kind of work.

*Text of Council Statute

954Q0147D Moscow DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK in Russian No 1, Jan 95 [Signed to press 23 Jan 95] pp 62-63

[Text of statute: "On the Consultative Council of Russian Federation Subjects on International and Foreign Economic Relations Under the MFA of Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

I. General principles

1.1. The Consultative Council of Russian Federation Subjects on International and Foreign Economic Relations under the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of Russia is created for purposes of developing the mechanism of coordination of international and foreign economic relations of subjects of the Russian Federation in the interests of ensuring a unified political line of the Russian state in relations with foreign countries and international organizations.

The primary task of the Consultative Council is to provide consultative, informational and methodological assistance to subjects of the Russian Federation in their development of international and foreign economic relations.

1.2. The Consultative Council is guided in its work by Articles 71 and 72 of the Russian Federation Constitution, which define the subjects of administration of federal organs of power and organs of power of subjects of the Federation; by the directive of the President of the Russian Federation dated 8 November 1992, "On Provision of a Unified Political Line of the Russian Federation in International Relations;" by Russian legislation, as well as by the present statute.

1.3. The work of the Consultative Council is performed in accordance with the following basic directions:

—expert evaluation of drafts of standards documents regulating international and foreign economic relations of Federation subjects;

—development of recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of international and foreign economic relations of subjects of the Federation;

—informing the administrative organs of Federation subjects on basic directions of Russian foreign policy and on the international situation as a whole, as well as on questions of international activity which directly affect the interests of the Russian regions;

—familiarization of the MFA of Russia with the course of development of international and foreign economic relations of Federation subjects;

—systematization, generalization and dissemination of positive experience in the interaction of regional and federal organs of power in the sphere of international and foreign economic relations;

—participation in planning and conducting conferences, meetings and seminars on problems of federalism, including on questions of interaction of federal organs of power and organs of power of Federation subjects in implementing international relations;

—development of recommendations on improving the system of training, re-training and advanced training of cadres of ministries and departments of Federation subjects engaging in questions of international relations.

II. Procedure of formation and work of the Consultative Council

2.1. The work of the Consultative Council is managed by its chairman—the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia.

2.2. The personnel complement of the Consultative Council is formed by recommendation of the appropriate subjects of the Federation. A head of executive power of a Federation subject, his deputy, a minister (head of administration) of foreign relations, as well as representatives of subjects of the Federation in Moscow (one representative from each Federation subject) may represent a region in the Consultative Council.

2.3. The work of the Consultative Council is carried out by plans, ratified by its chairman.

The agenda of the Consultative Council meeting is formulated at the suggestion of its members and the secretariat.

Meetings of the Consultative Council are held as needed, but no less than once every 6 months.

2.4. In the inter-session period, the permanent executive organ of the Consultative Council is the Consultative Council Secretariat.

The secretariat performs preparation for meetings of the Consultative Council, conducts the necessary day-to-day activity, ensures control over fulfillment of the Consultative Council's decisions, and also informs the chairman and the members of the Consultative Council as to the course of their realization.

The functions of the Consultative Council Secretariat are carried out by the Department on Relations With Federation Subjects, Parliament and Socio-Political Organizations, which is charged with the tasks of coordinating international relations of Federation subjects.

2.5. Organizational-technical provision of the Consultative Council's activity is placed upon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the administrations of Federation subjects included in the Consultative Council, with consideration for specific conditions and the place of conducting meetings of the Consultative Council, its work groups and secretariat.

2.6. Representatives of other federal ministries and departments, as well as representatives of other governmental and non-governmental organizations, may be called upon to participate in the work of the Consultative Council.

*RF Accession to Berne International Convention Noted

954F1751A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by R. Armeyev: "Russia Commits To Protect Copyrights"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since March 13, 1995 Russia has been a member of the Berne Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works. We asked the chief of contracts and legal management within the Russian Authors Society (RAO), A. Turkin, to comment on the event.

—As I recall, the convention was adopted September 9, 1886, - said Arkadiy Vasilyevich. - Since that time, of course, it has been amended and refined more than once. Today it encompasses approximately 110 states on the planet. Without a doubt, a participating state in the convention bears all the features of a civilized state, as the given international agreement not only provides for the joint protection of copyrights, but sets forth certain obligations regarding changing and improving national legislation on copyrights. In the convention itself there are specific norms that are supposed to be introduced into national legislation. On the eve of joining the convention Russia had already done this. The new law on authors' and related rights adopted in our country July 9, 1993, which went into effect August 3 the same year, completely satisfies the requirements of the Berne Convention. At one time this law was sent for expert review to the World Intellectual Property Organization, and received its approval.

What has changed for Russian authors - writers, composers, cinematographers, artists, and other people of the creative arts -since March 13? Most importantly, the number of states in which their copyrights will be protected has increased by nearly 30. Among the latter are Rumania, Turkey, YuAR [Republic of South Africa], and Egypt... Before joining the Berne Convention, Russia was a member of the Universal Copyrights Convention (since May 27, 1973), but the body of participants in "the Berne" is broader. It goes without saying, the rights of authors of "new states" shall be strictly observed also by Russia.

An important detail: Entry into the Berne Convention for Russia does not have retroactive force (the U.S. was accepted into the "concord" several years ago on the same conditions). This signifies that the rights only of those author-citizens from "new states" whose works were first published March 13, 1995 and later will be protected. As concerns citizens of states that are members in the Universal Copyright Convention, nothing has changed: those works which were first published abroad after May 27, 1973 remain protected.

Unfortunately, the official materials that are so needed in practice have been somewhat delayed. We expect that the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] will publish an official text of the Berne Convention and give a full list of countries that have entered into the latter. We also anticipate that state bodies connected with the use of copyright protected works, and in particular the Roskompechat [Russian Federation Committee on Press], will publish their own official interpretations so to put an end to various rumors and gossip.

*Turkey Accused on Domestic Repression, External Expansionism

954Q0160A Moscow EKHO PLANETY in Russian No 9, Feb-Mar 95 (signed to press 22 Feb 95) pp 5-8

[Article by Aleksey Yerovchenkov, Nicosia, and Ivan Ivanov, Moscow: "Turkish Spurt to the North"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] **Two events—one that occurred in Paris, and the other in Istanbul—have greatly disturbed the Turks. Moreover, by the will of chance, they coincided in time. In the Elysees Palace Francois Mitterand received the very well-known Turkish writer Yashar Kemal, in order to show proper respect for his talent. In Istanbul on the same day, official agents began urgently withdrawing from sale a book that had already managed to become popular, "Freedom of Thought in Turkey," which is a collection of articles by more than two dozen famous cultural figures, including Yashar Kemal.** [passage omitted]

"Suffice it to recall Germany. The Hitlerites committed atrocities. But people to this day have not yet cleaned their conscience, have not recovered from the universal tragedy... And if there had not been millions who rose up against Hitler, if there had not been writers with their burned books, or cultural figures, mankind would not have been spared from the catastrophe. If there had not been any Thomas Mann, Heinrich Mann, Stefan Zweig, Brecht, or Erich Maria Remarque, who rose up against Hitler, the Germans today would not be walking around with their heads held proudly high.

"But to this day, deep down in their hearts, they are ashamed of the terrible things and the nightmare that they experienced. And I shall repeat for a thousand times: the Turkish-Kurdish war is senseless. If, however, there is a reason for this war, it is the racism that is devouring everything that is human in man."

Judgments concerning the annihilation of the Kurdish nation cost the writer dearly. On the eve of the publication of his book, Yashar Kemal submitted an outline of an article to the German magazine SPIEGEL. The Istanbul state security court immediately summoned him to give depositions and initiated a case accusing him of "separatism.:" In the language of Turkish criminal law, that means that the authorities were intending to imprison Kemal for a period of from two to five years. However, the threats did not break the writer, and after the conversation in court, he stated, "My conscience is clean. No one will ever be able to reproach me. Rather, in time the judges will be in the defendant's seat themselves."

If one judges from the response in the press, the supporters of a democratic course do not like the drumhead justice against the writer or the banning of his book. In an article entitled "Shame," the well-known writer and social-affairs commentator Zeynep Oral writes: "That which has occurred with the book 'Freedom of Thought in Turkey attests that the state cannot even see those words right next to it...

"The court's actions mean that our writers and their thoughts are Turkey's main enemies. The things that the authorities fear are not weapons, bombs, fires, or rivers of blood, but free-thinkers. It is not racism, fascism, or extremism that are so terrifying, but thinking writers... In our country Nazym Khikmet has been gagged for years. But he has become the most beloved poet." [passage omitted].

Turkish journalists complain that for decades they have been tired of writing about how Europe is constantly kicking Ankara because of the very crude, monstrous violations of human rights. Certainly the authors of "Freedom of Thought in Turkey" are also tired of expending ink on this subject. But their conscience does not give them any rest.

Meanwhile, in the Turkish provinces that are populated by Kurds, war is raging. During the past three years alone, according to information from Kurdish human-rights organizations, more than 2500 villages have been destroyed as a result of actions by the Turkish Army, and 5 million persons have become refugees on their own land.

The events that are occurring in Turkey are yet another reason for directing more careful attention to other important topics that are linked with our former southern neighbor. The collapse of the Union sharply increased the geopolitical importance of the Turkish state. In the rather amorphous CIS, and especially on its southern flank, official Ankara is persistently and purposefully seeking "true brothers," and is attempting to increase its own role sharply, by taking advantage of the confusion that reigns.

According to a diplomat who worked for a long time in Ankara and who requested that his name not be mentioned, in the awareness of Turkey's political establishment one senses with increasing clarity nuances of a great-power mentality. Obviously, the recollections of the power of the Ottoman Empire, which used to extend to Asia, Africa, and even to Europe, give no rest to many politicians and have currently splashed to the surface. An increasingly large number of political analysts are agreeing in the opinion that what has become Ankara's goal is the creation, on the fragments of the former USSR and partially Yugoslavia, of some kind of pan-Turkic-Moslem political-economic formation, the dominating role in which would belong to Turkey.

As a result, Turkish policy in Central Asia, the trans-Caucasus, and even in the Northern Caucasus is becoming increasingly offensive and even aggressive. Ankara would like very much—and this is not greatly concealed—to command the "Turkic" republics that used to be part of the Union. Tremendous amounts of money are being appropriated for these purposes, Turkish companies have rushed into Central Asia and the trans-Caucasus, and television and radio broadcasts are being directed with increasing intensity at Russia's "soft underbelly." Incidentally, much has already been written about this, including in our magazine.

To a large extent these reasons also explain the at least strange reaction, in a country that is annihilating its own Kurdish minority, to the events in Chechnya. A senseless war is actually in progress there. But this can scarcely justify the behavior of Ankara, which issued an entry visa and received the "minister of foreign affairs" the Dudayev criminal regime.

Turkey announced, through its minister of foreign affairs, that the conflict in Chechnya "is no longer an internal affair of Russia." One wonders how Ankara would react if Russia were to receive officially, say, Kurdish Workers Party leader Abdullakh Odzhalan.

Against that background one somehow puts little faith in the sincerity of Ankara's unrest and its attempt, in connection with violations of human rights, to appear as protectors of the interests of the peoples of the North Caucasus. Involuntarily one recalls the past: General Yermolov used to complain that what he had to fight against was not so much the freedom-loving mountaineers, as the Turkish intrigues and dirty tricks.

Doubts also arise about whether Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and certain Central Asian countries that are seeking a way out to the international market with their oil and gas are not making a mistake by using Turkish routes. It is understandable that, for Turkey, a country that is poor in natural resources, plans for creating oil and gas pipelines promise a shower of gold. But those pipelines, which are supposed to operate like a good Swiss watch, will run practically through regions where the war against the Kurds is in progress.

In the opinion of Akhmad Dere, representative of the Kurdistan National Liberation Front (FNOK) to the CIS, the position of those who want to run an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean ports by way of the Kurdish regions appears, to put it mildly, strange. That oil pipeline,, he remarks, "occupies an important place in Ankara's pan-Turkic plans." "The Kurdish leadership has repeatedly stated, and continues to state, that it has enough manpower and means to hinder any operations in Kurdistan that are being carried out with a consideration of the national interests of the true owners of that land." In that instance, what discussion can there be about the safety of transporting energy carriers? Although, of course, sovereign countries have the right to make decisions themselves on matters that pertain to their future.

It would seem that the interests of Russia and Turkey are coming into sharper and sharper conflict. In this context one cannot fail to say a few words also about questions of military security. In late February in the Turkish province of Kars, in direct proximity to the borders of Russia and the entire Caucasus region, the Turkish Army (and that country is a NATO member) is beginning extensive "winter" maneuvers. According to information in the same MILLIET, the last time that military games like this were planned was for February 1993, but at that time they were canceled, because, in the words of Turkish strategists, "the Russian threat has noticeably decreased." However, at the present time, the Turkish general staff has changed its approaches and considers "northern exercises" to be extremely important.

The 3rd Field Army and the 2nd Tactical Air Command will participate in the February maneuvers. The basic combat tasks are being assigned to the command element of the 9th Motorized Infantry Division.

In the course of the maneuvers there will be an inspection of the "combat readiness and effectiveness of the actions of Turkish enlisted men and officers under winter conditions." There will be nighttime practice flights by F-16 and F-4 fighter aircraft that are based at the Erzurum and Malatya airfields.

Turkish generals, MILLIET writes, are redeveloping their military strategy after, in their opinion, "the hypotheses relative to the reduction of the Russian threat failed to be justified." Ankara is sharply raising the question as a result of the development of events in the North Caucasus.

For some reason one of the purposes of the maneuvers that are beginning, the newspaper continues, is "a demonstration of force, and the deterrence of the enemy." The Turkish general staff feels that the northeastern borders of Turkey that are adjacent to Russia "are in danger again."

Well, real life is not always pleasant. So when building normal partnership relations with our dynamic southern border, nevertheless, it is necessary to see and understand the new realities that are developing before our eyes.

*Foreign Economic Relations Chief on Export Dynamics

954F1836A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 17 Mar 95 p 9

[Article by Igor Konstantinovich Ilingin, deputy chief of the MFER [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] of Russia Main Economic Administration: "Russian Export Will Grow Some More. But Only a Little"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The volumes of Russian export in the past two years have steadily increased, and this year may quite probably approach the indicators for 1991—the most successful year for the Russian Federation on this indicator.

Among the main factors which exert an influence on the growth of export, we may isolate two—liberalization of foreign economic activity and a significant reduction in domestic demand. In the sphere of liberalization, the latest redoubts of administrative regulation have fallen after the issuance of the March presidential edict which, specifically, repealed the institution of special exporters, but which cannot have significant effect on the overall picture. A further reduction in domestic demand, of course, is possible. However, if it is significant, in all probability, the question will become one of survival in general, and not of the development of export potential.

If, however, the economy begins to develop, then the supply available for export will naturally decline, and the question of obtaining currenty—for import, for modernization of the industrial base, for payment of foreign debts—will once again become an extremely current one.

But currency for these purposes must be earned, and not simply borrowed. And until we undertake this task, we will be up to our ears in debt. There is the prospect of this.

At the same time, the problems of development of Russian export should also be viewed from the standpoint of general tendencies of development of international economic relations, continued integration of the country into world economic relations, and the task of economic reform implemented by means of structural reorganization of the economy.

First of all, we should note that practically all countries strive toward development of their export, no matter how favorable the situation in this sphere may appear.

This is determined by the fact that export:

—creates additional jobs;

—provides an influx of currency necessary for import purchases;

—directly defines the state of the country's balance of payments and formulates (supports) the exchange rate of the national monetary unit;

—makes it possible to increase the effectiveness of domestic production through advantages which international division of labor provide, as well as the quality of national goods due to competition on the international markets.

The data on the relative share of export in the gross domestic product (Table 1) testify primarily to the export orientation of the economy, since the degree of the country's involvement in the system of international division of labor is characterized to a large degree by absolute indicators.

Table 1. Relative share of export in the GDP [gross domestic produst] by countries (1993, in percent)

Norway (for 10 months of 1994)	63.6
Netherlands	52.3
Germany	36.4
Republic of Korea	29.4
Canada	29.3
Hungary	27.3
Poland	23.1
France	22.6
Australia	18.7
China	16.7
USA	10.4
Brazil	9.7
India	9.2
Russia (GDP)	13.7

For a long period of time, most of the countries have exhibited a steady growth in the relative share of export in the GNP [gross national product].

The quantitative indicators used in the present article were prepared according to the statistical data of international organizations and the Goskomstat [State Committee on Statistics] of the Russian Federation, and with consideration of expert appraisals.

After the decline in volumes of Russian export in 1992, in the subsequent two years a steady growth was observed (Table 2).

Table 2. Export of Russia in trade with countries of the far abroad (in billions of dollars)

1991	50.9
1992	42.4
1993	44.3
1994	48.0

Growth of export was accompanied by measures of its liberalization. Thus, for 1993 the number of commodity groups subject to export duties declined from 53 to 29. The government decree adopted in July of 1994 repealed export duties on 16 types of goods and commodity groups (including sugar, a number of metals and their alloys, individual types of petroleum products and timber materials), and significantly reduced duties on fertilizers, cellulose, and unprocessed aluminum. In 1994, the volume of goods subject to quotas and licensing in the overall amount of export declined from 60 percent (in the first half of the year) to 32 percent (of those, 27.5 percent were oil and petroleum products).

An increase in export, a sharp reduction in barter operations, and increased control over the repatriation of the export earnings led to an increase in currency revenues, which served to create real prerequisites for regulating the currency-credit problems of Russia.

However, on the background of relative prosperity, objectively there are a number of problems which require special attention.

First of all, the volume of export can and must be greater.

Export in its cost expression indicates the real participation of the country in world economic relations. And although the relative share of Russian export in the GDP has increased, we have still not reached the former cost volumes. And as compared with other countries, the volume of our export is disproportionately small (Table 3).

Table 3. Volumes of export (in billions of dollars) by various countries in 1993 and amount by which they exceeded (by number of times) the export of Russia:

USA	598.3 (13.5)
Japan	569.1 (12.8)
Germany	509.1 (11.5)
France	168.4 (3.8)
Italy	154.7 (3.5)
Netherlands	146.6 (3.3)
Canada	148.4 (3.3)
Australia	53.3 (1.2)
Russia (1993)	44.3

It is true, there are still some small "internal" reserves for increasing the volumes of export. The recent presidential edict, "On Basic Principles of Implementing Foreign Trade Activity in the Russian Federation," practically removed all non-tariff limitations on export of basic goods. Quota setting now may be used only for purposes of fulfilling international obligations (steel, textiles, etc.) of Russia. Export duties still represent the main mechanism for regulating export shipments. The export tariff is not a specific Russian "invention." The export tariff is used also in other countries: In Brazil (primary articles of export—raw sugar, unprocessed leather, cocoa beans, etc.); in Poland (mineral fertilizers, foodstuffs), Turkey, China and Finland. In Russia, export duties are charged at the present time during export of vital raw material goods and arms.

Initially, the introduction of export duties was necessitated by the significant difference between domestic and world prices. Here the export quotas fulfilled the function of volume regulators. At the present time, export duties are an instrument of compensation for various conditions of functioning of enterprises in different sectors of the economy, and of redistribution of superprofits received in the raw materials sector as a result of natural monopolies. The existence of export duties is expedient until such time as the state will implement subsidization of vital provision of the raw material regions where the primary sources of the export raw material are located. Moreover, export duties (or other specific taxes) must be retained on products of the raw material sectors in which state regulation of prices is implemented. A rejection of indirect subsidies and price controls will make it possible to fully repeal export duties.

The effectiveness of export may be increased to a certain degree by means of coordinating the price policy. For example, contract prices of specialized associations of the MFER, as compared with other exporters, were higher in the first half of 1994: On oil by 4 percent; on nickel—by 11 percent; on aluminum—12 percent, and on copper—by 13 percent. In the future, this problem may be solved within the framework of the unions of exporters which are being established. At the present time, such unions have already been formed for oil, ferrous metals, lumber, mineral fertilizers and certain other goods.

The removal of discriminatory obstacles on foreign markets should also have a positive influence on increasing export. At the present time, anti-dumping procedures in the European Union alone have affected 13 types of Russian goods.

Continued cost increase of export is possible also due to the anticipated growth in world prices on certain goods.

Through these factors, in 1995 the export volumes of raw goods and materials may be increased somewhat (according to expert evaluation—on the order of 10 percent). However, for extensive development this is practically already the limit.

Secondly, the structure of Russian export bears a clearly expressed raw material character (Table 4), which does not correspond with our real capacities. Moreover, the raw material orientation is increasing.

Table 4. Relative share of raw goods and materials in export of Russia by years: (in percent)

1990	63.3
1992	76.4
1993	77.0
1994	78.8

The significant volume of raw goods and materials in export is in itself an indication of the fact that the country has the status of a so-called "raw material appendage." The question is one of optimal proportions (Table 5).

Table 5. Relative share of raw goods and materials in the export of certain countries (for 1992), in percent.

USA	20.5
Canada	39.2
Australia	68.9
India	30.8
Poland	37.9
Norway	76.7
Russia	76.4

In principle, these figures also deserve commentary, since, during summarization, oil, steel, lumber, grain, fish, chemical products, etc. were all placed in this group.

The increase in export volume in 1994 as compared with the previous year was provided primarily through the growth in physical volumes of export of basic raw material goods and materials. There were 89 million tonnes of oil supplied (growth of 11.3 percent); 39 million tonnes of petroleum products (+10.6 percent); 109 billion cubic meters of gas (+13.6 percent); 12.8 million cubic meters of round timber (+10.9 percent); 3.4 million tonnes of cast iron (+50.3 percent); 5.8 million tonnes of nitrogen fertilizers (+20.7 percent), and 2.2 million tonnes of aluminum (+3.6 percent). We should note that in the past year and a half there has been a significant growth (on the average by 2 times) of the relative share of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, fertilizers and chemical products within the overall volume of export.

Export deliveries of electrical power, iron ore, ammonia, methanol, cut lumber materials, cellulose, and non-ferrous metals are higher than their 1993 level. The relative share of the fuel-energy complex comprised 44.1 percent of all Russian export (in 1993 it was 46.2 percent).

It is an alarming fact that the relative share of semi-finished and finished products is unjustifiably small. The relative share of machines, equipment and transport means in 1994 declined as compared with 1990 (former USSR) by more than 3 times (in 1990—18.3 percent; in 1992—8.7 percent; in 1993—6.5 percent, and in 1994—5.3 percent). This was determined primarily by the continuing decline in industrial production (in 1994 the volume of industrial production declined by 21 percent as compared with 1993. Moreover, the most acute crisis was felt in the scientific-intensive, high technology sectors and in the processing industry.) Secondly, it was determined by the lack of specific purpose in the implemented structural reorganization toward creation of competitive, export-oriented types of production.

The production-technological base of our export requires immediate renovation.

In ensuring renovation, we must preserve the industrial base for creation of basic goods of production-technical function. These are products of the metallurgical, fuel-energy, and building complexes. Without this, it will be impossible to ensure the development of the domestic economy within the nearest time.

However, the change in the structure of import over recent years reflects negative tendencies in the sphere of renovation of our industry's production base. The relative share of machines, equipment and transport means in Russian import comprised 34 percent in 1994, as compared with 45 percent in 1990 (former USSR).

The products of our domestic machine building are of poor technological quality in the overwhelming number of cases. They are manufactured on outdated equipment, demand high material and labor expenditures, are of low quality, and as a result are not able to compete on foreign markets.

The basic problems consist of: Financing NIOKR [scientific-research and design development], renovating the technological base and crediting the production program for fulfillment of orders. There is no money, and the high interest rates on credits often make contract work ineffective.

The conversion enterprises of the VPK [military-industrial complex], having significant capacities in this plane, are unable to realize them for this same reason. Although the potential for positive changes objectively exists in this sphere. This is:

—a well-ordered scheme of development of leading technologies;

—the presence of a highly skilled work force.

Unfortunately, at the present stage these factors are lost. There is a "drain" of the most intellectually gifted "brains," and fundamental research and progressive scientific-intensive programs are being discontinued.

At the same time, the branched network of cities and scientific-production centers which were closed in the recent past represent a ready-made infrastructure (primarily cadre, social and administrative, and secondarily—industrial-technological) for a unique "organic conversion" of the most well-developed sector of the national economy into a large-scale sector of production of current technologies and developments (innovation-technological complex), thus making it possible to solve the strategic task of adapting the national economy to the next stage of development of the world community. The system of closed cities of the VPK could become the base for "growth points" in the creation of an innovative-technological complex.

This, undoubtedly, is a question for the future. However, if already today we do not give this the proper attention, in the future we will have to encounter more serious problems—after all, winning markets is a rather lengthy and tedious proposition.

The cardinal solution to the questions of development of Russian export and formation of its progressive structure lies primarily in the plane of state support.

The forms of such support may vary:

—direct subsidies to export types of production; various types of grants; financing the creation of the necessary infrastructure; preparation and performance of exhibits and other advertising measures abroad, etc.;

—crediting and insurance of export operations;

—protection of the domestic market through measures of tariff and anti-dumping regulations for support of national producers.

Naturally, the realization of specific individual measures also requires certain financial expenditures on the part of the state.

We must say that the need for state support of export is also not a specific "Russian way."

In 1993, Finland allocated 800.0 million Finnish marks (0.5 percent of the budget) for financing various forms of aid to export. In addition to this, another 2.3 billion Finnish marks were allocated as subsidies to domestic exporters of agricultural products. Egypt in 1993 subsidized cotton producers for export deliveries in the volume of 200 million Egyptian pounds. In Mexico, somewhere on the order of 20-30 percent of the export is subsidized in the case where domestic prices exceed export prices. In France, over 30 percent of the national export is insured by the state. In Great Britain in 1993, 186 million pounds sterling were spent on the implementation of programs for promoting export. The Canadian State Corporation for Export Development, aside from insurance, also provides for its crediting by an average of 1.0-1.3 billion Canadian dollars. In China, producers are refunded direct and indirect taxes in case of export, and preferential credits are allocated. In India, enterprises of export orientation are exempted from payment of basic taxes for a period of 5 years. Poland planned to allocate $1 billion for insuring export in 1994.

The following primary directions may be defined in the state support of Russian export.

The first direction concerns the "ennobling" of export, increasing the degree of processing of raw material goods (petroleum processing, timber processing, products of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, etc.). This question takes on particular importance in connection with the existing significant potential of domestic producers in the plane of development of export, who at the same time are experiencing an acute shortage of funds for acquisition of the equipment necessary for this.

In this plane, measures for "ennobling" export may presuppose the creation of preferential conditions in the period of recoverability of the investments performed for import purchases, as well as the utilization of a certain mechanism of time payments for the obtained equipment (international cooperation, financial leasing, compensation deals). We should note that we are speaking primarily about benefits which would apply to new or supplementally produced products. Therefore, direct financial participation on the part of the state may be minimal here.

Great possibilities in this direction are concealed in using leasing operations in the foreign economic sphere. Leasing makes it possible, without significant initial expenditures, to obtain equipment for long-term lease with the right of subsequent purchase, and with repayment of least payments, including through deliveries of the produced product (on a compensatory basis).

At the current stage, leasing operations take on particular current importance in the plane of overall credit-currency problems, since, according to the rules of the International Monetary Fund, the financial obligations on leasing are not included in the state indebtedness.

The second direction is the development of machine-technical and scientific-intensive export. Here, more effective support will be needed in the form of granting preferential credits and creating a system of insurance. The State Specialized Russian Export-Import Bank has been created for the realization of this scheme. However, for the present time it has not been allocated the appropriate financing, and there is no practical return for the present day.

It is true, we should note that recently we have been able to make some headway on the question of support of construction and modernization of industrial facilities abroad, although these measures are clearly insufficient even to restore the former volumes of cooperation with our partners in the "socialist camp" and with the developing countries.

In the overall volume of export of technical aid, deliveries of machines and equipment comprise around 55 percent, and construction-installation work—on the order of 40 percent.

The third direction is associated with the development of the export of services. This sgment of the market has all the prerequisites for dynamic development, and its role takes on particular importance in connection with the upcoming entry of Russia into GATT/VTO [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization].

For solving the initial problems which require state support, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations has prepared and submitted to the government a draft Federal Program for Development of Russian Export.

Among the measures proposed by the program, we may specify the following:

—provision of preferential crediting to expand export productions and increase export deliveries;

—introduction of additional tax benefits for exporter enterprises;

—development of a mechanism for distribution of foreign credits for the purpose of expanding the sources of financing for export-oriented types of production;

—rationalization of the application of state investments within the framework of implementing federal target programs;

—creation of the appropriate transport and consultative infrastructure for Russian participants in foreign economic relations.

For realization of the program, provision is made for the formation of a fund for development of high technology export, which is to be replentished at the expense of budget loans received by Roseksimbank [State Specialized Russian Export-Import Bank], formulated by means of deductions from the value-added tax and directed toward crediting export-oriented projects.

We should note that the Federal Program for Development of Export is primarily aimed at the realization of currency-recoverable projects.

According to export evaluations, the realization of measures of the program, with expenditure of $1.5 billion, will give reason to expect an increase in export income of up to $4.0 billion in 3 years.

And although at the initial stage, export will be represented primarily by the so-called intermediate, "ennobled" product (products of petrochemistry, metallurgy, wood processing, complement goods, etc.), in the future there will be an ever-increasing relative share of products of final demand (space technology, aviation, ships, machine tools, power generation equipment, new technologies).

It is proposed that the State Specialized Russian Export-Import Bank (Roseksimbank), operating as the agent of the Russian Federation Government, be appointed as the central institutional segment of the system of financing export, crediting production of export goods, and guaranteeing and insuring export credits.

For fulfillment by Roseksimbank of the functions assigned to it for granting and attracting credits in the name of and at the instruction of the Russian Federation

Government, and for financing and guaranteeing export-import operations, during formulation of the draft federal budget for the coming year and on the basis of governmental decisions at the suggestion of MFER and Minekonomika [Ministry of Economics] of Russia, it is proposed that provision shall be made in it for:

—funds for granting state export credits;

—funds for crediting export deliveries and crediting production of export industrial products supplied on the basis of the appropriate decisions of the Russian Federation Government;

—funds for compensating the difference between interest rates on market credit resources and on special purpose credits for production of export industrial products (or export credits), as well as for covering government guarantees presented in securement of the said credits;

—funds for fulfillment of payment obligations by Roseksimbank, associated with the onset of guaranteed and insured cases.

Moreover, one of the sources of funds attracted by Roseksimbank may be the credits of the Ministry of Finance, with the procedure and conditions for granting them established by agreement between Minfin and Roseksimbank.

The current importance of supporting export is obvious. An appropriate federal program has been prepared. The problem, which is the crux of the matter, is financing. But if we consider the fact that in 1994 the volume of budget revenues from foreign economic activity (NDS [value-added tax], special tax and customs duties) in the dollar equivalent comprised over $5 billion, the question of allocating certain funds for support of domestic export appears quite legitimate.

*Russia, China Cooperate To Build Bridge Across Amur River

95P50089A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Belyy: "A Bridge Grows From Two Shores"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Russia, very likely, this will be a unique structure. We are talking about the construction, jointly with China, of a bridge across the Amur border. This is not the first year that the need for such a crossing is being debated. More than once the place of alignment under the bridge was changed; various alternative drafts, including one for a tunnel under this far eastern river, were proposed. What kind of bridge to build, automobile, railroad or combined, was discussed for a long time. The Chinese side proposed only an automobile variant. The Russian side, taking into account long-term prospects for trade and economic relations, preferred the combined.

But now the many barriers are behind. Recently the Russian-Chinese negotiations on this problem were concluded. They took place on the level of the foreign policy departments of the two countries in Beijing, in Heihe, which is opposite Russia's Blagoveshchensk, and in Blagoveshchensk. A protocol was signed indicating the conclusion of the coordination phase of the draft agreement between Russia and China on the joint construction of a bridge across the Amur in the Blagoveshchensk-Heihe region. It is expected that the agreement will be signed in May during the visit to Russia of PRC State Council Premier Li Peng.

It is possible that the construction, which will take three years, will begin this summer. All the necessary draft documentation is ready. On the Chinese side a free trade-economic zone will be created "under the bridge;" on the Russian side the financial-construction company "Most" [Bridge]. The sides will bear all the construction expenses equally (except for bridge infrastructure facilities). The Russian side has named the Amur Oblast administration and the "Most" company as responsible for the "interconstruction;" for China it is the people's government of the city of Heihe and a specially created company.

What will the transcontinental crossing be? A compromise was reached. First build an automobile bridge, but the pylons will be strengthened, taking into account the construction of a railroad track later on. The future will show whether a locomotive will be needed for broadening the contacts between the two countries.

*German Financial Aid to St Petersburg Continues

954F1875A St. Petersburg SMENA in Russian 21 Mar 95 p 3

[Article by Natalya Karima: "Germany Increases Aid to St. Petersburg"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The interest of the German Government in the economic development of St. Petersburg is increasing. This is reflected in the amount of funds allocated by Germany to the financing of a number of joint ventures.**

Whereas last year 10 million marks were used within the framework of the economic consulting program, this year the German Government plans to allocate 15 million marks. This money will go towards implementing specific projects, a listing of which has been approved by the German side and a commission specially established by the St. Petersburg Government. The criterion for selection is interest on the part of both sides in implementing the project. One such project, for example, is the railroad crossing project between Germany and St. Petersburg. A ferry crossing of this type exists between Klaypeda (Lithuania) and Germany. Opportunities for use of this crossing by Russia are today limited. Freight shipments from Germany to Russia travel across Finland or via the road network, which has an effect on their final cost. A joint-stock company will be established for construction of the new crossing. Its founders will be the Association of German Railroads and the St. Petersburg Government.

A second project, of interest to Russia as well as to St. Petersburg, is the establishment of an investment fund for venture capital. The decision to establish this fund was made at the Big Seven Conference in Tokyo. Management of the fund and responsibility for the financing of its operations are entrusted to the German Government.

Proceeding from last year's results, 60 percent of the projects begun within the framework of the economic consulting program of the German Federal Government will be continued this year as well—the program for purification of Baltic Sea waters, for example.

According to a report from Michael Mueller, representative of the German Federal Ministry, plans call for the implementation of joint projects with Leningrad Oblast. These projects will most likely involve tourism and the professional training of state employees, and will deal with the reorganization of a few enterprises.

Political Issues

*Kostikov Interviewed on Kremlin Situation

954F1952A Moscow NTV in Russian 26 Mar 95 p 1

[Interview with Vyacheslav Kostikov, former press secretary to the president of Russia, by Yevgeniy Kiselev, on the "Itogi" program 26 March]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kiselev] Well, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Kostikov himself is in our studio today. So, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich, can you answer the question Sergey Filatov could not answer: Why does the road from the Kremlin indeed lead to the Vatican?

[Kostikov] Well, I was the president's press secretary, and as a rule carried out the president's will. And in this instance it was also the president's will. There was a certain point—as I understand it, it occurred in November. A telephone on my desk, marked "president," rang, and Boris Nikolayevich's voice asked: "Vyacheslav Vasilyevich, how would you feel about working abroad for a while?" I know that such calls are never accidental. Judging by all the indicators, Boris Nikolayevich had already made this decision, and I interpreted this as the president's will. In two or three days we had a rather detailed conversation, and this decision was confirmed. I agreed. Technically, this is the way it happened.

[Kiselev] The press secretary is a very important figure in the Kremlin, or in the administration of the president of any country, for that matter. The head of state usually communicates with the press and the public more often through the mouth of the press secretary than directly. And if the president decided to part with his press secretary, apparently we are to assume that there is an element of dissatisfaction, are we not?

[Kostikov] I do not think there was a element of dissatisfaction here. It is just that circumstances change. Perhaps a time of new, difficult decisions is beginning for Boris Nikolayevich, and he probably needs a different press secretary.

[Kiselev] What kind?

[Kostikov] It is hard to tell what kind. You see, Boris Nikolayevich and I had a rather unusual relationship to a certain extent. It was rooted in the fact that I came to the Kremlin, to the president, and into politics at a time when the country was in a way bubbling in a democratic spring. It was a period of democratic romanticism of sorts. Boris Nikolayevich was riding the crest of this movement. He was very open, very democratic. He got along with people quite easily. It was during that period that an element of great private trust developed.

[Kiselev] That is, the unusual nature of the relationship, as I see it, was that you, acting upon this private trust, acting on intuition—writer's, political, human—frequently made decisions yourself.

[Kostikov] It happened sometimes. I would not say that I frequently made decisions on my own, since the last word was always that of the president. But I did frequently initiate many statements and even many political points. Of course, whenever I had some initiative or felt a need or sensed that something needed to be said, naturally I apprised Boris Nikolayevich of this, and he approved—or disapproved. Thank God, it so happened that generally speaking I was rarely mistaken. In any case, over practically three years of working with Boris Nikolayevich I cannot recall a single instance of Boris Nikolayevich chastising me.

[Kiselev] Were there serious conflicts with the president?

[Kostikov] Not where I was involved. Not where I was involved.

[Kiselev] Perhaps the press secretary has some ill-wishers somewhere in the president's closest entourage? I hear that your relations with the omnipotent security service have been very difficult, especially lately.

[Kostikov] You know, I would not say so. My personal relations with Aleksandr Vasilyevich were always proper. It is another matter that there was no close interaction between us, and I did not think such interaction was needed anyway. I never descended from the fourth floor, where the president's office is and where the groups of aides work, to the second floor, where the presidential security service is. I never went down there for particular political advice, or a particular recommendation.

[Kiselev] Do any of the other people working on the fourth floor do that?

[Kostikov] I would rather not talk about the others.

[Kiselev] Well, nevertheless, you are an informed person, who probably knows the Kremlin better than anyone else. I ask everyone this question. There are a lot of rumors. There is very little direct information. Is General Korzhakov really so powerful? Is General Barsukov really so influential? And these Kremlin special services—are they really beginning to accumulate so much influence and clout in their hands?

[Kostikov] Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, I follow the polemics, the opinions, expounded in the press on this subject as closely as you do. I would rather not comment on this process. The only thing I would like to say is that when a security service begins interfering in political processes and becoming a part of the technology of power—this is dangerous. But this is just a general political observation. How great Aleksandr Vasilyevich's influence on Boris Nikolayevich is, I cannot tell you.

[Kiselev] Well, how about the details that are currently popping up in the press—just details of everyday life in the Kremlin, and by the way, some of it I have seen with my own eyes. Is it true that people are beginning to step outside their offices in order to talk in the hallway instead of their Kremlin office? Is it true that people are writing notes to each other, to avoid saying things aloud?

[Kostikov] I will not speak about others. I will tell you what I do. I do indeed write notes and very often do not say aloud what I would rather not have overheard. In this respect, I would like to make this clarification. It is not so bad if you are being recorded or eavesdropped. After all, the security service has its functions, and it is its duty, if you wish, to see that the president is safe, and his aides, after all, are his closest entourage. I would not judge it harshly if this were going on. The danger is different—that your words will be misunderstood, misinterpreted, and misrepresented to the president. And it is mainly out of this concern—to avoid having my words taken out of context from my conversations and correspondence with friends—it is probably this circumstance that makes me rather careful.

[Kiselev] What would you say, as the press secretary who had to deal with journalists more than others, about the new, let me put it this way, trends in—if not rules of—communication with the press, which are now beginning to be imposed in the Kremlin. I mean, for instance, the stricter admission requirements, and the fact that now any person who enters the Kremlin is in a way under constant guard—if you forgive me, security service personnel even escort journalists to the restroom.

[Kostikov] I think this is demeaning—both for the aides and the president himself. I personally am incensed over these facts. I voiced my distaste on this subject on numerous occasions, but my words had no effect. I know that the new press secretary, Sergey Konstantinovich, intends to change this practice somehow—God bless him if he succeeds.

[Kiselev] All right, did you say your goodbyes to the president? Did you have a farewell meeting?

[Kostikov] Well, the farewell was quite lengthy, since the fact that I was leaving was announced back in November.

[Kiselev] No, I mean now, before you handed your job over to Sergey Medvedev.

[Kostikov] Well, our farewell was in a way divided into two stages. The first one took place in Boris Nikolayevich's office—a rather official one, where both he and I said all the words of farewell and gratitude appropriate to the occasion. Boris Nikolayevich told me that he did not see my departure as a falling into disfavor or a dismissal. He even used the word "promotion," although of course one can argue with this. Well. So I thought this was where our conversation would end, and that I would not see Boris Nikolayevich anymore. But literally in two or three days, absolutely unexpectedly for me, word was passed to me that Boris Nikolayevich wanted to talk to me once again. I remember it very well—it was after the ambassadors presented their credentials. I was invited into one of the rooms in the rear part of the former Supreme Soviet, where a small room is kept for Boris Nikolayevich. I went there, and saw a bottle of cognac, some hors d'oeuvres, and several glasses on a table. And Andrey Vladimirovich Kozyrev sitting there. I thought that Boris Nikolayevich...

[Kiselev] Had decided to invite your new bosses?

[Kostikov] I do not think that... Yes, in a way he handed me over personally. And, well, I will be honest—Boris Nikolayevich and I drank two or three farewell glasses of cognac; he wished me all the best, and actually we even hugged and kissed.

[Kiselev] Oh, really?

[Kostikov] Yes. I will tell you, this last farewell episode had a great emotional impact on me. It was this small informal presidential gift to the press secretary.

[Kiselev] All right, knowing the president well, what do you think he will write in his next memoirs about you?

[Kostikov] I do not think he will write anything bad, just as I will not write anything derogatory about Boris Nikolayevich. I told him openly: "Boris Nikolayevich, naturally, I will write something. I do not know what it will be—a novel, memoirs...." So you see, he is aware that I will be writing something. The only thing I told him is that I will not permit any tactlessness with respect to the president, for whom I have the greatest respect.

[Kiselev] And when will we read this book?

[Kostikov] Well, it is hard to tell. It all depends on how much time I will have for myself.

[Kiselev] Can you tell us at least when you will be leaving for the Vatican?

[Kostikov] Certain necessary stages already have been completed. I hope that the agreement will come through—so, I think, in a month or a month and a half.

[Kiselev] Well, good luck on your journey.

[Kostikov] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cart moves slowly. I am not in a hurry either.

[Kiselev] Good luck to you. Thank you.

[Kostikov] Thank you. Goodbye.

*Problems of Lobbying, Access to Decision Makers Viewed

954E0725B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 18 Mar 95 p 4

[Article by Ernst Chernyy, expert of the Association of Privatized and Private Enterprises and member of the Social Chamber: "Access to Persons Who Make Decisions Temporarily Suspended: Corruption as a Tool for Obtaining Unilateral Advantages for Rich Monopolists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first draft of Russia's law on lobbying has been prepared in the State Duma. The Foundation for Development of Parliamentarism in Russia organized its discussion in which well-known politicians, public figures, and deputies took part. The discussion left a strange impression. At times it recalled the conversations of people who together with Moliere's comic hero suddenly and unexpectedly realized that they were speaking prose. It seems that in studying the problem of lobbying in its most extreme and widespread form in our country—corruption over many years, we finally realized that we do have lobbying, and various types of it, and that it will continue to exist in the future too, but circumstances are forcing society to clean it up and smooth it out a little.

The participants in the discussion ignored one important aspect of the subject, however. The essence of it is that there is a split in lobbying not only into criminal and open lobbying. There is in addition lobbying in favor of the strong and lobbying in favor of the weak. Those who do the beating and those who are beaten and who on the whole need lobbying much more. This split is a fundamental one, and the business economy, especially in conditions of monopolism and the collective guarantee of the monpolists who ultimately shape power itself, begins with this split. If a new law does not help the poor now, we will have to bid farewell to ideas of a real market economy, since a real market economy is based on the fundamental concept of an independent population and small and medium-sized business which should make up at least 70 percent of the entire economy.

Overall, one can conceive of the contemporary structure of an economically developed society as a large meadow in which thick grass, the small enterprises, grows and where each blade is an enterprise and many shrubs are medium-sized enterprises, while scattered in places are trees standing alone, the monopoly structures. Only such a structure interspersed with monopolies which have developed gradually and which have their own sphere of activity and are strictly controlled by society is safe for society itself and the economy and citizens.

But if we imagine a picture of our economic space, we will see something different: the meadow is overgrown with many trees which have cut off the sunlight from the shrubs, medium-sized business, and the grass, small business. Neither one nor the other can develop, which we in fact see in real life. The economy suffocates in such conditions.

The "ecological" system of the economy is viable only when there are very powerful lower strata whose vigorous interaction can at any stage lead to the appearance of individual monopolists.

But if one examines our existing lobbying, it is not difficult to observe that in our country only lobbying of the strong and in favor of the strong has always existed and conquered. It is not difficult to surmise that this is yet another feature of a monopolistic or quasimonopolistic economy. That is how it was under the command-administrative system, and that is the situation in today's transitional economy too.

The most important thing is that in our country the distribution system with priorities has been essentially preserved. Only bureaucrats do not distribute and share just cars and other output now, but quotas, licenses, special exports, preferential credits and investments, treasury bills, noncompetitive acquisition of property, and so forth. It is not difficult to surmise that lobbying today is focused on obtaining advantages in precisely these spheres.

A tendency to obtain unilateral advantages for rich monopolists is characteristic of today's Russian lobbying. Essentially, it is ordinary corruption that is the tool for obtaining these advantages. It turns out that with the formally declared equality of all enterprises, monopolists obtain the favor of bureaucrats more easily.

I am convinced that it is not accidental but very deliberate that access to persons who make decisions is complicated and there is practically no one to prove that an enterprise or group of enterprises satisfies the standard demands for participating in a particular project; which is essentially certainly the main function of lobbying in the milieu of the executive branch of power.

Here is a final example involving the attempt of the Association of Privatized and Private Enterprises to provide help to its members in acquiring some of India's debts and treasury bills. It proved to be impossible to find the agents and those making decisions on this question and to get openness and logically coherent explanations, everything that the authorities are simply required to do. It was virtually impossible to reach those who make decisions and discuss the situation which has taken shape: the real authorities who make the decisions proved to be anonymous.

The communist ways of today's executive branch of power originated in the past, of course, so this power is frequently realized through bureaucrats of the old apparat who know how to do just one thing well—distribute. Bringing the functions of bureaucrats to the normal level and regulating relations precisely with laws will minimize tactical lobbying on the level of the executive branch of power but will substantially increase the proportion of lobbying in the legislative sphere. It is precisely legislation which provides "economic comfort" for the country for many years to come which should have the undisputed advantage.

If lobbyists appear who are able to prove the priority of these laws, it will be to the benefit of both the taxpayer and the country. Such lobbying can obviously be considered civilized.

In any case, lobbying should not be a tool for obtaining unilateral privileges. It should be a system which makes it possible to make an effective comparison of the interests of different groups and on this level formulate decisions which are the most acceptable to the majority.

*Decisions of Congress of Russian People Outlined

954F1855A Moscow ROSSIYANIN in Russian No 3, Feb 95 pp 1,2

[Unattributed report: "Decision of the Second Congress of Representatives of the Russian People in the Country and Abroad" held in Volgograd on 5 February 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Second Congress of Representatives of the Russian [Russkiy] People in the Country and Abroad, having heard and discussed the following reports:

B. S. MIRONOV, "Russophobia in the Context of State Policy"; A. N. STERLIGOV, "The Russian National Patriotic Movement and Russia's Future"; and a letter of appeal to the congress by P. V. ROMANOV, deputy to the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly,

NOTES THAT:

the lack of accord and stability in society, the pro-American and pro-Western domestic and foreign policy of Russia's present leaders, the kindling of interethnic discord, and the continuing genocide of the Russian people have resulted in a nationwide crisis and are leading the country toward dismemberment and the death of the Russian nation.

THE CONGRESS DECREES:

1. that until the convening of the All-Russian Zemstvo Assembly (People's Assembly), the congresses of representatives of the Russian people in the country and abroad shall be the supreme form of expression of the will of the Russian national movement and assume responsibility for getting out of the crisis and recreating historic Russia peacefully.

2. that the Russian National Assembly shall be instructed to establish a Russian Policy Center in Moscow with a view to forming the necessary structures for protecting the Russian people's interests.

3. that a nationally oriented leadership should come to power in Russia. That those who are to blame for the collapse of the state, the economy, and spiritual and moral values, and for robbing the people shall not be admitted to structures of authority.

4. that the congress shall appeal to Petr Vasilyevich Romanov, general director of the Krasnoyarsk Yenisey Chemical Combine Production Association and hero of labor, to consent to his nomination as a candidate for the office of head of state.

that a For United Rus election bloc shall be formed; that it shall be recommended that P. V. Romanov hold consultations with the leaders of national patriotic parties and movements concerning the composition of that bloc and its election platform.

5. that a united coordinating body, the Council for the Reunification of Russia, be formed on the basis of the coordinating body of the Union People's Movement, the Dnieper Circle (Smolensk, 25 September 1994), the Organizational Committee (Russian National Assembly), and other representatives of the national patriotic forces of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Crimea, and the Dniester region, and of the Russian and Slavic communities of the near abroad; the membership of this body shall be as follows:

BOLDYREV, Mikhail Mikhaylovich, vice president of the Rosagropormstroy [Russian Agricultural Construction] concern, ataman of the Zimovaya Stanitsa in Moscow of the Don Host;
Colonel General **BOYKO, Nikolay Makarovich**, chairman of the Committee for the Memory of G. K. Zhukov;
Gen of the Army **VARENNIKOV, Valentin Ivanovich**;
VENEDIKTOV, Aleksey Nikolayevich, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Dnieper Circle (Smolensk);
ILYUKHIN, Viktor Ivanovich, chairman of the State Duma Committee on National Security;
KARPENKO, Igor Konstantinovich, chairman of the Party of Slavic Unity of Ukraine;
KRUPIN, Vladimir Nikolayevich, writer;
KUZNETSOV, Mikhail Nikolayevich, corresponding member of the International Slavic Academy of Education, Science, Culture, and Art;
LOSEV, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich, co-chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Union of the Russian People;
Col Gen **MAKASHOV, Albert Mikhaylovich**, chairman of the People's Veche;
MAYBORODA, Leonid Aleksandrovich, president of the Petrov Academy of Sciences and Arts;
MILOSERDOV, Vladimir Ivanovich, chairman of the Russian Party;
MIRONOV, Boris Sergeyevich, writer and journalist;
MOZGOV, Aleksey Kirillovich, member of the Executive Committee of the Dnieper Circle (Smolensk);
NOSOV, Vavil Petrovich, member of the Union People's Movement;
PAUKOV, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, member of the Russian Committee of Workers (Nizhniy Novgorod);
PETUKHOV, Leonid Pavlovich, deputy chairman of the Russian National Assembly;
POZDNYAKOV, Yuriy Leonidovich, member of the Executive Committee of the Dnieper Circle (Vitebsk);
ROMANOV, Petr Vasilyevich, deputy to the Federation Council of the Russian Federal Assembly;
SERGEYEV, Nikolay Maksimovich, chairman of the White Rus Slavic Assembly;
STARODUBTSEV, Vasiliy Aleksandrovich, chairman of the Agrarian Union;
STERLIGOV, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, chairman of the Russian National Assembly;

TERENTYEV, Stanislav Viktorovich, cochairman of the Coordinating Council of the Union of the Russian People, editor in chief of the newspaper KOLOKOL (Volgograd);
TIKHONOV, Georgiy Ivanovich, chairman of the Union People's Movement;
TULEYEV, Aman Gumirovich, deputy to the Federation Council of the Russian Federal Assembly;
FROLOVICH, Robert Fedorovich, member of the Executive Committee of the Dnieper Circle (Gomel);
SHUVAYNIKOV, Sergey Ivanovich, chairman of the Russian Party of the Crimea;
SHULYAKOV, Vladimir Alekseyevich, member of the Executive Committee of the Dnieper Circle (Smolensk);
SHCHADOV, Mikhail Ivanovich, president of the International Mining Concern.

that the Council for the Reunification of Russia shall be instructed to determine the procedures and dates for gathering the signatures of the citizens of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus for holding a referendum on the revocation of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreement; to fully develop a concept of the reunification of the triune Russian people; and to take other practical measures within the context of people's diplomacy for the implementation of this idea.

that it shall be considered that any dismemberment and division of Russia as a unified living organism must be stopped and punished with the full force of authority and the law.

6. that the land and its underground resources and all natural resources shall be the property of the whole people; that the land should be under the management and in the use, including the hereditary management and use, of those who work it; that the land and its resources may not be the object of buying and selling, mortgaging and usury.

that the country's growing economic occupation by foreign capital should be abolished and the circulation of foreign currency in the country be prohibited.

7. that the Cossacks should be deemed to have been unjustly and unlawfully repressed; that it be demanded that the federal and local bodies of authority adopt normative acts restoring the state status of the Cossacks and restoring ataman rule in places of Cossacks' traditional and high-density residence, that the Cossack hosts be reestablished, and that they be charged with guarding state borders and border territories; that the return to Cossacks of lands unlawfully taken away from them be deemed an act of restoration of historic justice; that federal taxes be substantially reduced and a state program of subsidies be developed for the purposes of developing the infrastructure on Cossack territories.

8. for the purposes of arousing the self-awareness of the Russian people, that it be demanded that the executive authority develop regular Russian [Russkiy] programs on state television and radio treating genuinely Russian problems, the Russian people's way of life and their history, spirit and culture, and the traditions of governing the Russian state.

9. that the Russian national movement resolutely disassociate itself from the ideology, methods of action, and symbolism of fascism as unacceptable; that it be demanded that the Russian president bar officials of non-Russian nationality serving on his administrative staff from assuming the right to label the Russian national movement fascist.

10. that it be demanded that legislative bodies adopt a law barring the use of the word "Russian" [Russkiy] in the names of companies and other organizations whose activities do not reflect the interests of the Russian people.

11. that it be deemed necessary to establish, on the basis of the higher schools of Volgograd, a Russian University for training cadres for the national patriotic movement.

12. that a regular Congress of the Representatives of the Russian People in the Country and Abroad be held in Volgograd on 6-7 May 1995.

13. that an appeal be directed to central and local mass media outlets requesting that they give wide coverage to the materials of the Second Congress of Representatives of the Russian People in the Country and Abroad, and that the refusal to do so be considered a manifestation of an anti-Russian position.

Volgograd, 5 February 1995

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*Boris Fedorov on Political Aims, Issues

954E0730A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
4 Mar 95 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Boris Fedorov, member of the State Duma, Liberal-Democratic Fund president, and leader of "Forward, Russia!" political movement, by observer Boris Krotkov under "If I Became President of Russia" rubric: "We'll Find the Will To Create Order"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **DELOVOY MIR continues publishing interviews with political and state figures who may take part in the battle for the highest position in Russia—the post of president. Today, we introduce Boris Fedorov, State Duma member, Liberal-Democratic Fund president, and leader of the "Forward, Russia!" political movement. He speaks with Boris Krotkov, DELOVOY MIR political observer.**

[Krotkov] You, Boris Grigoryevich, have begun the pre-election campaign earlier than many, and you are doing it with great energy and tension: in the press, on the radio, and on television. You are doing a lot of traveling around the country. Is there enough powder in the powder horn?

[Fedorov] Very much so! There are less than 300 days until December.

[Krotkov] But there is almost a year and a half until the presidential elections.

[Fedorov] But I haven't announced that I'm running for president yet.

[Krotkov] That's news! Many people, myself included, have the impression that your chief goal is the presidency.

[Fedorov] If I am offered it, of course I will accept, but as they say, according to established procedure. I am not afraid of work.

[Krotkov] In that case, we'll speak hypothetically. What if you become president? In fact, it might be better if I approach it indirectly. In your opinion, what qualities should the president of Russia possess?

[Fedorov] Most importantly, competence, decisiveness, and honesty.

[Krotkov] People say that you are an extraordinarily ambitious man. You obviously disagree with that?

[Fedorov] I believe that a person who has no ambition should not go into politics. I am a politician.

[Krotkov] Which of your own character traits do you dislike?

[Fedorov] Many of them. For example, I suppose I am excessively inclined to compromise; at least I used to be. As a member of the government, I would often be quiet when I should have been speaking out. Then, more good might have come from that government. I was too shy.

[Boxed item] Dossier

Boris Grigoryevich Fedorov was born in 1958 in Moscow into a worker's family. He graduated from Moscow Financial Institute, worked for seven years at USSR Gosbank, then at the Institute of World Economics. For 10 years he was a consultant to the social-economic department of the CPSU Central Committee. He was RSFSR minister of finances for the second half of 1990. He worked abroad for the next two years in the European and World banks. In 1993 he was Russian vice premier and minister of finances. He has left the government. He has his doctorate in economic sciences. He has a wife and is the father of two children: a daughter, nine years old and and a son, 10 years old. [end box]

[Krotkov] I'll say frankly that you don't seem shy. Which of your character traits do you value highly?

[Fedorov] I don't know, and I don't want to talk about that. A person cannot judge himself objectively. If you insist, however, I will say that I am an able worker, I am true to my ideals, I have never betrayed like-thinkers or friends, and I consider myself to be an honest and decent person. I will repeat, however, that it is not for me to judge myself.

[Krotkov] It's time to move on to more fundamental subjects of conversation, but I have one more question. Are you religious?

[Fedorov] I am not religious. I don't like to pretend in this matter. It sickens me to see certain familiar faces in church, the way they feverishly cross their foreheads, but I know they don't believe in God at all.

[Krotkov] So if you were the president of Russia, what kind of program would you have? A maximum program and a minimum program?

[Fedorov] In order to acquaint you with my maximum program, I would have to talk for five or six hours. Neither of us has time for that. It would be better if you asked me specific questions that I could answer quickly.

[Krotkov] OK. Let us begin with your first priorities. What are they?

[Fedorov] The following: freedom for citizens; prevention of the rise of any form of dictatorship; restoration of the standard of living and a war against the increase in unemployment, restoration of citizens' savings and protection from inflation; extending to people the opportunity to become landowners and barring the forced redistribution of property; protection of citizens from bandits, criminals, embezzlers, bureaucratic tyranny; a drop in taxes and tax reform; resolution of the housing problem.

[Krotkov] We will say frankly that that is an impressive bouquet, but how are you going to achieve all of this? For example, how will you fight crime and corruption, which have become the scourges of Russian society?

[Fedorov] It will be very complicated, but it is possible. I believe that in order to do this, we must make the punishment for crimes against people and property harsher. I am for the death penalty for murder and other serious crimes. Recidivists who have committed more than three crimes should be deprived of their freedom for life. As far as the war on corruption is concerned, I think the penalties for state officials caught red-handed should also be harsher, and declaration of income should also be mandatory for them.

[Krotkov] I don't know how much good that will do. The state apparatus is rotten from top to bottom.

[Fedorov] That's why I stand for complete reform of the state apparatus, and it should begin directly with the government. The number of ministries should be reduced to 25, and the number of state employees in Moscow should be cut by at least 10,000. The Cabinet doesn't need the vice premiers or their 300 reviewers. Then, the ministries will become real ministries. Then, people will treat their selection more responsibly. As a result, the White House will be given to the parliament, and the premier will take one of the smaller residences in the capitol's center. It will have a hall with an oval table for meetings, and the premier won't sit at the head of the table but in the middle, demonstrating that he is not the chief of the ministers but the first minister. Seventy-five percent of the issues that are documented by government decrees and orders will be passed into the competency of the ministries and departments, whose responsibility will increase sharply. On the first day, the premier will cut the cords of the seven special telephones from his desk, which are actually of useless. The number of people guarded by the state will be cut 10 fold. The premier will stop parading around the country, collecting petitions, and making promises that cannot be kept. He will stop walking through factories and farms with a sly look on his face. Theatrical, solemn meetings of the government, where essentially nothing is decided or discussed, will cease.

[Krotkov] Isn't 25 ministries a little low for great Russia?

[Fedorov] Not at all! Right now, we have a lot of useless departments which must be closed. Those that have lost their functions must be consolidated with stronger ministries. The government will have several blocs. The bloc heading the ministry of industry will include the ministries of transport, communications, fuel, energy, and part of the Ministry of the Economy (the remainder of which will go into the Ministry of Finance). The Ministry of Finance will include the taxation organs, the Committee on Precious Metals, the Russian Insurance Inspectorate, customs, and issues concerning the alcohol monopoly. The social bloc will include the ministries of science, labor and social protection, culture, and health care. Some of the departments that currently exist in this bloc will be combined with or will become subordinate to ministries (the employment service to the Ministry of Labor, the Committee on Cinematography to the Ministry of Culture, etc.).

[Krotkov] What do you intend to do with the so-called power ministries?

[Fedorov] The Ministry of Defense should be headed by a civilian. The department itself should have three orientations: military (the General Staff), political, and economic. The MVD should take over its internal affairs, including issues concerning population migration. The war on crime should be concentrated in a new department based on the MVD and the Federal Counterintelligence Service.

[Krotkov] You call yourself a financier. Let's talk about what kind of financial policy there will be if you come into power.

[Fedorov] We will reorient budget, tax, money, and credit policy in the interest of stimulating economic development and social protection. We will be working toward financial discipline and monetary stability.

Over a few months, we will attempt to gain control of the most frightening taxes and the inflation that is consuming society, increasing its stratification and leading to a degradation of the economy. Price increases should not exceed 10-20 percent per year so that citizens' savings can be protected and enterprises can make normal production plans.

The Central Bank will be forbidden to credit the budget deficit, and its issue must be covered 100 percent by foreign currency and gold. The ruble will become a real, convertible currency.

After certain prerequisites are attained, a denomination will be conducted—that is, monetary reform—which we will use to remove the many zeroes from our banknotes and securities but without a bolshevist confiscation.

One of the main goals of state financial policy will be to provide for a real—that is, overtaking inflation—growth in the population's savings as a basis for prosperity and investments. Harsh measures will be taken against financial swindlers.

The structure of budget expenditures should be changed. We have wasted enough money supporting bankruptcies and an excessive army. We need socially significant programs that assure development. The bulk of budgetary expenditures on education, health care, culture, science, and ecology should be doubled.

The essence of tax reform will become an easing of the tax burden on enterprises. It will include the following elements:

—turning away from a fiscal-punitive tax policy, including abolishing the principle by which fees are delivered into the pockets of tax organs, and their fusing under the aegis of the Finance Ministry;

—reexamining the NDS [value-added tax] system, narrowing its application (not transforming it into a tax on all activities), and establishing a 15-20 percent "ceiling";

—abolishing the tax for exceeding the labor salary fund, establishing a special tax rate on profit for small businesses;

—not increasing income tax or in the tax on savings account interest;

—gaining a clearer understanding of the concepts used in tax legislation, including the application of normal commercial expenditures to profit;

—introducing the principle of adjusting for inflation profits from the sale of various assets, including foreign currency;

—using accelerated amortization;

—appointing firm sources of income to every level of government;

—establishing a "ceiling" for local taxes.

[Krotkov] What can industry expect from you?

[Fedorov] The main thrust of industrial policy will be raising labor productivity. Without it, there can be no reform. Without a growth in production, the state cannot develop, and its coffers are empty. However, we don't need production for the sake of production; we need production for the sake of people—the manufacture of quality and competitive goods that are in demand. Support for production doesn't mean growth in the number of privileges, subsidies, or state capital investments. On the contrary, it means creating the conditions for work: tax reform, accelerated amortization, liberalization of foreign trade, stimulation of foreign investment, protection of stock-holders' rights, and control over monopolists.

For example, these measures might be proposed:

—a war on monopolism in price formation, through the regulation of prices on electrical energy, oil and gas, rail transports, and utilities;

—forbidding the use of budgetary funds at all levels for the support of artificial price levels;

—forbidding limits on the movement of goods and services between Federation subjects.

Dealing with non-payments through the adoption of a real budget, ending political pressure on enterprises (for example, deliveries in the CIS), and programs creating jobs for dismissed workers will have enormous significance.

We will introduce stricter management of enterprises with the state form of property. An increase in responsibility for directors, broadening the application of bankruptcy, and transferring enterprises to effective owners will provide impetus for a growth in labor productivity.

Bringing order to defense branches will become a priority, when fewer of the more effective weapons will be ordered with guaranteed payment. An extremely specific conversion program will be carried out first in the mono-cities [defense industry cities], with budgetary loans allotted for carefully considered, high-efficiency projects.

Of course, liberation of the economy must continue, including the removal of bureaucratic obstacles, easing access for private capital into all spheres of the economy (from the defense industry and energy to garbage collection), and permitting trade in land, within the framework of state regulations. Demonopolization should work not so much toward breaking up enterprises, as towards stimulating the creation of new ones.

[Krotkov] How do you evaluate the results of privatization, and what measures do you intend to take here?

[Fedorov] So far, privatization has not provided any satisfaction for the bulk of the population, or income for the budget, or a growth in production efficiency. It is time to end this corruption that masquerades as privatization.

The stock packets belonging to the state will be sold only at auctions conducted by independent firms, which will make it possible to maximize the sale price and provide more funds for the budget. Some of the state stock packets may be exchanged for our debts to foreign countries in order to ease the debt burden. The population will have the opportunity to participate in land privatization.

The protection of private property, of citizens' property, must be assured legally and in practice by all the means the state has at its disposal. Special attention will be paid to protecting stock-holders' rights (to participate in management, to distribute profit), which are ignored everywhere.

[Krotkov] Will you support small business?

[Fedorov] One of the main goals of our economic policy is to stimulate the development of business, specifically small business. For this, we propose adopting a broad set of economic measures:

—releasing any new enterprise employing not more than 10 people from all forms of taxation—except contributions to social funds—for its first two years of operation;

—establishing a simplified accounting system for small businesses;

—lowering tax rates on profit for enterprises with an annual turnover of less than the equivalent of $500,000 to the 20 percent level;

—supporting young businessmen, as well as family businesses;

—creating a system of credits and guarantees for new and small businesses.

[Krotkov] Something bad has happened to our foreign trade. All you hear is that it is irrationally organized and that it has become a refuge for previously unseen corruption. What can we do about it?

[Fedorov] First we can support domestic export in any way possible. How? Through completely abolishing export quotas, licenses, and duties, with the exception of a small group of strategic products (uranium, gold, diamonds).

Protectionism on an intelligent scale for domestic industry is necessary, of course without introducing import duties above the maximum level generally accepted all over the world, which results in constraints on the consumer. All import duties and taxes on cars and equipment that have no equivalents within the country will be removed.

We must refuse foreign aid as a state policy and depend upon our own strengths. We will end the practice of accumulating a foreign debt, and we will adopt a program that will resolve the debt problem in 15 years.

Support and encouragement for attracting foreign investments will consist mainly in a stable investment procedure, cutting back on the number of bureaucratic obstacles and eliminating discrimination.

One more thing: when we come to power, we will insist that the state refuse direct participation in foreign trade (besides the sale and purchase of strategic products). The use of budgetary funds for import will be forbidden. The state's role will be to establish the rules of the game and to support exporters through export credits and guarantees. The state will also use its influence to attain easier access for our firms to foreign markets.

[Krotkov] Realizing your plans in the area of economics will require a lot of money, especially at first, where will you get it?

[Fedorov] There is money in this country; you just have to know how to get it. There are several very simple ways: selling off dachas, vacation lodges, and other facilities for the privileged. Nobody except the president and the premier will have official residences. This will liberate the funds used to maintain those facilities (the presidential administration alone employs 40,000 people for those purposes) for eliminating foreign economic privileges, halting subsidies to CIS countries, cutting the state apparatus by half, forbidding extrabudgetary expenditures, improving tax collection, and pursuing the war against contraband more aggressively. Finally, the sale of state stock packets—stocks in just 50 of the leading oil, gas, energy, and metals companies—would provide tens of billions of dollars for the budget.

[Krotkov] Of today's Russian politicians, who do you like most?

[Fedorov] Very few of them. Maybe Boris Nemtsov, the Nizhegorodskiy governor, and Yegor Stroyev, the Orlovskiy governor. For his fighting qualities I like Anatoliy Chubays. I like strong, willful people—champions and fighters. When I come to power, I will choose my team from people like this. Chubays, for example, might be a good minister of internal affairs.

[Krotkov] Will there be a place for Yavlinskiy and Gaydar?

[Fedorov] Yavlinskiy could be minister of labor. Labor relations are his specialty. Gaydar could be advisor on macroeconomics.

[Krotkov] How do you feel about them as politicians?

[Fedorov] Today it is already entirely clear that Gaydar didn't work out as a political activist; he allowed too many compromises. What kind of a political activist doesn't take care of the state, of his strength? I have more ambiguous feelings about Yavlinskiy. It seems to me that he has come down with the disease called "leaderism." In addition, without participating in any creative processes, he has taken the position of eternal critic. He doesn't take any specific duties upon himself.

[Krotkov] Whom do you see as your main competitors, speaking of the presidential election?

[Fedorov] It is too early to talk about that now, but they may be people like Chernomyrdin, Rutskoy, Zyuganov...

[Krotkov] Participating in an election campaign is very expensive. Who is helping you? Where is your money for the elections coming from?

[Fedorov] From sympathetic people. There are dozens of firms that have offered their help and that give us money—some more, some less. Naturally nobody is giving us billions, but we are careful in the way we spend the money we get, unlike certain other movements.

[Krotkov] Are you left or right?

[Fedorov] We are neither left nor right. We are normal. That is why I am certain that if we come to power, we will make Russia strong and effective; we will bring order here. We will find the will for that.

*Gorbachev Discusses Political Ambitions

954E0763A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 18 Mar 95 p 1

[Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev by DELOVOY MIR Rome correspondent Aleksandr Grigoryev in Genoa; date not given: "It Is Enough To Make People the 'Manure' of History"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **It is now clear why Gorbachev's perestroyka failed. It seems that Mikhail Sergeyevich followed the path of the Genoese Christopher Columbus, who had big ideas about a great mission to open a short route to a country with spices but never got there. Although "the father of perestroyka," speaking in the Italian navigator's native city, criticized himself admitting that in the decline of his own reforms he lost his way in their intricate design and lost his guiding star and his power along with it, Mikhail Sergeyevich looked cheerful and was winning over everyone with his activity and indestructible faith in the correctness of the "new political thinking for the country and the world." He repeatedly proposed returning to the fundamental principles of his teaching, which, it appears, is nothing but a panacea for all the ills of today's world, a world lost in the new post "Cold War" era Going back to the beginning, however, is a thankless task. For this reason, the reader who can still interpret M. Gorbachev calmly is offered an interview that is not too tiring which he gave to your correspondent at a meeting in Genoa devoted to the 10th anniversary of perestroyka in the USSR.**

[Grigoryev] Do you fear for Russia's future?

[Gorbachev] It would be incorrect to say that I am afraid because after all that I have been through, I do not know what else can frighten Gorbachev. I am very uneasy though. I have already said and I repeat: what the Yeltsin regime began doing in January 1992 led Russia to severe consequences. He should leave for this reason. If the current president still has a sense of responsibility and is ethical, he should propose that elections be held ahead of schedule and perhaps enter them. A new government, which enjoys support, is needed now. For new policy to be presented, new people are needed. For new people to emerge, new elections are needed.

[Grigoryev] What do you think about the forthcoming parliamentary elections at the end of this year and the presidential elections in June of 1996?

[Gorbachev] There are two urgent problems now. We must do everything to ensure that the elections take place. I am still not fully convinced that they will be held. I have just come from Novosibirsk; the people are waiting for the elections and they will vote. You will still recall our conversation. It is necessary that there be free elections based on the law, the new law on elections, because if they are organized by the executive authority, we will get a substitute.

[Grigoryev] Mikhail Sergeyevich, many people see your trip to Siberia as the beginning of an election campaign.

[Gorbachev] A fellow journalist of yours probably brought this subject up in Novosibirsk—that I supposedly went there to open my campaign. That is not the case. I repeat, however, that Russia's long suffering may come to an end soon. It is holding on for now, thank God and thanks to the Russians who are enduring what no nation has endured, but this is what I will say to you: if it suddenly becomes clear that the same person was elected as the result of presidential elections, I will not believe this. This would be a lie because the government has already been repudiated.

[Grigoryev] If you enter the elections, upon what will your confidence in victory be based?

[Gorbachev] A decision has not been made yet, so I do not have such confidence yet. I will return and head for central Russia right away. I will be traveling through all the regions and dropping in at all the places in order to find out if Russians still need me and my experience. If so, I will undertake this.

Time is growing short now, like shagreen leather. Scientific and technical potential is being ruined, the economy is becoming degraded, education and public health are being destroyed—everything in which any other nation makes a breakthrough—and if all this finally collapses, we will be on the horizon for decades.

[Grigoryev] Consequently, you have seen Russia, in the example of Siberia, changed over the past 4 years, and not for the better...

[Gorbachev] I cannot say this unequivocally. First of all, no one has been able to trample down the seeds of freedom and glasnost, no matter what was done. A struggle against both glasnost and freedom is under way in all directions, but they both remain. So the public is not giving this up. Even though this kind of reform put 50 percent of the people back to the poverty line, the people are surviving, nevertheless, and they are speaking out for democracy and reforms.

[Grigoryev] You have repeatedly emphasized in your speeches that the regime should leave because it has become outdated and that all this should take place democratically. Let us assume, however, that this regime makes sure that elections are not held. What could be done?

[Gorbachev] That is the worst scenario. Why? I think the government is afraid to leave. A picture will be revealed that will horrify us all. They must answer for this. A great deal is already being revealed. For this reason, their first attempt will probably be to postpone the elections on a plausible pretext. Another possibility is that they will hold the elections but will attempt to "seize" them in every stage. This will not work; the attempts will be futile...

This is roughly what Kebich was thinking, and he had the support of "all circles," believing that victory was already in his pocket. Then came Lukashenko. Kravchuk also thought he had a victory, but Kuchma arrived. Do you remember when "Russia's Choice" was already raising glasses in the Kremlin? Then Zhirinovskiy arrived. There were others... So you cannot lead the people. These are not the people who followed the trail of promises—provided that a person was not a communist or the secretary of a rayon committee—but now they understand. Delaying the elections may exacerbate the situation.

*Romanov on Election Plans, Economics

954F1862A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Mar 95 p 2

[Interview with Petr Vasilyevich Romanov by writer Yevgeniy Chebalin: "The Logic of Romanov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Chebalin] Petr Vasilyevich, I naturally tried to study all of the accessible information on you, including the book "I, Petr Romanov," in preparing for a detailed discussion with you. It is no secret that Russia and its milieu are currently divided and fragmented into political and social niches. I am in the same niche with you in national and social outlook. Taking into account your readiness to assume responsibility for the fate of Russia as president, I now have an approximate idea of the thrust and essence of your stance on many issues of everyday life.

That stance, as far as I know, is shared by millions of citizens made unfortunate by the crazy "destructuring" [*katastroyka*], the industrial captains of ruined enterprises, the shattered kolkhoz-sovkhoz system, the intelligentsia and state officials, and many others.

But here is the tragic idiocy—many of today's powers-that-be, having elbowed their way into government and senatorial offices, have basically forgotten their own pre-election slogans, changed their colors in chameleon-like fashion and begun to lie and grab, seizing their power and fully aware of its temporariness. And also just plain refusing to "lie on the rails" for lying. Where is the guarantee that your stances will become a businesslike flesh and blood equivalent to the promises, should you become president?

[Romanov] Were you spanked with a strap as a child by your mother and father?

[Chebalin] Occasionally. More by my mother.

[Romanov] And for what?

[Chebalin] Well, I don't remember. Obviously not for exemplary behavior.

[Romanov] But you remember the spankings. My mother punished me with the strap once right up to bruises for some trifling lie, repeating "never lie!" But seriously, my guarantee is the thousands of workers and engineers of the Krasnoyarsk Yenisey Chemical Combine, where I rose from worker to general director. You will agree that one cannot wear a mask, hiding the face of a scoundrel or a liar behind it, for that long—the true face will sooner or later shine through and show itself.

I recall the absolutely precise and striking wish of General Malashov with regard to the former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Gorbachev's USSR: complete the course of training of the young soldier. We received over us at the end of the 1970s an aged company of sleepy ideologues and wordy theoreticians with the nomenklatura's reflexive "hairy paw," not knowing real life, not having gone through the many stages of the school of active production and creativity.

He who has never so much as laid a brick with his own hands, not hammered together a stool, not extruded the finest part, not plowed up a grain furrow, can scarcely have a genetic commonality with his Fatherland and feel its pain. Russia will always remain "this country" for such people, and the rapacious, fattened satiety of the West the ideal way of life. It is just such people who are ruling our country.

[Chebalin] What is the financial fig that the government is systematically shoving under the nose of the producer today? A half year's lack of pay for products produced, for grain turned over to the state granaries, is explained by the lack of money. But any attempts or call to turn on the printing presses provoke an anguished wail: hyperinflation will kill us! But poverty is already killing us, hunger is killing us. What is the truth here, in your opinion, and what is just conniving?

[Romanov] Practically everything here is conniving. We are lazy and incurious in the search for historical analogues to what is happening today. We look to America in the Great Depression of the 1930s. Unfortunately, few know what actually happened there, where the truth lies. And it is extremely banal.

In 1913 the financial lobby of the Rothschilds, when most of the members of Congress were away on the Christmas holidays, passed a law known as the Federal Reserve Act. It authorized the activity of the private financial institution of the Federal Reserve Corporation, with a board of directors and its own bank. This law yanked from Congress the right to issue and control money, and transferred those functions to the newly created corporation.

So now the Federal Reserve Bank, a private enterprise, came to issue money to the government and the country at interest. Sometimes it refused altogether, as happened in 1930. There was no shortage of production capacity, fertile lands, experts or skilled workers in America. There was an enormous and wonderfully streamlined system of transport—rail, highways, water arteries. The telegraph, radio, postal and telephone systems were the best in the world. There were no wars or epidemics.

But a diabolical experiment of the bankers with far-reaching aims crashed down on the country: they intentionally withheld eight billion dollars, refusing to grant loans to entirely reliable factories and tradesmen. And American was frozen, and went into crisis and depression.

There were enough things to sell, there was enormous demand and much work. But there was no money for settlements. Thousands of enterprises and firms were artificially driven into a debt hole and **became the property of the banks for a failure to pay their debts**—which is what was required of the experiment.

The bankers considered the experiment complete in 1939, and put money back into circulation. The Great Depression ended at once. The depressions of American then and Russia now were caused not by an abundance of money, but rather by a shortage of it. They scare us with the printing press and inflation like children with goblins. Inflation will pass quickly and be extinguished if we eliminate the mutual debts, if enterprises are freed of the excesses of the choke collar of inordinate taxes and get to work.

[Chebalin] A harsh reality is that a new class of owners with properly, half-properly and improperly gained capital has formed in Russia. What will you do with them?

[Romanov] The same for everyone, keeping Russia from a new civil war at any cost... One breakdown into whites and reds is enough for two generations of Russians. We have endured enough of the blood of our brothers, and only by a miracle did we not drown in it. Everyone who will work for the resurrection of the state, even with dubiously gained capital, is an ally not subject to discrimination. If, of course, the capital was not assembled by criminal means. But there will be no mercy for bandits and thieves regardless of where they have spun their nests today, in the rackets or the government. It only seems that all of the ends could be hidden in the water abroad. I am certain that we will always find our own "Rutskoy's suitcases," documents and witnesses of the robbers who are cleaning out Russia today, growing fat as vultures on its ailing body.

[Chebalin] And who are your allies in this "distribution...," if you have in mind actual agreements and not just schemes?

[Romanov] About eighty percent of the agrarians and communists, the Glazyev party, a large portion of which is still fragmented patriotic movements. But a process of nation-state maturation is proceeding, albeit slowly, among the still inert and intimidated working class, fragmented by sops.

Painstaking work is needed at the plants for the cohesion of the producers. And a chemically pure monarchist, capitalist or even communist idea can far from achieve results in this work. These "-isms" have already been smoothed off by world practice and frayed by the aggressive diehard nature of other leaders. Russia has its own path, a collectivist one, with a clear-cut social orientation accenting collectivism not only in economic strategy, but also in management. The era of dictators, monarchs and unrestrained parliamentary chatter is passing with the 20th century.

I see a Russia brought together by the idea of national resurrection, living according to its own historical laws of the zemstvo system, territorial division and a strong collegial government. The 20th century is not giving rise to any Roosevelts, Churchills, Lenins or Stalins now. They should be replaced with a professional, nationally oriented team of like thinkers where the classes of the workers, kolkhozniks, private farmers, businessmen, intelligentsia and military will all be represented. We can drag Russia back from the abyss only together.

[Chebalin] Do you have your own vision the hiding places from which to extract the funds for the resurrection of Russia—from Russian mineral resources through energy raw materials, thereby robbing our own children and grandchildren as before? From the munificence of the International Monetary Fund? Or are there other reserves as well?

[Romanov] I will start with the IMF. The Caucasians have a clever enterprise in which three participate—an ox cart, a donkey and the master. The master puts a carrot in front of the mouth of the ass, which, in reaching for it, pulls the cart and rider along the path that the latter needs. We have a similar situation with the IMF on the path to the abyss. It is only a question of whether the rider directing Russia there will be able to jump off the cart. The West is already worried that our mafia, which gave rise to and set free our ruin, has been carried over to it. But that is still a trifle.

As for our mineral resources, yes, nature has stored a raw-materials larder for the period of our youth. And we, as all civilized states, cannot manage without it, since we have not yet acquired any other type of energy sufficiency. But they must be used with eternal thrift.

We should not labor under the delusion that the IMF is investing long-term, respectable sums in the development of our northern resources. Our riches are enormous, but their extraction is far more expensive than in Europe or America. It is thus much more profitable to invest finds there, which the IMF is indeed doing.

We are historically strong in more than raw materials alone. The uniquely designed national intellect of the Russians has proved its independence in technological breakthroughs over the ages—the radio, the laser, the steam engine, the Buran and the like. Our Committee on Invention, strangled in the cradle, was able to trade in the products of Russian minds so impudently and resourcefully before its demise that it did a great favor to dozens of far-off corporations and firms. The future government should take that into account in setting up the legal and financial relations with the distinct class of Russian Kulibins or Polzunovs. And they have not become extinct. We are obliged to trade in our own technologies, our VPK [military-industrial complex] sucked in so many of the brilliant achievements of technological thought over the years of Soviet power that their use for the good of Russians and all of mankind would be of great advantage.

But there is one more "trifle": the swollen bureaucratic apparatus of management that is devouring four trillion rubles today instead of the optimal one, and a presidential (power and political) staff that is unprecedented in size, gluttony and privileges...

[Chebalin] I have friends, highly talented European-class Russian singers in Samara and Moscow, writers, artists, musicians. Show business has covered them all with little red flags like wolves, covered them and shot them with the buckshot of mockery, cynicism, isolation and press silence.

But there is a paradox—as soon as I try to unite them on a common platform of Slavic art, convince them to extend a helping hand to each other, I run into great coldness.

Do you, having assumed the heavy role of political conciliator, experience something similar from politicians?

[Romanov] Naturally I do, after all everyone here considers himself a prince and nobleman, even in tatters. Our primary aim is to bring together healthy and nationally oriented forces. But they are still split by schism and fissures, primarily based on various views of Russia's past. The schism into reds and whites, into communists, anticommunists and monarchists, into realists and abstractionists, into democrats and patriots, into "new Russians" and cattle, into kolkhozniks and private farmers... Whence the warring of everybody against everybody, in which only the West wins. This is being done with enormous sums by the Western intelligence services and financial oligarchy, which absolutely does not need a competitive, unified and strong Russia in the world market, where all economic and trade niches have long ago been filled. The ancient Roman principle of "divide and conquer" operates unabated today.

[Chebalin] But how can the schism be countered?

[Romanov] Convince and explain to Russians, day after day, the essence of what is happening, expose the provocateurs and those fomenting schism in their milieu. To paraphrase Ostap Bender, explain that if we do not extend our hand, we will be turning up our toes. Yes, we have varying levels of information, and thus varying points of view on historical events and personalities. But this is true madness—head out together into the woods for berries, sink into a swamp and, already in up to our waist, rather than spreading brush, breaking branches and pulling ourselves out, instead raising great cursing and shouting, trying to see whose forefather were more correct, the kulak, the priest or the working peasant.

[Chebalin] The homespun lab chiefs and theoreticians have brought us to economic wrack and ruin. A special strategy and the priority selection of actions are needed to restore such a gigantic state organism.

The idea of an iron curtain (already tried by Stalin) is flying around...

[Romanov] It has also been expressed repeatedly, incidentally, by the anti-Stalinist Solzhenitsyn. There is a grain of sense in it—the Russian bear could hide in its den for a few years and lick its wounds sustained from the wolfpack. One optimal variation, it seems to me, could be to establish tight state control, with criminal liability, over strategic areas, first and foremost in the extraction and movements of strategic raw materials such as oil, gas, ores, precious metals, gold and diamonds.

Second, stop the dollar intervention by giving gold backing to the ruble and, most importantly, giving it a social burden as well—deductions for science, education, art, medicine, preschool education and the latest military technologies.

Third, halt immediately the feeding of American and Canadian farmers by buying their grain and meat, an act that cannot fail to be called poorly thought-out or even simple stupidity: the domestic food potential has been destroyed entirely so as to become a dependent boarder of the West. The most criminal thing that today's authorities have done is that Russia has no strategic reserves of food, and the food warehouses are virtually empty.

The reproducing communal reflex of the peasant is being intentionally smothered, and the solitary farmstead system, which has already outlived its time around the world, is being instilled instead. It is clear to the biggest fool that something as big as Russia will not be fed by such a system. Our lab chiefs and party people, with revolutionary frenzy, destroyed not only the production base of agriculture but also all incentives and all willingness to work among the peasant and worker, instead of stimulating, modernizing and, most importantly, providing material incentives for the commune (kolkhozes and sovkhozes) with the granting of private allotments.

A new and quite fat segment, engendered by need and want, has appeared in society—the "shuttles"—with a stable, trader's mentality, completely through with the learning of production skills and disciplines. Many of these people, especially the young, have been lost to productive labor.

[Chebalin] The young are being corrupted under the guise of an emancipation of mores that supposedly existed in Russia under slavery. We are being accused of pornographic Neanderthalism, as a consequence of which there are grounds to excommunicate us from the civilized nations. And they have succeeded in this endeavor to such an extent that it is now impossible to take your children to the movies—it is shameful.

The thresholds of conscience and shame have been virtually destroyed—it is easier to control such people. What do you propose to do with this invasion?

[Romanov] Channel it to the law and criminal liability. It sounds intimidating, I understand. But such is the practice around the world in general terms.

The older generation has a debt to the younger generation—to raise it morally healthy, based on historical and national traditions. Any tax and criminal knout for the corrupters will thus be justified to achieve this aim.

I do not think that the time for fighting with them will drag on for years—a quite staunch immunity to the pedo-sexual plague has been developed over the three hundred years of the Romanov dynasty and the seventy years of Soviet power. And the current times of total smut on screens, video rentals and cheap press, I think, will soon be totally forgotten.

[Chebalin] They are beginning to "nip" at Senator Petr Romanov... I read one tiresome and heavily repeated question: how will Petr Romanov, if elected President, manage Russia? Perhaps in complete conformity with the psychology of an inhabitant of the GULAG? You spent your youth, after all, in the KRASLAG. The "biting" will obviously increase in geometric proportion as we get closer to the elections. You are too big a target for the political poachers and plunderers, not only in Russia, but abroad as well. Are you ready for that?

[Romanov] I am ready for more than that. An individual who has knowingly selected the ascent to the political Golgotha should take note of the fact that the political rules of the Western democracies, where a politician exposed in an improper deed ends up in retirement, are a chimera for Russia.

Not one of our government diehards ever goes into retirement, just like no one did after the October shoot-up of the parliament, the betrayal of fraternal Serbia, the sale of strategic state secrets to the CIA, or the inept war in Chechnya.

Each of the aspirants to the presidency should take into account that the methods of the pre-election fight and the opposition of the regime to a new wave of politicians and parliamentarians will not have anything in common with the laws of civilization. Anything is possible here, from mudslinging in the press and on central television to physical removal, from the buyoff of voters to the direct juggling of the results of the elections.

If the block of candidates of national-state orientation is thus not now able to devise a reliable system of control and auditing, starting with the electoral precincts and running right up to the very top, there is no use for it to get involved with the election campaign.

[Chebalin] Thank you for the frank and interesting conversation.

*Communist Party's Bindyukov on Party Platform

954F1914A Moscow PRAVDA ROSSII in Russian 23 Mar 95 pp 1,2,3

[Interview with Nikolay Bindyukov, secretary of the Russian Federation Communist Party Central Committee, by Valentina Nikiforova; place and date not given: "We Are Not Calling to Arms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **At the Third Congress of the Russian Federation Communist Party (RFCP), Nikolay Gavrilovich Bindyukov was elected secretary of the Central Committee, responsible for ideological work. He is a new face in the party leadership. Who is he? What does he want to talk about and what can he do?**

He himself tells his biography briefly, objectively. Born in 1946, he graduated from school with a gold medal and entered the teachers institute in Minsk, but he was drafted into the army in his second year. After his service, he took correspondence courses from the School of Philology at Leningrad University.

Later there was work in Novgorodchina in a school, the Komsomol, the oblispolkom, and the obkom of the CPSU, which he decided to quit when he did not agree with the style and methods of the leadership. He entered graduate school, but while he studied he also worked as a stevedore and rigger. Despite his small stipend, he felt obligated to support his family.

After graduate school he became a doctoral candidate in philosophy at Novgorod Pedagogical Institute, where he held every post (except the deanship) from senior teacher to rector. He worked five years as rector and began to fulfill his long-held dream: to create a university in Novgorod. In December 1993 he was elected deputy to the State Duma, and now he works on the Committee for CIS Affairs and National Communications.

The reason for our conversation with Nikolay Bindyukov was his reaction to O. Latsis's statement in IZVESTIYA, "Forward, Into the Past!"—malicious, unfair remarks on the congress of the RFCP.

"It was frustrating to read that," said Nikolay Gavrilovich. "I knew Latsis from working with him in the secretariat of the 28th CPSU Congress. This was a man—by the way, not a rank and file member of the CPSU—who seemed to sincerely want renewal for the party, who had no doubts about the correctness of socialist and communist ideas. What happened to him? Was it the dehumanization of society that did it?" My interlocutor's eyes looked out in concern and disappointment from behind his glasses. "He explains the Communist Party's failure in the 1993 elections in comparison with the Socialists' victory in several Eastern European countries by the fact that 'the Communist Party was in power in the USSR for much longer than for our European neighbors, and the memory of the crimes committed are deeper. The RFCP has scarcely tried to revive its own socialist slogans.' Let us set aside the main accusation for now because we have to say something about the slogans. Were the socialist slogans—power to the people in the person of the soviets or social guarantees for people of labor—really so bad?"

[Nikiforova] You have to understand that all this was said for a reason three weeks after the congress. They thought it over and realized that the RFCP was a real force that could really spoil the elections for power-hungry Russia's Choice (Vybor Rossii) (by the way, Latsis wrote an entire epic about this party and bound it in a shiny cover). So they went on the attack. I don't doubt that in the near future some other serious product from some famous analytical center will appear suggesting methods for eliminating those who are unwelcome. Understandably, the battle is getting more serious, and the Communists simply have to win the upcoming elections. This is the country's last chance to survive, and this means that the materials from the congress have to be made accessible not only to Communists but to all Russians, so that people know about them not from Latsis's or other people's assessments. What is the Central Committee doing about this?

[Bindyukov] First of all, we have tried to provide everyone with the reports, program, and resolutions. Our thanks to PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and PRAVDA MOSKVIY for that. The magazines ...IZM and DIALOG have also helped. We are also publishing them in a separate brochure. Second, we are preparing a brochure with answers to the 50 most typical questions, the ones people ask at meetings with deputies and organization leaders.

[Nikiforova] For example?

[Bindyukov] What is the difference between our program and the program of the Social Democratic Party? Is this or that politician sympathetic to our party? Who are the allies we could form a bloc with for the elections? Is there a danger of fascism arising in Russia?

[Nikiforova] There are so many questions about fascism. Isn't this an artificial issue addressed in order to distract people's attention from the real disasters and used by some to open a new "battle front"?

[Bindyukov] We have to consider both those things and also give people a full and honest answer. Latsis is being skillful when he tries to scare the gullible with concentration camps for supporters of perestroyka and reform. He's hoping that in the political rock slide people will not dig down to the truth, that they'll be frightened off and reject the Communists. That is why we want each member of the party not only to understand the congress materials but also to accept them in his heart. We have drawn up general recommendations, indicated the key problem issues, and prepared a list of literature.

[Nikiforova] Is a new system of political education being created?

[Bindyukov] To be more precise, it is political study for party members and political education for non-Communists. We have to show people what the party supports. In the program we wrote that the RFCP is the heir of the RSDRP (Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party), the VKP(b) (All-Union Communist Party [Bolsheviks]), the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), and the RSFSR Communist Party. We do not reject evolutionary or revolutionary methods of changing public life, but how can we talk about revolutionary methods of struggle when not a single detachment of the working class or the intelligentsia rose up in the general political strike? People are outraged and dissatisfied, but that has not translated into social action.

[Nikiforova] Your kitchen beachhead has done little to facilitate this.

[Bindyukov] Like Vladimir Ilyich, you have to start with circles, consultation sites where people can come to get advice, receive free consultation, and read the newspaper.

[Nikiforova] Are you thinking that only social activists will be able to master all this?

[Bindyukov] Altruists are hard but not impossible to find. In Volgograd, for example, we found them among VUZ teachers and scientific workers, and things are going pretty well. People are grateful. A young people's university has been created there. I have cited one form, but there are dozens of them. We will have to master all of them.

[Nikiforova] During the congress I noticed you looking after one young man. 0 [Bindyukov] Yes, he is a third-year student from Novgorod, Igor Ivanov. He isn't a member of the party or Komsomol, but he's a good student, a future historian. He's trying to sort out what is going on. We invited him to the party congress and got him together with some interesting people. Petr Vasilyevich Romanov gave him an autographed copy of his book. He attended youth meetings with Zyuganov. After the congress he and I talked and he told me: "In two days I haven't become a Communist, of course, but I have understood that these are ordinary people who are concerned about the well-being of the Russian state." I am more than certain that if he doesn't enter the party, then this kind of participation in the congress will at least influence the formation of his world view. Our misfortune is that we are still not strong enough to do as much of this kind of personal mentoring with young people as possible, through participation in major undertakings that give food not only for the mind but for the heart as well.

[Nikiforova] You mean to put into young hands the ideology of the 21st century, the concept of steady development? I think Latsis was wrong to be insulted that the Communists seized on this idea before everyone else. It did not necessarily start at the Communists' initiative, and what does steady development and socialism have to do with this anyway? It's too bad he didn't have enough time to get acquainted with the arguments of Academician Koptyug and his conclusion: steady development for countries and the world is possible only on the path to socialism. Unfortunately, however, for all its attractiveness, this idea has yet to generate general interest, like that specter of communism that roamed over Europe in the early 19th century. Energetic, fearless young people could have understood.

[Bindyukov] It's understandable that taking up something new when you're getting on in years—well, you keep looking over your shoulder and you measure dozens of times before you cut. But the party cannot live without fresh ideas. When we were defining our strategy, we liked this concept and we supported it. You don't have to frighten us with the Stalin bogeyman. Say what you like, but we Byelorussians know what bondage is. We understand what would have happened to the entire Soviet people if not for the victory in the Second World War, which you can't write Stalin out of. After the war our family—there were seven of us children—lived in a dugout for four years, and I was four before I drank a glass of milk. The occupiers slaughtered our cattle and drove it to Germany. That is how my fellow countrymen lived. It is too bad that people have forgotten it so quickly.

[Nikiforova] Or rather, that they have been made to forget it by those who did not live through those trials. Do you know what question people ask every day? Why did the RFCP drop its slogan, "Proletarians of all countries, unite!"?

[Bindyukov] Was that really a mistake? Let's sort this out. We know that no class, no social group, remains unchanged over time. The current working class is not the same one there was at the turn of the century or even 15-20 years ago. In a few countries, a rather significant middle class has appeared, which, according to Western sociologists' definition, stabilizes society. You have to understand where this "stability" comes from. We know that every third dollar earned in Brazil goes to repay its loans to the United States, which has caught other countries as well in such loans. As a result it is possible there to pay workers properly, to make them complaisant and society stable. If the United States lived the way we do at the cost of its own labor, then its stability, I think, would be dealt a serious blow. Their middle class is essentially an exploiter, albeit an indirect one. Can we unite with those types? After all, none of the foreign worker organizations supported either our miners or our ZIL workers. This does not mean that we are opposed to unification. People of labor must invariably unite against exploitation of some by others. I am certain that with time a slogan will appear, but it may sound somewhat different.

[Nikiforova] Is anyone in the RFCP studying the condition of the working class? Or are many conclusions coming out of private conversations, one-time observations? Doesn't it seem to you that other forecasts commit the sin of dilettantism or a completely stereotypical approach: "golden hands," scoundrels, and moonlighters? That does make it easy to lose the party's historical social base.

[Bindyukov] I can't say that the party is thoroughly studying the condition of the working class, but when I was writing my dissertation I came upon some interesting facts. There are a great number of workers who, having reached 35-40 years of professional expertise, considered well-done work more important than wages, although no one would refuse a raise. People did not work to get on the Honor Board but because their conscience would not allow them to work below that level. Their conscience was their own monitor.

[Nikiforova] This self-monitor does not allow them now to fight for their own dignity. How do people learn how to resist? Letters to the editor often ask that question.

[Bindyukov] Fairly recently Yuriy Pavlovich Belov and I were at the Petrozavodskbummash factory in Karelia. It was very hard to go there, as if the collective were against it. One worker actually shouted: "They didn't shoot enough of you Communists at the White House! This is me, the famous Sazhin, talking to you!" We suggested that we sort things out, that they give us a chance to speak for five minutes each; it would only take 10 minutes. We kept our word, but the discussion lasted more than two hours. At the end a worker came up to me and said: "Don't listen to him. They're not all like that, like Sazhin, but what are we going to do? Take up arms? I'm ready . . ." We understand Sazhin and the others, too. There is no point saying that only four or five percent have turned toward the market. According to my numbers, there are more—about 20 percent. What are we going to do, fight all of them? No, we are not calling people to arms, but we are advising them to demand decent treatment for themselves and demand that they be paid a decent salary in a timely fashion. That is in the current Constitution, after all. The trade unions are not completely destroyed, and it is their duty to protect people. They just don't want to because they are too busy forming their committees. In Novgorod, where there is high-tech industry and 12 percent of the jobs require higher education, people were simply lost at first. On 27 October 1994, however, they came out on the square. Moreover, they had had enough of the official trade unions, which did not want to advance political demands and were interested only in economic demands such as "President, government, give us our pay!" They advanced their own demands: if the president and government could not ensure normal living conditions, then they should step down.

[Nikiforova] Struggle is struggle, though. The regime has experience putting down protests. Could the party defend, say, participants in a strike?

[Bindyukov] It couldn't if they didn't support the party. Alliance is a pledge of success, and if you hold the position that those of you on top should decide and help me while we down here watch, then even a 550,000-member party cannot defend so much as a small group of picketers.

[Nikiforova] A strong organization is needed. Two months after the congress you held meetings with Communists and nonparty members. What were the general observations?

[Bindyukov] People are attracted to the Communists. In Staraya Russia, for instance, they have created six new primary organizations in the village and accepted six people into the party—of whom four were under age 20—and another 12 are preparing to join.

[Nikiforova] The new elections are coming soon. Will the party take part in them with its program?

[Bindyukov] We are formulating our campaign platform on the basis of our party program. We are making the articles of the minimum program more concrete. We are stating specifically that we want to form a government of national trust (or perhaps, salvation). We think that everyone—Communists and non-Communists alike—must take responsibility for what has happened to the country and bring it out of this impasse together. Afterward, at the next elections, let people show their preference for one party, which will form its own government.

[Nikiforova] Suppose our man becomes president. According to the demands of some, his first edict should eliminate the office of president. Is that correct?

[Bindyukov] I think that is emotion. I don't like the office or the institution of the presidency itself, but if there is a reasonable man, judge logically. Above all, the president has to organize the work of the government in order to halt the anarchy and its fall into the abyss. After that he can ask either the nation or the parliament this question. In addition, during this time he must prepare a new Constitution. Work has been done on this. More than a million signatures have been gathered for a referendum on Slobodkin; there is also Rumyantsev and the one by the deputies of the Russian Supreme Soviet.

[Nikiforova] Who would you like to be president?

[Bindyukov] I don't care about the name, but it must be a man who is physically and psychologically healthy. I worked as a rector for five years, and we did not allow one university entrant into his exam without medical permission. Right now in Russia you can take a megaphone and go out onto a square or a market and ask people to vote for you without presenting any kind of credentials. In my view, someone who knows the structure of the state as a system can work as a president (that is how he put it, **work**—V.N.). It's a complex system of social relations. I can't keep from citing the example of Reagan. He did not write quite correctly, and he wasn't strong in geography, but he did have one of the most valuable qualities: he had a nose for intelligent people. He wasn't the one who wrote the program for bringing the United States out of its crisis, but he found 50 smart people, and they created it. He and the government made a gifted stab at implementing it. Don't we have talented theoreticians and executives?! I have noted more than a dozen of them in the Duma alone. We need to give them a chance to work, and Russia will not remain in the dark. The Communist Party is ready to support them.

*Communists View Regional Elections

954F1914B Moscow PRAVDA ROSSII in Russian 23 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by Eduard Kovalev: "Let's Think About the Numbers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In March, elections for local organs of power were held in several regions of Russia.

In Orel, people voted for the oblast Duma in 11 okrugs and for the municipal Duma in 11. Communists were elected in 10 okrugs for the oblast Duma and in 10 for the municipal Duma. The two remaining mandates for the Duma—one for the oblast, the other for the municipal—went to representatives of the Union of Women (Soyuz zhenshchin). Now, of the 50 deputies in the Orel Oblast Duma, 30 are Communists, and in the Orel Municipal Duma 16 of the 18 deputies represent the Russian Federation Communist Party (RFCP).

In early March, elections were also held in Bashkiria.

Deputies were elected to the two chambers of the republic's State Assembly: the chamber of representatives (148 deputies from 74 okrugs, two representatives for each rayon and city); and the legislative chamber (40 deputies from single-mandate territorial okrugs). On 5 March, primary elections were held in 73 of the 74 okrugs for the chamber of representatives and in 34 of the 40 for the legislative chamber. Elected were 146 deputies to the chamber of representatives, of whom 27 (about 18.5 percent) were from the republic organization of the RFCP, and 34 deputies to the legislative chamber, of whom 12 (more than 35 percent) were from the RFCP. As was intended, the majority of those elected are representatives of power structures: the prime minister, all five of his deputies, and the administrative heads of the cities and rayons.

It is notable that representatives of political parties propagating a nationalist policy virtually lost the elections. Unfortunately, the Agrarian Party made an unsuccessful showing. Among the newly elected deputies, there are a few representatives from the corps of directors and from commercial and entrepreneurial structures.

*Subsidies for Government Papers Scored

954F1914C Moscow PRAVDA ROSSII in Russian 23 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by the editors: "Who Lives Happily and Freely in Russia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Naturally, people live more happily when they have money, but for those whose profession is to "make freedom" for speech or to create its appearance, the appearance of both (money and freedom) is a double reason for merriment.

Merrier than everyone else and exactly twice as free as all other publications put together is ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. Exactly two times less merry is ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, but even the circulation of this governmental dwarf is quite modest—70,000 subscribers. It makes merry, however, for a sum four times higher than the subsidies for the foremost daily newspaper in the country, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

Generally speaking, one can tell by the level of subsidies who is freer (or behaves better) than whom. Thus, TRUD is almost twice as free as KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, although its circulation will be lower.

If we take one issue as our unit, then the most free are INZHENERNAYA GAZETA, DELOVOY MIR, and UTRO ROSSII. Despite a vanishingly small circulation, the subsidies for the latter, for instance, equal those for SELSKAYA ZHIZN, which has the third or fifth largest circulation in the country among daily newspapers. Great, too, is the degree of liberation and merriment for MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. After all, they come out weekly, not daily, and their subsidies are respectable, especially for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, which receives the third largest subsidy of all non-state newspapers.

From its not quite R132 million from the state, PRAVDA can come out all week, and as a result the subscription cost for it is disproportionately great in comparison with the "freer" newspapers.

Naturally, putting out the Communist Party's newspaper PRAVDA ROSSII as a free weekly supplement to PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSII (which, by the way, receives an utterly laughable sum), we are not hiding the fact that the money for this publication comes from the party, and we make no claims to "freedom of speech" Yeltsin-style, just as we do not to the merriment of a feast during the time of a plague.

Circulation of Several Newspapers for the Russian Federation, as of 1 March 1995, Based on Data from the Federal Postal Administration of the Russian Ministry of Communications

Publication	Subscriptions	Retail Sales
MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA	152.9	283.1
OBSHCHAYA GAZETA	10.65	37.0
UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA	141.3	—
LITERATURNAYA GAZETA	51.5	52.1
MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI	54.2	*
RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA	28.8	40.0
MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS	3.0	1.6
DELOVOY MIR	13.0	—
...*... (weekly)	33.0	5.0
ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI	70.5	*

* By direct agreement with the editorial office.

Subsidies for Periodicals in 1994 out of Federal Budget Funds (thousands of rubles)

Publications Founded by the RF Government and RF Presidential Administration	
ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA	24,841,289
ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI	11,702,856
ZHURNAL RODINA	2,168,785
ZHURNAL ROSSIYSKAYA FEDERATSIYA	1,216,355
Total	39,929,285
Russia-wide Newspapers	
LITERATURNAYA GAZETA	908,729
VETERAN	129,871
MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI	250,000
SELSKAYA ZHIZN	571,334
NOYES LEBEN	90,981
RUSSKIY INVALID	55,933
LESNAYA GAZETA	99,019
DELOVOY MIR	537,361
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA	3,199,362
UTRO ROSSII	225,396
SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA	40,236
KULTURA	248,256
RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA	398,647
ROSSIYA	40,855
PRAVDA	131,956
TRUD	5,354,748
OBSHCHAYA GAZETA	44,630
INZHENERNAYA GAZETA	103,254
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA	107,296
SHCHIT I MECH	15,838
Total	12,553,902

*Inaction on 'Fascist' Papers Scored

954F1887A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 23 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by Nikita Vaynonen: "There Is a Court, but Where Is the Case?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An informed source in the State Legal Administration confirmed in a conversation with a ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent that an edict by the Russian Federation president entitled tentatively "On stepping up the struggle against extremist political organizations" is being prepared. The source was not specific about when the document will be signed, but to all appearances it will not be long; there have been too many warning signs lately that activity by the various extremists is being stepped up.

One of the signs of this danger became the subject of consideration recently at a meeting of the Legal Chamber on Information Disputes attached to the Russian Federation president. The State Duma asked the chamber about the broadcast "Gazetnyye Istorii" [Newspaper Stories] ("Fascism in Russia") on Channel 2 on 22 February and repeatedly mentioned it over the air and in print.

Let us remind you of what happened. Oleg Vakulovskiy, who was in charge of the broadcast, brought a young, unknown person, one Aleksey Vedenkin, to the screen. This brawny little fellow, without a trace of sincerity on his well-groomed face, expressed openly extremist views in the manner of Komsomol leaders, touching only slightly on Vakulovskiy's questions. We have heard quite a few statements like this from various ultrapatriotic leaders. It would mean nothing if Vedenkin did not want to show that he is a tougher fellow than his older party members. Blurting out their secret desires, he said he is prepared to shoot Sergey Kovalev and Sergey Yushenkov in the back of the head with his own gun.

The chamber found itself in a difficult position. Representatives of the television company repeated the position that its chairman, Oleg Poltsov, and other Russian television journalists had expressed more than once that the broadcast on which Vedenkin became the hero was aimed at showing the public the reality of the fascist threat, discrediting its lack of concern, and arousing defensive reactions. Critics of this position pointed out that Vedenkin's statements were not subjected to a convincing commentary, and this is not out of place at all in such cases.

The legal side of the matter was not simple, either. Can the company's actions be perceived as a violation of Article 4 of the Law on the Mass Media, which does not permit using the media to inflame national, social, and other intolerance and dissension? Judging by the text of their appeals to the chamber, the deputies assume this is precisely the case. A faction of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], however, which sent its representative to the meeting, believes that the purpose of the broadcast was to "create the myth of Russian fascism" (consequently, it does not exist in nature).

As always, the chamber adopted a reasonable and considered decision: the "Gazetnyye Istorii" broadcast attests to the authors' efforts to show the true face of fascism, and it succeeded to a considerable extent. The broadcast was timely, but it was not provocative and its authors did not violate the law. The chamber noted at the same time that the use of unverified facts in the broadcast, which is unacceptable, directs our attention to the need for further developing legislation aimed against extremism.

It is easy to agree with this, but the question remains: what is next? The chamber has been in similar situations before, but a case did not ensue. This is not the chamber's fault. Like a judicial proceeding—and even a presidential one—it does not have the usual judicial powers. It only has the right to make representations, give opinions, and recommend... This is the fault, or more precisely the trouble, with all three of our branches of government: the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

I cannot help but recall one article almost five years ago. The September 1990 issue of the magazine ZHURNALIST had an article by Eduard Polyanskiy entitled "How the Fofa [expansion unknown] Rehabilitated Adolf Hitler." It contained the following lines: "In the first draft of the CPSU Central Committee platform for the party's 28th Congress, we find words stating that "the creation and activity of organizations and movements which advocate violence and national discord and pursue extremist, anticonstitutional objectives should be banned in a legislative procedure." Such a law has been needed for a long time, and the press has repeatedly written about this need... This was written, I repeat, in 1990. There is still no such law.

Because they do not have a legal interpretation of the words "fascism," "extremism," "racism," etc., the courts deliver "not guilty" verdicts for openly fascist parties, publications, and individuals, but the latter still make counteraccusations of insults and slander. It is believed that references to the lack of legal definitions are groundless since in the Criminal Code and the Law on the SMI [Mass Media], penalties are provided for the appropriate deeds and appeals, and this is entirely adequate, they say. Not always! A demonstration takes place with extremist double transparencies [vernacular?], and both the deed and the appeal are apparent. There are no guilty parties. So why do they invite Vedenkin? For his hateful attitude, his loathsome nationalism which debases the true national dignity of a great people? No. The charge reads "for threatening murder." His imprisonment is purely symbolic—6 months. That is the same as any drunk might receive for threatening another person with: "I'll kill your mother!.."

They say it is hard to give an unambiguous definition of fascism: it is different today than under Hitler. As a rule, it repudiates its "classic" roots, and vague interpretations may provide the groundwork for arbitrariness. The question, however, is not raised today. The signs of fascism are well-known, and no one will dispute them. Of course, testimony of the fascist nature of some organization may not serve as a sign individually, but the sum total of many organizations may be symbolic. If we are referring to a publication, it would be the sum total of its materials which express a certain position. I doubt that it is right to take just individual statements, which usually cause the press committee to issue warnings to editorial offices and draw the attention of the Legal Chamber.

Why is it so important to legislatively define what fascism, racism, etc. are? Fascists and racists take strong offense to these words now and run away from them like the devil runs from incense. The leader of Russian National Unity, Aleksandr Barkashov, answered in response to a televised question about his attitude toward fascism: "I interpret it the way our people have perceived it." It seems to some people that the fascists are repudiating fascism only while the 50th anniversary of the victory over fascism is being observed. This is a very simplified interpretation. One of the scientific definitions of fascism states that "it differs from other forms of reactionary dictatorship by its broad ties with a certain rather large part of the population which is not part of the ruling class and has the capacity to mobilize and activate politically." Without such support, there is no fascism as a reserve force, and under favorable circumstances even a ruling force, of historically unpromising but quite powerful structures (here that is criminal business, corrupt officials, and the revanchist part of the ruling elite). "Support of the masses" is completely essential for them, but they never will obtain it in Russia under the banner of fascism. If it is demonstrated that some party, some newspaper, or some loud leader are fascist by nature, however, this would be a very powerful blow to the main antisocial forces. The word "fascist" would become equivalent to the word "criminal," just as the word "racist" is equivalent to it in accordance with all international standards. Until there is a court decision, no one can be called racist. If you were convicted under the "Fascism" article, however, do not shout "Slander!" when they call you a fascist, just as a recidivist called a gangster does not shout when convicted in accordance with the "Gangsterism" article.

The most humiliating and irritating feeling is weakness. They taunt you openly, but you cannot do anything. Barkashov repudiates fascism while he sits under a stylized fascist symbol. A certain Mogutin, a young author at the newspaper NOVYY VZGLYAD, edited by the fairly well-known Yevgeniy Dodolev, heaps a lot of contempt on members of the Legal Chamber, which exposed him as a double-dyed racist, and he is sent away with his boss, swaggering with impunity. He wrote in the paper: "the Chechens... are a half-savage, barbaric nation. Let them resettle in their auls and kishlaks [villages] and mountain ravines and live in their tents, yurts, caves, and mud huts, or whatever they have there where they eat!" He called the intelligentsia an "anti-Russian settlement tank" and said of the Catholic pope: "Where is the Pope looking?.. Will he shout for the fate of hundreds of Russian Christians who have died?" Dodolev justifies the article by saying that this is pluralism, and what commentary there is in it is a pat on the back for a street boor. The cheap populism of this opus disappointed me. His sense of style has changed. His theses are disputable, but this point of view "has a place." By supposedly repudiating Mogutin's racism and xenophobia, his "commentator" differs little from him: "I have already stated that Sergey Kovalev is a state criminal." Thanks, only if the pistol is not placed at the back of his head.

Regardless, NOVYY VZGLYAD is still coming out all right. With regard to RUSSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, B. Zhamsuyev, chairman of the Duma Committee on Nationality Affairs, recently asked deputies to "resolutely condemn the displays of chauvinism and nationalism" in this newspaper, but the committee on the press, where this document was sent for steps to be taken, as they say, replied that it had been given two official warnings, but "the proper conclusions were not drawn by the editorial office" and for that reason, the committee is "preparing materials for a suit" for the court to end its activity. As a comparison: only two of the many cases of this type have been brought to a victorious conclusion in the court of first instance, and those were appealed.

This is the price of a lack of "definitions," although the matter is far from being limited to them, of course. So why are the deputies dragging out the law which suppresses the very possibility of extremism? Shouldn't they be looking for an answer right there, in their own decision "according to Kovalev?"

The Russian people despise fascism, but the moods of the masses provide real soil for the shoots of its ideology and practice, under other names or without any at all. A wolf is a wolf under any disguise, whether it be sheep's skin or a falcon's feathers. The public does not have the right to deceive itself. Otherwise, even a presidential edict will have a weak effect.

*Independent Trade Union Electoral Bloc Discussed

954F1763A OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 10, 9-15 Mar 95 p 8

[Article by Lev Sigal, under "Tendency" rubric: "Improbable Solo Edition of 'Old' Trade Unions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Recently, the executive committee of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions [FNPR] resolved to create the Russian Trade Unions electoral association, which would participate in parliamentary elections. It is expected that the next congress of the**

FNPR will be convened at the end of March and that it will approve the trade union's list of candidates for deputy positions.

The general intention for the list looks like this: the first three include, naturally, FNPR Chairman Mikhail Shmakov; one of the women, at the same time representing the ethnic republics; and also some distinguished personality called in from outside. In the arguments about whom to invite for this role, the names of Viktor Chernomyrdin, Ivan Rybkin, Sergey Glazyev, and Stanislav Govorukhin are being bandied about. It is proposed that "Varangians" will make up nearly the entire first 10, and then will come the trade union activists.

The daring nature of this plan is striking, as its solo entry onto the political stage of the enormous union association is something that is nearly unprecedented in the world—all the more since the FNPR numbers about 60 million, which is 90 percent of the working population. It is natural, then, that among trade union bosses, not to mention the rank and file dues-payers, there are also loyalties to many different parties. The large trade union of agro-industrial complex workers, for example, is one of the founders of the Agrarian Party of Russia [APR]. Even at the last elections, the textile workers union supported the agrarians, and now timber industry and communications workers are being drawn into their orbit.

Within the FNPR, there is also a union of detective service workers. The detectives are friendly with Yegor Gaydar, Boris Fedorov, and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. Although among the public utility workers' trade union's active members there are also several admirers of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and the Democratic Party of Russia has its supporters as well. The strongest ideological impact, however, especially on the leaders of regional trade union federations, is made by the communists. Among branch workers, those most strongly drawn to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [KPRF], are the leaders of military servicemen's unions and defense workers.

If the provinces are more radical and closer to the communists, then the Moscow leadership of the FNPR and the central committees of most branch unions prefer pinkish tones rather than red. This is partly Lyudmila Vartazarava's Socialist Party of Workers [SPT], but it is to a large degree the Russian Social-Democratic Union [RSDS]. With Mikhail Shmakov's blessing, Tatyana Frolova, FNPR secretary, Mikhail Nagaytsev, chairman of the Moscow Federation of Trade Unions, and Andrey Isayev, editor of the trade union newspaper SOLIDARNOST, have become part of the leadership of the RSDS, while Igor Yurgens, first deputy chairman of the General Confederation of Trade Unions of the CIS, has become co-chairman of the union. True, Shmakov recently welcomed a congress of "Yakovlev's party," but this, most likely, should be understood as a sign of respect toward the state government, which openly demonstrated its patronage of Yakovlev's congress.

In addition to this, individual branch workers have shown a desire to start their own parties: the union of automobile manufacturers recently created the Automobile-Lovers' Party, while Vitaliy Butko, leader of the coal workers' union, has come up with a Miners' Party.

To all appearances, this ideological-political pluralism has also compelled the FNPR to do something in order to prevent the federation's dispersion, to bring the regional and branch workers who have been distracted by various parties back into the bosom of their family. However, many experts consider the means that have been chosen to be extremely risky. The trade unions, putting it mildly, made less than a brilliant showing at the last elections, when they promoted their candidates by single-mandate districts. A failure in the '95 elections will mean, to a lesser degree, that the FNPR's leadership will step down, and in the worst case scenario, it could cause the government to dissolve the gigantic trade union association, declaring it an inflated organization. Even if the five-percent plank is taken, far fewer than 60 million of the electorate will give their votes deliberately to Russia's Trade Unions, a fact of which the FNPR's enemies will tirelessly remind us.

For this reason, many people consider Russia's Trade Unions to be only a way station on the road to a coalition with other parties. They say—and Shmakov himself has stated—that when the trade union electoral association is created, it may become part of a bloc "with the KPRF, the APR, the RSDS, the SPT, and other left-center forces."

Theoretically, a large coalition like the KPRF-APR-FNPR-RSDS rectangle, the idea of which is being promoted by Igor Yurgens, is advantageous for its participants because it allows them to challenge the parliamentary majority. With the current level of friction among the "left," however, this is almost a utopia.

In the opinion of Boris Kagarlitskiy, an FNPR expert, the trade unions will unavoidably enter into a bloc with the KPRF, it being the only powerful party. Here, either Mikhail Shmakov will give in to pressure from regional trade union leaders, who have already formed blocs with communists at local elections, or they will replace him at the next congress after accusing him of opportunism.

This, however, is only one of the possible alternatives. Mikhail Shmakov has already demonstrated more than once his art of parrying attacks from the left. This is not a matter of his diplomatic talents but of the fact that the trade union bosses do not want to become sworn enemies of a government that recognizes the special status of traditional trade unions. Gennadiy Zyuganov's direct appeal to the regional trade union associations (at the end of last year, he sent them a letter, over Shmakov's head, proposing cooperation) also fails to foster growth in mutual understanding between the leadership of the KPRF and the FNPR.

A pre-election bloc made up of the FNPR and Yuriy Skokov's Federation of Goods Manufacturers also seems doubtful, flirting with regional trade union bosses who are opposed to their Moscow chiefs. Aleksandr Yakovlev's RPSD [Russian Party of Social Democrats], occupying a different ideological flank, most likely will form a bloc not with the FNPR but with alternative trade unions like the NPG [expansion?] or Sotsprofa.

The RSDS, which was also created counting on a political alliance with the FNPR, is another matter. True, the social-democrats have not yet reached a single point of view on pre-election tactics. For example, Pavel Kudyukin, RSDS secretary, believes that the social-democrats should come out independently at the elections because a bloc with the "old" trade unions will not raise but, on the contrary, will lower their popularity. However, most likely the social-democrats will take advantage of the fact that the FNPR's executive committee has instructed its political committee to create an electoral association, and in that political committee the majority of the members happen to be social-democrats and sympathizers. Naturally, they will try to form a bloc with the FNPR and the RSDS based on the most honorable conditions for both of them. So, Andrey Isayev, a member of the political committee, proposes forming a bloc called the Union of Russian Social Justice (with the acronym SSSR [USSR]), and cementing it before the May holidays with a one-day strike demanding payment of back pay.

*Arrest of 'Fascist' Vedenkin Discussed

954F1763B Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 10, 9-15 Mar 95 p 8

[Article by Yelena Tokareva under "Company Secret" rubric: "Vedenkin Appointed Fascist of the Day"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **After Aleksey Vedenkin became the first of the fascists to be granted the right to express himself on television and then was imprisoned in Lefortovo, all the state structures and public organizations exposed to him hurried to disown him, as if he were an open impostor.**

It turns out that this saucy kid is just a fascist off the street, a liar, an insignificant parvenu, who "never did, was not a part of, did not belong." In fact, according to several sources that OBSHCHAYA GAZETA has access to, Mr. Vedenkin is not at all the person people say he is.

A typist from one of the central newspapers identified Aleksey Vedenkin as her son's boss, an employee of the organization that everyone is accustomed to calling the KGB. Galya the typist's story, accompanied by ecstatic interjections, looked like this:

By title, Aleksey Vedenkin is probably a general. In any case, when my son and I and two of his children went to the Foros sanatorium on vacation at Vedenkin's invitation, Vedenkin was living there in "deluxe" accommodations with a sailboat and a whole staff of servants at his disposal—various boys who drove him around, entertained him, and generally waited on him.

We went to Foros without passes; he just called and said: the weather is great, blow on over. They gave us a room for four, but Vedenkin decided that one room would be a little small for us and immediately proposed that we move into his mansion. He is very kind, just a saint. His room had a refrigerator filled with imported food and wine, which he left to us without saying anything more about it. Arkadiy Volskiy, who was also vacationing at Foros at that time, and many other famous people treated him very well.

Although my son is only a lieutenant, Vedenkin was kind to my son. He always gave him the opportunity to make money outside of his regular work. For example, he arranged that he would guard some central committee dachas; they had a swimming pool and a sauna. My son was satisfied, and his wife was happy. Then, they guarded a Archil's restaurant...

Vedenkin called my son from America, where he had business, and when the October events began, he called my son from the White House and asked him to defend parliament, but I didn't let him. It was already too dangerous, and I was able to keep him from going...

The same evening another person, knowledgeable of nomenklatura personnel, identified Aleksey Vedenkin—Aleksandr Krasnov, former chairman of the Moscow's Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon Soviet.

"Who doesn't know Lekha?" Krasnov exclaimed. "After all, he has worked in the guard—first in the KGB, then in the presidential administration. Then he guarded Gavriil Popov and the state dachas on Skolkovskiy Highway, which for some reason had been given to a commercial organization—the Foundation to Support International University, which is the same university that Gavriil Popov was permitted to create as smart money when he yielded the post to Mayor Luzhkov.

The dachas that Lekha guarded were about 60 cottages and a luxurious central building. All of it was rented out, bringing in good money. Vedenkin is a pretty harmless guy, sometimes too harmless. In any case, in his life he has never offended a single woman; he simply has nothing to do with them. When the owners of the dachas were gone, Lekha would invite his friends there and would generally behave like the mutt in the cartoon who invites another dog over to boast about his life and complain about his boss until his heart's content.

Had Lekha left the KGB by that time? I don't think so. After all, nobody ever leaves there; a person stays there forever. Of course, he really wasn't a general; judging by his age, he wasn't any higher than captain. Before Vedenkin headed Gavriil Popov's security service, he worked at Staraya Ploshchad—not when the CPSU Central Committee was there, but when Proshin, who called his company the "Security Service for the Presidential Administration," settled there. This wasn't Korzhakov's real Security Service; it was the same kind of word play used in the Foundation to Support International University closed joint-stock organization. In my opinion, either Korzhakov or someone else didn't like Lekha, so he flew out of there. True, there were few strange things about him. For example, he adored listening to the fuhrer's speeches, even though he didn't understand a word of German. He'd sit in a car with a flashing light, push in his cassette of Hitler's speeches, and enjoy. Sometimes at traffic lights, when his feelings overflowed, he would turn on his loudspeaker and broadcast Hitler's speeches to the public. He loved to listen to the textbook fascist songs: the "Horst Wessel Song" or "On Watch at the Rhine." He also had this weakness: when he'd see a dog, he would always say "arf" through his loudspeaker. A nice person, wouldn't hurt a fly.

What can explain his love for the fuhrer? Perhaps it was an internal yearning. It was an entirely non-partisan love. He was an unregistered fascist who didn't belong to a single organization, but he loved the black uniform, the holster. Maybe it was some kind of inferiority complex. Among the fascists, Vedenkin was nobody. He had none of their structures; he was the one that everyone would send out for beer.

When Lekha contracted to guard Archil Gomeashvili's Golden Ostap restaurant, he became acquainted with the German Hirke, who was responsible for the party cash box in the German Workers' Socialist Party. The party no longer existed, but the cash box did, and Lekha managed to become friends with this Hirke. After the 1993 putsch, Lekha realized that it was time to get out of here, and with Hirke's help, he got out to Europe where he flew in a rectangle—Belgrade-Vienna-Paris-Berlin—creating security services and combining them into one heap.

Vedenkin loved to meet famous people. You might see him next to Zhirinovskiy at a press conference and the next minute with Barkash's people. He, of course, wanted to find a place for himself close to some strong personality. Maybe aces like this would come into the building where he worked. I remember how he very much wanted to get to know Otari Kvantrishvili at the very same Golden Ostap. Oh, how he groveled: "Otari Vitalyevich, I have dreamed for so long of meeting you..." Otari, however, was a man of principles, and there was something about Vedenkin that he didn't like, maybe his youthful pink cheeks... He chased him away.

In September-October, 1993, Vedenkin made himself out as Achalov's deputy, screaming into the telephone: "Launch the planes in the Primorye!" and that kind of nonsense. It is hard to say exactly who he was working for at that time; for him, the main thing was always to be participating in some kind of commotion. He arranged for some articles to be printed about himself; he probably even paid for them. When I knew him, his aspirations reached no higher than to become head guard for some important person. After shooting his mouth off about his fascism, he regretted what he'd said; he's in trouble for being stupid. Incidentally, he called me right before he was arrested looking for some guy; he was very scared and upset. It is understood, incidentally, that he won't be put away for long.

*Proposed Amendments to Federal Law on Weapons Noted

954F1883A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Mar 95 p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Boris Bronshteyn, Izhevsk: "If in Act I a Rifle Is Hanging on the Wall, Before Act III It Is Desirable To Adopt a Precise Law on Weapons"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **In Izhevsk the topic of weapons is being discussed actively. For a city that is considered to be the unofficial capital of gunsmiths, that topic is especially important, especially since this time it has been addressed by Oleg Kuzmenko, executive director of the Union of Russian Gunsmiths, and Rafis Kayumov, chief of the Criminal Investigation Administration of the Udmurtia MVD.**

When Oleg Kuzmenko was the head of a working group in the State Duma's Security Committee, he prepared for review by the deputies a number of major amendments to the "Weapons" law that had been adopted a year ago. That law—the first of its kind in Russia—replaced the semisecret MVD [Ministry ofInternal Affairs] instructional guide that attempted to regulate, in the best way that it could, the sale and storage of weapons. The law laid the legal foundations in this extremely dangerous sphere of human interests, but, during the year that passed, practice has revealed a large number of gaps and incompletely resolved places in it. It was necessary to make amendments and additions which, in the view of the persons developing the changes, were supposed to help the law-abiding citizen to defend his life and property.

What kind of changes were these? Well, for example, it was proposed to simplify the obtaining of authorizations to own a gas-operated weapon. Currently, in order to get a gas-operated pistol, a person must obtain and submit to the militia four official statements, walk through various offices for two or three weeks, and pay for a license an amount of money that exceeds the value, say, of an RG-22 revolver. It is the general feeling at the Union of Gunsmiths that RF Minfin [Ministry of Finance] and MVD have converted the licensing of weapons from a means of control into a reliable method of assessing excessive taxes, and this pertains not only to gas-operated weapons. For example, the cheapest rifle, the IZh-18, thanks to the implementation of a number of legally binding acts, becomes 3.8 times more expensive for the purchaser. At such time the manufacturer-plant does not receive a single kopeck from the amounts of money additionally exacted from the citizens.

Out of the large number of other corrections, it is necessary to mention a paragraph that authorizes having in private ownership a smooth-bore weapon (but its owner must not depict himself as a hunter, be part of any association, or provide himself with an extra document). Something else that undoubtedly deserves attention is the addition that authorizes cadre military personnel and workers in the power departments to store and wear a weapon that they might be able to employ both for their own protection and the protection of those around them. "This is simply surprising," Oleg Kuzmenko says. "An officer is trusted, say, with a combat aircraft, but is not trusted with a personal weapon. Because if one is afraid of his unpredictable actions, their consequences are much more serious when he is sitting at the controls of an aircraft than when he is carrying a pistol in a holster. It is ridiculous and sad to watch many officers in the militia, after the end of the working day, change into civilian clothing out of fears that, on the way home, if they are still wearing a uniform, they will be asked—without having their weapons on them—to go to someone's help."

But what subsequently proved to be the main correction concerns the service weapon. According to Kuzmenko, the discussion about it at the State Duma session involved so many passionate views that the entire law sank in the noise and the uproar. Those collisions apparently deserve to be described in greater detail. The article "Service Weapon" in the law that is in effect is worded in a not completely intelligible way. It states that the storage and wearing of a service weapon is authorized for workers in enterprises and organizations with special tasks according to their charters. That is, this is authorized for persons who are executing duties of protecting property, valuable or dangerous freight, special correspondence... But the text does not contain a precise definition of specifically what kind of weapon can be used as a service one. The situation has reached the absurd. As of today, Oleg Kuzmenko explains, if one lives according to the law that is in effect (and how can one do otherwise?), then it will be necessary to disarm all the plant guards and bill collectors, since 1 January was the expiration date for their use of their previous weapon, and there has not yet been any definition of what weapon they are supposed to be issued instead. So what appears is an amendment that recognizes as a service weapon a short-barrel weapon with muzzle energy of no more than joules and also a long-barrel one that has no more than a thousand of those joules.

Obviously, certain deputies might have been confused about such unusual units of measurement, but, as Oleg Kuzmenko said, shortly before that discussion the leader of the LDPR [Russian Liberal Democratic Party], upset by the latest in a series of murders of a State Duma deputy, added his amendment to the article "Service Weapon" by a text that immediately moved the joules into the background. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy proposed providing a service weapon to the deputies to the Federal Assembly, as well as the highest officials in the executive authority of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Federation. After stormy discussion, Zhirinovskiy's proposal was rejected, and, together with it, the entire legislative draft that had been easily adopted a month ago in the first reading and that had been coordinated with 26 ministries and departments. The deputies were left without any service weapon, and the country was left without a balanced law, the need for which apparently no one has any doubts. A law that contains simply surprising deficiencies remains in force. Thus, according to Oleg Kuzmenko, if a person has a grenade today, that is definitely not a violation of the law, because that grenade has not yet fallen either under the definition of "weapon" or "explosives." It is understandable that a grenade that has not found its way into the text of a law will find its way more easily into a door or a vehicle.

Oleg Kuzmenko's vexation with regard to the failure to accept the amendments to the law is largely explainable by the fact that he, as the executive director of the Union of Gunsmiths, is protecting the interests of the weapons producers. And those interests lie chiefly in assuring that the weapons being produced find a consumer more easily. However, for the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that the gunsmiths, taking into consideration the opinion of the MVD, are ready to place limitations on their output, and that important factor was reflected in the proposed amendments. They included, in particular, a requirement concerning the inability of the weapon to be modified. What this is can be explained with the example of the 6P-42 gas-operated pistol, which is an almost exact copy of the famous Makarov pistol and which can be adapted rather easily for bullet fire. This causes the completely understandable dissatisfaction of the workers in the militia, who state that our gunsmiths are helping gangsters to arm themselves.

It was precisely this kind of pistol that was used a week ago in Izhevsk to murder the legally recognized thief Oleg Murin, and that murder served as the beginning for a new series of bloody showdowns in the city's criminal environment. Mutilated bodies, cars set on fire, persons who had disappeared... All of this gives rise to fears and rumors in any populated place, and especially in a city where weapons are being produced in unbelievable quantities and are being secretly circulated.

Dozens of Kalashnikov assault rifles and Makarov pistols (including those that had been modified from gas-operated ones) that were confiscated from criminals, and grenades and cartridges, are mentioned by Rafis Kayumov, chief of the Criminal Investigation Administration of the Udmurtia MVD. Last year, 342 crimes that were linked with the theft, manufacture, or sale of firearms were committed in the republic. The militia discovered underground shops for assembling Kalashnikov assault rifles and detained the people dealing in them. Rafis Kayumov refers to the imperfect legislation, but unlike Oleg Kuzmenko, who is in favor of the broader application of self-defense weapons, stated that he is in favor of limiting their production and sale. "Our society has not yet matured to the point of owning weapons, and attempts to arm the law-abiding population are leading to an additional increase in crime." That is the opinion of an important militia worker and experienced practitioner.

What can one say to this? An IZVESTIYA corespondent was reminded of a statement made in a local newspaper by one of the rayon investigators, who, giving an overall evaluation of the practical situation, wrote that there had been an increase in the number of domestic murders with the use of hatchets, irons, and shovels... It is not precluded that someone will conclude that our society has not yet matured to the point of owning hatchets and irons!

*Criminal Code Changes Needed To Fight Organized Crime

954E0791A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Osin, candidate of legal sciences: "Rebuses for Judges: The Legal Field for the Fight Against Organized Crime Will Be Mined if Changes Are Not Made in the Draft of the Criminal Code"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The draft of the RF Criminal Code that was considered in the first reading by the State Duma is undoubtedly a substantial step in moving toward an adequate reflection in the legislation of Russia of those socioeconomic reforms that have occurred in our country.

The need to adopt that Law is also influenced by the circumstance that various groups, organizations, and parties, attempting to represent to the voters their importance in law-making activity, are proposing all kinds of versions of special laws. This is inevitably leading to the destruction of the existing legal system and to the annihilation of codified legislation, with which many generations of jurists have become accustomed to working. And also, for the citizens of Russia, legislation that has been codified by the individual branches of the law is more understandable and more accessible. However, the presented draft is not devoid of shortcomings. This pertains first of all to organized forms of crime.

It must be admitted that the proposed formulations for defining organized forms of crime do not contain any clear signs that would enable the practical workers to make any delimitations among them, or to give a different interpretation to them.

An analysis of judicial-investigative practice, as well as the decrees of the RF Supreme Court, attests to the fact that, until the present time, both investigators and judges have been experiencing serious difficulties even in delimiting crimes perpetrated by a group of persons in accordance with a prior plot or by an organized group.

It was also impossible to do this when, in July 1994, the Criminal Code was supplemented by Article 17.1, in which the first attempt was made, with the assistance of concepts that had crystallized in the Russian language, to describe the signs that differentiate one group crime from another. The different degree of organization within the groups constituted the basis for this classification. If there was information to the effect that the persons participating in the group crime had previously only come to an understanding about the crime that was committed, then that crime had to be qualified as one that was perpetrated by a group on the basis of a prior plot, but if there was information to the effect that the participants in a group crime and not only come to an understanding, but had also previously united, then that group should be recognized as being an organized group (Article 1 of the UK [Criminal Code]). However, the law did not reveal wherein lies the difference between the concepts "previously come to an understanding" and "previously united."

In the S. I. Ozhegov Dictionary of the Russian Language, the use of the word "to unite" [*obyedinitsya*] is recommended for those instances when it is necessary to talk about the combining of something into a single whole, "to join, forming a unity." The words "to come to an understanding" [*dogovoritsya*] is applicable in those instances when it is necessary to speak about a situation in which the sides, after negotiations, have come to some kind of agreement, for example, "how to act."

Thus, the meaning of the words mentioned only characterizes individual aspects of the crime committed by a group of persons. Both for a group operating on the basis of a prior plot, and for an organized group, one may employ words that characterize the existence of previous negotiations and the agreement among the participants about "how to act," as well as the "formation of a unity" from among that number of participants who have combined to form a group to commit criminal acts. However, there is no doubt that the degree of organization between the groups that are being considered has its differences and it should be designated by other signs than "previously united" and "previously come to an understanding."

The definitions proposed in Article 36 of the legislative draft for crimes as being committed by a group of persons in accordance with a prior plot, by an organized group, or by a criminal community also do not enable one to make any delimitations among the various forms of group criminal activity.

Whereas the proposed definition of a crime committed by a group of persons in accordance with a prior plot contains signs that make it possible to distinguish it from any group crime committed, for example, at a warehouse or grain storage facility on the basis of such signs as "the participants included executors who had previously come to an understanding concerning its joint commission," the proposed description of an organized group does not enable one to judge about that new quality that it has acquired, and that would enable one to differentiate it from a group of persons who had previously come to an understanding about the joint commission of the crime. The state of organization of the group cannot be revealed through such a sign as "stability." In the Russian language the definition corresponding to this concept is "standing firmly, without wavering, without falling, not susceptible to waverings, constant, steady, firm."

Even more difficulties arise with regard to the proposed definition of a crime that is committed by a community.

First of all, although the law and its norms will read "committed by a criminal community," in that instance such crimes simply cannot exist in nature, since it is only by a court sentence that has gone into effect that any organization (including a community) can be recognized as a criminal one. Therefore, in order to qualify a criminal act that has been committed by a community according to the definition that is proposed in Article 36 of the legislative draft, it will be necessary to have a court decision that would make it possible to conclude that the persons who united into a stable and consolidated organization were previously sentenced by a court for commission of a crime as part of a community.

Inasmuch as the responsibility for that criminal act does not exist in the Criminal Code that is in effect, the judges will not be able to hold anyone accountable for such misdeeds, and, consequently, in all instances of *corpus delicti* in which it is proposed to punish the guilty individuals on the basis of the highest category of crimes, those norms will simply be inoperative.

In this regard it is proposed, in order to develop more precise definitions of various forms of group crime, to invite into the working group, alongside of specialists in criminal law, philologists as well. One should not forget that, when formulating the norms of a law, it is necessary to employ those concepts that are used in the language in which those laws are written. In addition, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that "the words and expressions of the law must be given the meaning that they have in the corresponding language."

At the same time, the arbitrary exposition of criminal phenomena in the norms of the criminal law also substantially limit the measures with the aid of which various signs of a crime are established. And one cannot fail to take that circumstance into consideration when describing various forms of group crime. It may happen that the proposed signs of a group crime will be impossible to prove with the aid of those measures that are set forth in the UPK [Code of Criminal Procedure].

A word that cannot be applicable for describing a criminal group having a qualitative and possibly quantitative distinction from an organized group is such a word as "community" [*soobshchestvo*]. In the Russian language one understands by that word "an association of peoples, states, having common interests, goals."

The criminal activity of a group having a more qualitative development than an organized group can be characterized as an organization. In the theory of criminal law, a definite amount of attention was paid to that concept when attempts were being made to deal with such a concept as "an anti-Soviet organization."

In order to qualify what was committed by a group as a crime that had been committed by an organization, it is necessary to use all the findings of criminologists concerning the criminal groups that are operating in Russia, their structure, and their differentiating signs; possibly this, then, will make it possible to provide a definition for a crime that has been committed by an organization.

If it is impossible to do this, then in order to fight organized crime at the present-day stage it will be completely sufficient to make more precise, completely unambiguous differentiations between acts that are committed by a group of persons in accordance with a prior plot and by an organized group. Only in this instance will it become possible to carry on the struggle against this social phenomenon with the aid of the norms of criminal law. This is already attested to by the experience of foreign countries. There the existence of organized crime has been recognized for a long time, but there is no responsibility there for crimes that were committed by the "Mafia." For example, in Italy those whom the journalists call "Mafiosi" are brought to justice for having committed crimes as part of an organized group.

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*Statute on All-Russian Social Labor Monitoring Confirmed

954E0791B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 11

[Decree: "Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation, dated 22 March 1995, No. 291, Moscow: 'Confirmation of the Statute on All-Russian Monitoring of the Social-Labor Sphere'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Government of the Russian Federation decrees:

1. To confirm the appended Statute on All-Russian Monitoring of the Social-Labor Sphere (not published).

2. The RF Ministry of Labor the RF State Committee on Statistics are to:

—take steps in 1995 to organize and conduct all-Russian monitoring of the social-labor sphere jointly with RF Ministry of Economics, RF Ministry of the Social Protection of the Population, the Russian Federal Employment Service, the Russian Federal Migration Service, and other federal agencies of the executive authority, as well as interested agencies of the executive authority of subjects of the Russian Federation;

—coordinate the activities of agencies of the executive authority, institutions, and organizations that guarantee the conducting of the all-Russian monitoring of the social-labor sphere.

3. To allocate in 1995 to the RF Ministry of Labor for the financing of the all-Russian monitoring of the social-labor sphere, 5 billion rubles from the reserve fund of the Government of the Russian Federation.

4. RF Ministry of Finance, beginning in 1996, is to stipulate the specifically addressed financing of the all-Russian monitoring of the social-labor sphere at the expense of funds in the federal budget.

5. To recommend to agencies of the executive authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation that they organize on the corresponding territories the conducting of monitoring of the social-labor sphere.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government.

'Paradoxes' of Corruption Case Viewed

954F1880A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Mar 95 p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Albert Plutnik: "A Person Recognized as Being Guilty Is Finally Free: Certain Paradoxes in the Court Sentence in the Case of the Military Conductor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Late in the evening of 20 March, in the court of Military Unit 36822 (chairman, Colonel N. Kortavenkov) the sentence was announced in the case of Major Shkutnik, conductor of the military band of one of the units in the former ZGV [Western Group of Forces]. Recognizing his blame for having repeatedly received bribes from the musicians in the band in exchange for the extension of their service in the Western Group of Forces, the court sentenced the major to a year and two months of confinement in a regular-conditions colony. What has finally happened since the moment of announcement of the sentence is what was been dreamed about so long not only by the musician himself, but also by all those unprejudiced observers who attentively followed first the course of the preliminary investigation, and then the court investigation of this "case".**

We might recall, in explaining this paradox, that in his accusatory speech Procurator Nikolay Putushkin, colonel of justice, demanded a much more serious punishment for the defendant: 8 years of imprisonment, loss of all military ranks and awards, and confiscation of property. The court did not consider it possible to agree with all those demands. The officer has retained his military rank, and there will be no confiscation of property. We might also recall that, in order to avoid surprising the reader concerning this, so to speak, unround figure designating the term of confinement, that Georgiy Shkutnik was arrested in July 1993, and then was intermittently confined for exactly one year and two months, that is, precisely the amount of time meted out to him *ex post facto* by the court. So now it would seem that he does not owe anything to military justice, and it owes nothing to him. We might also recall that the conductor had been accused of taking bribes in the amount of 1600 German marks. But the court recognized as being proven an amount of 1200 marks. That is, the amount received from three musicians, rather than from four (at the rate of 400 marks from each). That is a very important refinement—for the purpose of understanding, it seems to me, the course of the court investigation. The fact of the matter is that if, in this instance, one subtracts one musician from four, then the total amount collected from the three so-called bribe-givers is a sum that no longer reaches "especially large size." Consequently, the court has the opportunity to requalify the accusation and lighten the sentence.

Inasmuch as the verdict has just been given, naturally no one, other than the judge himself, Major of Justice Tsymbarenko, and his deputies, Major P. Migranov and Captain Yu. Osipov, has held it in his hands or read it. But even as heard by everyone who was present in the courtroom during the announcement of the sentence it was clear that a complicated piece of work had been done by its creators. It became understandable why the pronouncing of the court's decision had taken so long. Even on the last day it had been allegedly necessary to wait, as though this was a superimportant air flight that had been delayed many times. It had been planned to read the sentence at 1700 hours, then at 1900 hours, then... The comparison with a delayed air flight is all the more justified in that the court that had meted out the justice is assigned to long-range aviation.

In a word, one could sense how difficult it had been for the military jurists to make the final decision of this question. In general, one can understand them. After an investigation that had been conducted in a rather undistinguished manner, after everything that it had done with the poor major (the insults, arrests, the traveling under escort, his confinement in a mental hospital, the sudden taking of him from Germany to Moscow, the repeated attempt to confine him to a mental hospital, his confinement in a solitary-confinement investigation cell, etc., etc.), the court was confronted by a task that was hard to execute: in some way, *ex post facto*, to save the honor of the uniform of military justice. And also to preserve not only its own dignity, but also to smooth out somewhat in the eyes of the broad public, including the worldwide public, the unpleasant impression that it had produced. Because the impression that had been formed was that the military investigators and procurators haddecided to create a little prototype of the most highly principled attitude of the agencies of the army's system of jurisprudence to all kinds of instances of corruption in the ranks of the ZGV that were disgracing the army. The impression created was that the plans were to turn this trial, which lacked, to put it mildly, sufficient proof, into a show trial.

So if one takes into consideration the real-life situation today and does not approach the actions of one separately taken court from romantic or idealistic positions, then it must be admitted that, within the framework of the presumed supertask, the court headed by Igor Tsymbarenko coped with the duties entrusted to it in a manner that was probably more satisfactory than poor. In the search for the golden mean, it had to tack skillfully between, on the one hand, the procurator's excessively harsh demands, without being so bold as to disregard them openly, and, on the other hand, the numerous violations that had been committed in the course of the investigation, to many of which it assiduously failed to pay any attention, at such time repeatedly excusing many witnesses for the defense all their depositions in favor of Shkutnik, which the court viewed as the result of conscientious delusion.

If, with respect to the so-called bribe-givers, the court made a private decision and, possibly, will still hold them accountable, then how many times is it now that, in analogous situations, those exemplary executors of illegal orders (in this instance, the investigators, physicians, and procurators) remain unpunished once again, and they will be immediately saluted as soon as "advice and recommendations" are received from the superior chiefs. Without even mentioning, obviously, those very same chiefs, whose calligraphic handwriting—or, rather, index finger—was, it seems to us, extremely tangible during the conducting of the investigation. But what is one to do? The times are confusing, transitional...

It's just that even after the court, tranquility did not return to the Shkutnik who had been suppressed and completely harassed.

"I don't understand why they didn't believe me, but believed those people. Why did I still get a verdict of guilty?"

What a naive person! He doesn't know life. He doesn't understand that it is necessary to think not only about oneself, but also, for example, about our law-enforcement system, about its practice and its reputation. About the fact that once it has decided that someone should go to jail, and it subsequently turns out that it should not have done so, in that instance it is still necessary somehow to encourage it, to rehabilitate it. Certainly not something that will lose faith in itself... So it is necessary, whether you want to or not, to support the accusation at least partially.

And thus, at least partially, to "legalize" the illegality.

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*Role of Private Detective Bureaus in Russia Discussed

954F1761A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 10, 9-15 Mar 95 p 8

[Article by Rodion Morozov: "Private Special Services—Salvation of Domestic Business"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The security and investigation business is an extremely delicate subject. This is why the people engaged in it prefer to speak in general terms in conversations with journalists. Consequently, it is relatively difficult to understand what exactly is the sphere of operations for domestic Sherlock Holmeses today. Alternativa-M Chief Igor Nikolayevich Morozov and I were, as sometimes happens, together by chance. An acquaintance, a prosperous businessman, was kidnapped in the capital of a large, West European state, and by his own admission, had already lost all hopes of ever seeing his wife and children again, especially after he was taken in the trunk of a car into one of the former socialist countries, where he was guarded by cutthroats he didn't know in an abandoned cabin. His business partner and former counterintelligence worker didn't "lose himself" during this situation. He turned to his former colleagues at Alternativa, and a week later the liberated hostage was already sitting in his Moscow apartment and—a little rumpled and scared, but most importantly alive—told about what he had been through... Morozov didn't respond immediately to the suggestion that we meet, but he did agree after thinking about it.**

The 'Special Service'

"In Russia, there is no shortage of private security or detective companies, and I do not foresee one in the future," Igor Nikolayevich smiles. Today, in this country there are about 1.5 million people employed in this field, the majority of whom form structures of a purely criminal type—the so-called "covers" who engage in attacks, extorting debts, and other charms.

"The employees of companies like this are former athletes, so-called 'road warriors,' and are often simply bandits who have taken advantage of the law 'On Private Investigative and Detective Operations'—or more exactly, the incomplete system of licensing—to legalize their weapons and do whatever they want right in front of law enforcement organs. It works out that there are plenty of "shop signs," but a small selection; there are not many serious organizations staffed by qualified professionals. Essentially, an organization like ours is the most real one. Yes it is compact and yes it is oriented toward relatively local assignments, but it is a special service with stricter criteria for employment than the state security organs had. A professional comes to us, a former KGB, GRU [State Intelligence Directorate], MVD employee, who is ready for anything. We have a specific department for every kind of work, headed by a person whose former work allows him to be as useful as possible in exactly that area. The chief international expert is Vyacheslav Zavaloka, a former PGU [KGB First Main Directorate, dealing with foreigners] officer who worked abroad for a long time and, accordingly, who has extensive contacts (on top is his time spent in Vympel, whose intelligence-sabotage section at that time had no equal in the world). Our chief detective—we'll leave his name out—came to us from counterintelligence and happened to be one of the first to begin the war against organized crime in our country. Personal security is headed by Aleksandr Yudin, a 'nines' officer who later served in the GUO [Main Security Directorate] and whose last job was guarding Viktor Chernomyrdin. His team includes former "niners," guys from the brigade that guarded the General Staff, high-level athletes who have undergone special training. Building security—for banks, commercial structures—is entrusted to Volodya Suslov, who just left a position as commander of a border guard division. The system is the same everywhere: the same kind of counter-intelligence and intelligence measures are taken, the establishment of "watches," etc.

Daily Bread

Alternativa's main line of operations, the work that provides its "daily bread," can be characterized in just three words: "assuring business security." Not a single even marginally serious commercial firm, not to mention banks, can exist today without its own security division. There are about 20 firms and banks like this that are under Alternativa's guardianship—in these situations it is not acceptable to name names. Their security is taken care of by Alternativa. Training and comprehensive support are on the "guardian's" conscience. The same can be said about their security service. The security service, however, is a higher link, and its functions include not only physical security but intelligence and counter-intelligence work and of course, economics. It has its own closed information-analytical group that works on these assignments in its head office. It is also entirely autonomous and is controlled only by its mother organization.

Another type of service is also running at full bore. Businessmen who have at their disposal large sums of money have good reason to fear for their lives. For this reason, a reliable personal guard is not a luxury but a necessity. This is not cheap. True, there are certain nuances here. It is one thing when a guard is ready, just in case, and another when a kidnap attempt—an unsuccessful one—has already been made.

We Help When the Militia Is Powerless

"One of the more important reasons that people prefer coming to us and not to law enforcement organs," admits Alternativa's chief of detectives, "is that often the people who are attacked don't have clean hands, either. For them, a statement to the militia could be fatal. However, even if they do not have a clean conscience, they still should not be murdered. Although the issue of having clean hands is important, it is not the only reason people come to us. Many people don't trust the militia, having already been convinced, based on their own experience, of how easily employees involved in cases can be bought."

"Recently, one of our clients was kidnapped," Vyacheslav Zavaloka, international department head, joins the conversation, "a very well respected man. They took him out of the city, scared him, and fired shots over his head; his fate was already sealed. We went to the firm that had organized the raid, going to the office to negotiate about him; they insisted on that. There we were met by a team from Vityaz, which was acting as a "cover" for the aggressor firm. (Incidentally, it became clear later that one of the guards from that firm who was directly involved in all these shadowy affairs was a current FSK [Federal Counter-Intelligence Service] employee. It was good that we were conducting the operation jointly with RUOP [Russian Organized Crime Administration]."

"And the most important thing," this is Morozov's opinion, "is that the militia can localize one or another criminal situation only to a particular area, but who can guarantee the person that later a grenade won't come flying in his window or that he won't be shot, as we see happening almost every day? When a businessman comes to us, he can be sure that his problem will be resolved from A to Z, that he will come out of the situation with minimal losses, and that there will be no friction with the law. In our operations, we do not violate existing legal norms, and we inform law enforcement organs of any urgent measure that we may take."

Wars and Rumbles Are Not for Us

The procedure for working under extreme conditions is about the same. The first stage is collecting material. We discover who made the attack and what was the actual motive for the attack. Quite often, the client is not open about this, and the company must be sure that it is doing what is right. Then, the investigation begins. The group is "surveyed:" its membership, the routes taken by its members , its financial strength, how well it is armed, how can it be penetrated, where are its weak points, what is the best way to "cause it pain," etc.

Here, of course, one can't get by without agents or, as they prefer to say here, "ties." Then the case goes into its final phase. The company goes after the bandits directly (and often the latter are entirely surprised), and sets conditions for a meeting "at which," Morozov explains, "they are explained the full illegality of their actions and the possible consequences—a criminal case and a prison term. After all, in compliance with existing law, we are fully within our rights to collect primary material and present it to the appropriate courts, and there are more than enough examples of criminal cases initiated based on our materials."

"There are times when you can't get by without using force," states the detective incognito, "but there is something else that is much more effective: when the bandits understand that this is it, they are caught, and it is better for them to keep still. Let's say that same Solntse brigade could raise five hundred fighters in an hour and attack us, but they attack us and find themselves fighting the OMON [militia special forces]. Do they really need that?" [In this paragraph the IC says: "...that same

Solntse brigade..." like it had been mentioned before, but this is the first reference to it. Did IC drop anything?]

Holy of Holies

"In Russia and in other former socialist countries, a situation has developed that is unnatural for the 'civilized world.' In our country and in Eastern Europe, there are many private security structures, while the detective business is poorly developed. Meanwhile, it is exactly that business that leads our work," explains Igor Nikolayevich, "because we, too, have reoriented ourselves. For us, detective work now takes first priority while security has been bumped to second place." The most popular direction for today is issuing recommendations for commercial security and verifying the reliability of business partners. This is why Alternativa's "holy of holies" is its information-analytical center.

"Here, these are the hands," Vladimir Smirnov, Alternativa's chief analyst, shows us his palms, "that have written most of the PGU's instructions for assuring security through the use of SVT (computer technology) in intelligence."

Vladimir Smirnov has dedicated over half his life to scientific-technical intelligence and retired only after a wave of personnel reshuffling, when one of the most respected (for his entire history) directors of the scientific-technical revolution, Zaytsev, was replaced by a person whose competence, to put it nicely, left a lot to be desired.

Vladimir Aleksandrovich's current work exacts its own costs. "You're walking along the street," complains Smirnov, "and you don't know where to look. You look in every direction, and no matter where you look, there are ads everywhere. I know that behind those ads are soap bubbles that were born yesterday and will burst tomorrow."

Information concerning banks and commercial structures has been collected and systematized by Smirnov and his people over the last several years, and today the center has a nearly complete picture of domestic business. "Recently," Smirnov tells us, "I got a call from Morozov at the FSK asking me to see if we had anything on some firm that the counter-intelligence people were interested in. They had come up 'empty,' and I, in 10 minutes, was able to give them all the information on it. That is not the only incident like this. There have been instances when state organs have come to us for information."

All new structures are followed as well. Here, the work is conducted according to an "American" principle: the entire upper part of the bank or firm is illuminated, the origins of its capital are exposed, and the existence of ties with the criminal world is determined. "After we view all the data on one or another structure as a single picture, it becomes completely clear for us." In general, Alternativa uses the rule: as soon as a new, large firm or corporation appears, especially one promising high rates for its investors, a check begins automatically. Often, everything becomes clear immediately. When the detectives see an office "guaranteeing" an income of up to 500 percent annually, and when this office has wooden boxes instead of furniture and a guard in a torn sweater at the door, there is no longer any question. When the detectives come to a place where a certain well-known financial company is promising to build a multi-story home, and a building belonging to the engineer cooperative is already standing there, there is no question.

It is hard to argue with the results of these checks. Just in the last year, Alternativa was able to protect a whole series of its extremely well-to-do clients from investing capital in firms like Vlastelina or the Tibet concern, or...it doesn't do any good to list them here. In the words of Smirnov, himself, today in our country, there are almost no firms—of the type that specialize in collecting money from the population—that have anything real standing behind them that would make it possible for them to pay out the high interest that they advertise.

The demand for work like this is colossal, and lately, foreign partners have been turning to us more and more often. For them, working in Russia is entirely impossible without the appropriate supply of information.

Not so long ago, the Moscow office of Kroll, the largest international detective agency in the world, known in Russia for the effective, but—and this is the miraculous thing—unclaimed in our country—work that it did in finding the CPSU money, came to Alternativa. After the check, Kroll's directors decided to make Alternativa a permanent partner. So far, nobody else in Russia has been deemed worthy of this "honor."

No Alternative

"Now, there is a lot of talk about whether or not the state needs structures like ours. For us," Morozov shrugs his shoulders, "there is no question at all. Today, nobody would be able to take on our functions—not the MVD, or the FSK, or anyone. There are many reasons for this; they lack the money, the technical means, the available people. We are the only ones who can work through every case that we get from A to Z, not to mention the fact that we, unlike law enforcement organs, are able to operate in all corners of the globe. If you look at our firm today, we have our own bureaus in Germany and Czechia. We are working on opening a firm in Vienna. We have no alternative. If we close down, our place will be taken by the criminal world, and the resolution of all disputed questions, the provision of business security, will be within their exclusive competence. We do not have the right to transform this sphere into their estate. On the contrary, we have a real chance, slow though it may be, step by step, to push the criminals out of the niches they have selected and to bring to domestic commerce a new, civilized system of cooperation."

Rodion Morozov
Contact telephone for Alternativa-M
233-52-45

*Security Concerns Raised by National Unity Party Actions

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21 Mar 95 p 5

[Article by Sergey Leskov, IZVESTIYA correspondent: "'Lefortovo' Vedenkin Could Take Control of the Airline Ticket Sales System in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If Yeltsin and Clinton even vaguely realized how a word from them could resonate, they would be afraid to sign any communique. At their latest meeting the incautious presidents termed "Sirena-3" a top-priority joint infrastructure project in the field of high technology. Now things have come to the point where the project spotlighted by the presidents is pointing toward Lefortovo.

How Sirena-3 Was Divided Up

Otherwise Aleksey Vedenkin, an infamous activist of the Russian National Unity Party, would have lost the support of all his comrades. Even so no one can tell where his connections lead: to the KGB, to Rutskoy, to Zhirinovskiy, to Barkashov...? As he languishes in the vale of Lefortovo, Vedenkin is a sort of metaphysical figure with no real earthly biography.

Let us attempt to trace his latest scandalous earthly move—his participation (or only, as some claim, boasting about it) in a project by the Sirena International Technology Corporation (Sirena MTK). This is a very large project that the USSR, and later Russia, has been preparing for several years now. Its purpose is to introduce modern systems to cover the entire spectrum of air transportation management: ticket reservations and sales, management of airport departures, air freight handling, accounting for accounts receivable and payable, rates, revenue management, even transactions (so exotic for us) like renting cars at airports and reserving hotel rooms. The current Sirena-2 is thoroughly outdated, and looks particularly pathetic when compared to current international standards. But this is the first and the last point on which the opinions of Sirena MTK's supporters and detractors concur.

Sirena MTK's shareholders include 63 organizations, virtually all of them airlines and other institutions connected with air transportation in Russia. The general contractor is IBM, the software will be provided by American Airlines, and the satellite telecommunications system will come from AT&T. Note that all these companies are American, and that Russia is seeking a $130 million loan in the West to pay for their participation. According to the directors of Sirena MTK, what is acquired now will be merely the nucleus of a system that will have to be modified constantly by our specialists, who have already completed a training course (in America) and are standing by.

Then Vedenkin makes a statement in the press: the Russian National Unity Party—often called the Russian fascists—has acquired 20 percent of the shares in Sirena MTK and is preparing to purchase virtually the entire project. Denials follow immediately: not a single share has been sold outside, Sirena is being slandered. But where there is smoke, there is fire, and even Vedenkin was half Khlestekov, half front man for parties unknown.

As was explained by Vladimir Sipachev, president of Aeroflot Bank (one of the founders of Sirena MTK), a few months ago the bank's board of directed decided to withdraw from the project and sell the bank's shares. However, under the Sirena MTK charter it was impossible to do so without consent from a shareholder's meeting. Therefore Aeroflot Bank sold off through an intermediary one of its divisions, the Aeroflot Foreign Trade Agency, which had formal ownership of the Sirena shares. A buyer appeared, showing identification as an aide to LDPR deputy Vengerskiy and the deputy chairman of the Resurrection Foundation (i.e. Rutskoy). V. Sipachev recalls that those documents inspired confidence in the visitor, who thus got hold of the corporation's shares. Later, according to V. Sipachev's story, shares in the Main Computer Center and the Main Air Transportation Agency, which were also involved in the project, were turned over to the persistent Vedenkin to manage (as you will recall, it would have been problematic to sell them outright). The total was approximately 25 percent of all Sirena shares. At that point Vedenkin made his widely publicized announcement that Russian National Unity now owned Sirena.

When a Russian Fascist Is Calm, a Capitalist Starts Going Crazy

Our editorial offices received a curious document addressed to "Mr. A. Vedenkin, deputy chairman of the Russian National Unity Party" and sent by S. Clive, general manager of the U.S.-based Alpha Investment consulting firm. The text of this letter indicates that the Americans are prepared to acquire from Vedenkin a block of shares valued at $30 million and immediately add on another $2 million payable to an account in any Russian bank. "Please rest assured that we understand the delicacy of the matter in question," wrote S. Clive. We were unable to locate any company in Moscow under that name. But we did notice that the zip code was the same as IBM's Moscow representative, and that the company's trademark was reminiscent of the IBM company symbol. However, IBM claims to have no knowledge of Alpha Investment.

Aleksey Vedenkin added his handwritten instructions to the letter: "Do not reply! Let them go crazy. Two million dollars is nothing. The minimum amount of compensation we will take is $15-20 million." This is accompanied by a soaring eagle and a swastika.

And there is one other very intriguing detail in the version offered by Aeroflot Bank's president. Vedenkin's arrest was reported on television at 7:00 pm on 28 February. However, at 8:00 pm Sipachev and Vedenkin were talking on the telephone, and Vedenkin had no idea of the impending threat. He was only arrested at 11:00 pm, following a search of his office. It seems a strange coincidence that Vedenkin's arrest and the press conference by Sirena MTK's directors took place on the same day, 28 February. If they wanted to neutralize Vedenkin, he had enough time prior to his arrest to cause an uproar at the sedate press conference. Or, as is so often the case, did they take too long preparing the deed?

Vladimir Sipachev says that he was dumbfounded when he learned that the shares had fallen into the hands of fascists: "Vedenkin misled us. He shifted the shares from the pocket of his suit coat to the pocket of his military jacket. A devil, a real devil!" This story leaves many things unexplained. Aeroflot Bank is a well-established institution. Could its bankers indulge in the luxury of not checking out their buyer and so getting caught by a childish ploy? Was no background check done? But there was no need to dig very deep—after all, Aleksey Vedenkin is a long-standing client of Aeroflot Bank. He is the one who manages Russian National Unity's accounts with the bank, and he holds a power of attorney from Barkashov.

"All the Morgans in the world have joined forces," said the Russian Bank president. "The CIA and IBM have long arms in Russia, and it is possible that they arranged to have Vedenkin arrested because he was discrediting Sirena, which we need. And Sirena benefits the Americans as well because it allows them to take control of strategically important information about air transportation in Russia." "You wouldn't even have to send a secret agent to Moscow," predicts V. Sipachev. "A satellite flies over the computer and—click!—all the information is in the bag. Or another—click!—and you could shut down all aviation in Russia. That is exactly how our strategic missile complex fell into a trap supplied by Hewlett Packard. Now we are heading in the same direction with our aviation. The CIA does not even want our country to control its own trolleybuses."

All Spies Are Welcome Here

Considering the possibility of such all-encompassing information about us, we had a lively discussion on the topic of whether the bank has in its employ individuals who work for those agencies that know everything about every subject. V. Sipachev took a personnel list in hand and pointed out to me that there really are former senior officials of the "power structures" on his staff, but not for the sake of profit, solely out of sympathy for their difficult situation. Yet against the backdrop of the mysterious sources of struggle over Sirena even enlightened humanism does not dispel one's doubts about how, with such far-reaching information, they could have overlooked a crude provocateur under their very noses.

The Main Air Transportation Agency, the Main Computer Center and the Aeroflot Bank form a trio of opponents to Sirena. Their official position, stated in numerous papers, is that the project is too wastefully expensive for Russia, that it includes services that are presently superfluous for Russia, and that the computers and program being offered by the Americans were out of date ages ago. On the other hand, supposedly there are 100-percent Russian projects that are much cheaper and more reliable and that will provide jobs for our industry instead of America's. Between the lines one can read that our designs will also guarantee Russia independence in an area of strategic importance.

Incidentally, if one wants to get on the subject of spy mania, one could just as easily portray Sirena's opponents as secret agents of IBM's many competitors. There are dozens of major Western companies who have their own interests in Russia's skies and who are waiting and watching to see how they can trip up IBM, which has been showing signs of weakness in recent years. Or, forgetting about spy mania altogether and focusing just on the commercial interests of the parties involved, without a doubt Sirena-3 could shatter the monopoly enjoyed by the Main Computer Center and the Main Air Transportation Agency, which currently receive gigantic revenues (approximately R10 billion per day) from Sirena-2 and would prefer to modify it quietly rather than parting with it altogether.

Technically speaking, that is probably possible. But who ever said that modifying an old system is cheaper than creating a new one? Many experts believe that the attempt to breathe new life into the outdated Sirena-2 system is like trying to turn a cropduster into a jet airliner. Sirena-3 is based on a qualitatively different ideology. And prices around the world are roughly the same, whether you buy from IBM, or Unisys, or Air France. If you find a product that is cheaper, that means that it lacks something. The idea of using our own designs if very tempting, but in the opinion of many experts they exist at this point solely in the minds of eager inventors and are nowhere near ready for practical use. As for national security, due to our technical backwardness even now information about international flights by Russian airlines is being processed by our adversaries in the U.S. city of Atlanta.

In addition to the Main Computer Center and the Main Air Transportation Agency, Sirena also affects Aeroflot Bank's interests. Not any noble interests involving our entire state, but instead some quite ordinary ones involving down-to-earth revenue. The bank was unsuccessful in purchasing a 20-percent block of shares from IBM. Nor did its plans to use Western loans pan out. Aeroflot Bank feels that it has been relegated to a very modest role in the Sirena project handling domestic payments. It wanted to establish contacts with Western investors, but the Ministry of Finance has listed a different address: the Bank for the Development of Enterprise [Bank razvitiya predprinimatelstva], which is fully to the liking of those capricious capitalists when it comes to representing the Russian Government's interests.

Simultaneously Playing a Game of One-Upmanship

Presently Sirena is on the verge of receiving a $90 million line of credit with the U.S. Export-Import Bank and a second line of credit for $40 million from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The necessary documents have already been sent to Moscow for the purpose of getting the government guarantees that Western investors require. V. Chernomyrdin has already signed a letter to that effect, and all that remains now are formalities.

From a technical standpoint, Sirena has already been granted all the necessary licenses, the ground-based and space networks are already 90 percent complete, and the specialists have been trained. In the latter half of 1996 an international reservation system will be brought on line and revenues will begin to flow in. In late 1996 or early 1997 reservations for domestic flights will become available. But perhaps this is not the end of the scandal surrounding Sirena, only the opening act.

Because, as I was informed at Aeroflot Bank, the domestically-designed system being financed by it is moving ahead on the same schedule. "We barely got out of Sirena-3 in time. Nothing will ever come of it, it will just suck money out of Russians' pockets," its bankers predicted. "Yet we will quietly start accepting reservations this year."

Unless that is a bluff, soon Russia will embark on an absurd enterprise in comparison to which all our past absurdities will pale. Our country will have two parallel systems in place to manage its air transportation. That is not just original—that is something no one in the world has ever dreamed of before...

The whole years-long story of Sirena (1994 broke the record—100 articles about it in the press) seems to be sad confirmation that Russia's government today is amorphous and directionless. It seems incredible, but the Ministry of Transportation has not even stated definitely which option it favors. When one group of specialists is there, their ideas are hailed as great. If their opponents visit the next day, then they are told how smart they are, too. The result is that Sirena is undergoing a continual metamorphosis that is not to our credit. And going through scandals that shame Russia before the whole world.

There is an old chess rule that says it is better to follow a bad plan than just to move pieces around with no plan. The Sirena MTK project needs one thing: a final decision, consistently implemented. If, of course, the strength and the will to do that exist.

*Urnov on Chechnya, Analytical Centers, Security Council

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rnov: Competing With 'Brains' of Special Services Will Not Hurt Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **According to rumors, you tried to leave the presidential structure not even having worked one week as the director of the center.**

It was not that I had made a decision to leave. It was simply that the Chechen crisis strongly affected me. On December 8, I was placed at the head of the Analytical Center, and on December 11 the military operation began. The latter was being conducted by methods I did not support. In addition, many weak points were apparent in the very nature of the military operation, and in how the political, informational, and international aspects were worked out basically, all that which now has become commonplace. At that time, however, at the initial moment, the attitude arose: "This goes against our grain, we are leaving."

"We?" Who Is "We?"

The rather large number of brand-new people to the administration. Now I feel inwardly ashamed of such emotion, because in it I see nothing other than weak-willed hysteria. In accordance with the old academic tradition, we decided - myself included - to write recommendations and send them "upward," and there our mission ended. It was the result of a lack of experience working in state structures. Take, for example, how businessmen reach the market with goods. First of all, they conduct marketing, then ensure the promotion of the goods. It is a huge undertaking. Little product is produced - it must again be promoted. The state apparatus, in fact, works according to similar laws.

If you give recommendations, you should take care that these recommendations win the competition against the similar products of other firms. I now consider it a sign of weakness to complain, "Oh, the version promoting force was adopted." One's "goods" must simply be improved until they are of irreproachable quality.

That is one issue. The second issue is that, there really are people in the presidential administration, and in the state apparatus overall with different mentalities, with different traditions for resolving the country's unconventional problems. Relatively speaking, some are of a mind to promote force, while others, among whom I count myself, are primarily politically minded. There are also individuals of a predominantly moral and ethical character. Sergey Adamovich Kovalev is one of the latter. The task is not to fill the state apparatus entirely with people who share one approach. A supreme power should have a stereoscopic view of what is taking place, and for that it must have the recommendations of one, two, three sides.

Is that not complacency on your part? After all, having decided to stay, you have compromised with your conscience.

It is not a compromise. I well know that in a state undergoing a period of transition, in which we now live, the mechanisms for working out decisions have not been refined. Naturally, this increases the likelihood of various types of mistakes and crisis. They cannot be refined instantaneously. One can and should, however, take part in improving them. Only in this way will the situation improve. And the situation is changing for the better now, in my opinion.

Changing? Your comments do not agree with reality. The analytical center, which was headed by Mr. Yasin before you, exists alongside an entity which frightens the public, the information and analytical center of the presidential security service headed by General Korzhakov.

In this regard, society is frightened in vain. If a special service exists, it is obligatory that it have an analytical center. There is nothing frightening about it. I was never a supporter of monopolization within the realm of information. Like monopolization within the economy, it is also harmful. The center you named exists under the security service. There are also analytical entities within the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service], the foreign intelligence service, and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. And thank God! The more there are of these centers, the better, because they will cast light on the various aspects and approaches the authorities use in making decisions. As an analyst and person, who at one time dealt in psychology, I know that on every document the imprint of the the author's individuality is left, no matter how hard he tries to objectify the situation.

While conducting situational analysis in our center, I try to have a gathering of people assembled who are not all of one mind ideologically. I may not share the point of view of a person, but that point of view is necessary, mandatory for me. Of course, one can brainstorm by inviting close friends who are entirely of one mind ideologically. However, there is a great danger after half an hour of ceasing to criticize yourselves. You say the people support you. You fall into a rhythm. It is pleasant, there are no conflicts. You are finished! You think you have discovered the only true way. However, if several people with entirely different views sit by you, they break down your point of view, they point where you have never peered with your thoughts. That is what real work is. Only by engaging in dialog the entire time with a person who tries to destroy your position will it be possible to accomplish something.

You have torn the problem out of its historical, social, and political context. You are discussing the security service analytical center as though it were "The Heritage Foundation," the American center operating under order of the CIA. The information and analysis structure in the West has never became one with the state, and is not a part of a mechanism for repressing society.

How could they not become one, and with whose money do they operate, if, as you say, they are run under order of the CIA? I repeat, information monopolization today is harmful. However, there already exists an anecdote against the danger about which you speak, our free press that writes whatever it pleases. I spoke with one American, whom I in no way suspect of having sympathies toward a totalitarian regime. He told me about what happened with the U.S. press during "Desert Storm." Absolutely all information was placed under the control of military censorship. Nothing hit the CMI [mass media] that was not approved by the latter. Journalists were not allowed into military action at all, or were led by the hand. One journalist, it is true, got through into Iraq and filmed a tape showing that high-precision weaponry does not always hit the intended air vent, but sometimes hits civilian sites, destroying them and killing women and children. This tape was never shown in the U.S., and the person who shot the footage still cannot find work, although he is a journalist of high caliber. During the Chechen conflict our press has enjoyed a state of freedom undreamed of by its Western counterparts.

If we return to your idea about information monopolization being harmful, it is apparent what the result is of "healthy" competition between the analytical services: the forceful actions taken in Chechnya.

That was, in large part, the result of the lack of competition in our output at the time.

You said that the mechanisms for making decisions are starting to change. How is this being expressed?

There are changes, for example, in the make-up of the Security Council, that, in my opinion, are extremely important. The two leaders from the houses of the Federal Assembly are now there. First of all, they represent another branch of power. Second, they are backed by deputies, with whose opinion Shumeyko and Rybkin will be obligated to reckon. Thus, cooperation between the legislative and executive powers is improving. I think that, had these people been included in the SB [Security Council] before the events in Chechnya, the scenario of those events would have been different.

In addition to the personnel changes in the SB, there are many other issues, although purely of an internal nature, in which I see serious shifts in the system by which the authorities function.

You would not like to comment on them?

They are "boring" methods that, in the social sense, are of little interest, but which are exceptionally important to increasing the quality of the political mechanism.

What might be the consequences of what has occurred in Chechnya? The political, strategic, and international aspects. What conclusions have these events brought you to?

First of all, the mechanisms for working out multi-level state decisions must, and as far as I know, are being adjusted. Second, considerably more informed professional dialogue between the authorities and the free press is absolutely necessary; a situation cannot be deemed normal in which the overwhelming majority of the SMI [mass media] is in opposition to a power guaranteeing democratic development. Both the authorities and the SMI are guilty here; the authorities because they are not sufficiently open, and the press, because it operates on the basis of the stereotype of always being in opposition. As soon as a precedent is created, the alienation mechanism immediately switches on - it is better to criticize, it is simpler. It is infrequent that calm, carefully-weighed analysis of the situation is met. Unfortunately, at this time we do not have any newspapers of the genre like "Wall Street Journal," or "Financial Times," or like the journal "The Economist," all of which strive to speak with the utmost objectivity. I keep waiting for the time when similar publications will appear in Russia...

Next, it is necessary to create a balanced system of relations between the executive and legislative powers. There are a tremendous number of problems, and what is vexing is that they are frequently not of primary importance. Conflicts arise because there are no conventions for mutual relations. Some start resenting others because the expected step does not match "their" ideas. Statistically, these small glitches are ten times greater in number than the major ones. By building up, the trivialities are what create the atmosphere.

Further, it is, of course, necessary to surmount the crisis resulting from the deep-seated breech between the authorities and social opinion. I have conducted sociological polls since 1987 while working at the Institute for the International Workers Movement. One question I copied from a pollster from the American Gallup Poll service was: Do you regard the representatives of the following professions as respectable? A list was given. The results that ensued were unreal. The Americans' list began with 80 percent who considered priests to be respectable, and diminished to 14 percent -union activists. Our list began at 14 percent, and ended at 2 percent, also, by the way, with union activists.

Then I conducted a comparison between Russia and Great Britain. There, 60-70 percent of the people consider lawyers, judges and policemen to be respectable, here their rating did not rise higher than 15 percent. Under conditions of such a culture of complete distrust the state cannot function normally. Of course, these sentiments did not just start in 1987. And it is understood that the average person finds living hard today: the state is still "unrefined," the situation changes daily, and the institutions of power do not work as efficiently as not only the citizens, but the government itself would like.

Meanwhile, the people's expectations regarding the state are unrealistically high, once again by force of Soviet traditions. Politicians are met with cheers, therefore, who promise to bring order to the country in two days; a country where nearly two thirds of the economy was in the defense sector, where agriculture is virtually in ruins, where a service sector must practically be created from scratch, and the psychological stereotypes of life in a totalitarian state must be overcome. It is not possible to resolve these kinds of problems in two days, or in five years. It is a generational problem.

Here is just one example illustrating what the state apparatus is up against, and what has left society stumbling: We have a democratic constitution guaranteeing pluralism, private ownership, and so on. Pessimistic experts and lawyers believe that it is necessary to adopt approximately 3,000 fundamental laws in order for the constitution to operate at its full potential. Optimists assert 1,000 will be sufficient. In 1994 the State Duma adopted approximately 80 laws. Of the latter, about 20 could be considered fundamental. Thus, one can count the miles remaining to a "bright future." There is nothing one can do about it. I think it is necessary to explain to society that in history there are no leaps ahead. If we want things to get better for us, we are doomed to perform menial, difficult work daily - to build little by little. And in that building there will be no remedy via "massive development." We must plough ahead, one foot after another, winning ground back from chaos.

Is not Russia sliding into a new chaos - nationalism, crime, corruption? Into becoming the kind of Latin American state that Grigoriy Yavlinskiy two years ago called "Aziopya?"

The Chechen crisis has shown, first of all, that there is no real basis for militant nationalism in Russia's social conscience. All attempts on the part of nationalists to conduct massive actions have ended in vain. In addition, anti-aggression sentiments have grown. The number of people who prefer politics, rather than the bang of a fist, has begun to grow. This is a sign of deep change. In 1987, I conducted a poll in Moscow's academic environment that showed that fear of one's own leadership was three times greater than that of thermonuclear war. If you recall, from 1989 to 1991 any attempts made at strengthening repressive legislation ran up against fierce resistance in social opinion. What was behind that? A syndrome of fear toward an aggressive state. Each person tried it on for size and thought: Having made the laws stricter, the state will not miss a chance to reprimand me. The fear later subsided, however. And along with the decrease in fear, the popularity of leaders began to grow who preferred an aggressive style and aggressive terminology. Moderation proved unpopular. The reason for this was that people began to dream of order, thinking that with a strong leader they would not be the ones who were reprimanded, but the "neighbor" making it hard for them to live. All those lacking "love" for their neighbor applauded the harsh terminology. It is apparent to me that this was one of the biggest reasons for Zhirinovskiy's success. What did Chechnya do in this regard? Chechnya showed that aggressive approaches not only entail parades, drums, and victory flags, but also "cargo No. 200," real blood and coffins. Social opinion has wisely reacted to the latter, it has started to move away from sympathizing with aggressive rhetoric. And the popularity has sunk of political leaders promising "easy" ways for resolving internal conflicts.

Unfortunately, the state and society learn much only during times of crisis. I think that in the upcoming elections people will be drawn to more moderate politicians.

However, in this case it is also thought that the authorities will take into account that society is growing cold to the idea of Westernization, to the Western model of development. A return to Slavic integration in the economy, politics, and culture has appeared, as has a clear rapprochement with Kazakhstan.

During the period from approximately 1985 to 1991 a situation unprecedented in all of Russian history took shape, whereupon the word "Western" was associated in the minds of an overwhelming number of people in society with the idea of a "prototype." It could not last forever. A turning point had to be noted, which is just what happened. Understandably, under conditions of democracy and an uncontrolled press, we can never again completely break away from Western values, but there will also not be the previous level of enthusiasm. The view of the West is becoming more sober, more pragmatic. It has reached the level of an ideological cliche. Essentially, society is adapting to the new conditions in a quite interesting way. Take a look at what is happening. On the order of 80 percent of people, according to a poll conducted by VTsIOM, prefer order to democracy. The question is then given: Is it necessary to control the press? Seventy percent respond negatively. Also, on the order of 70 percent assert that the authorities should act in strict accordance with the law. Try polling people now as to whether elections are necessary or not. An overwhelming number will say "yes, of course." In other words, on the one hand, we prefer a firm hand to democracy, while on the other, we insist on freedom of the press, elections, and the rule of law. Public opinion is, in principle, contradictory. This phenomenon has been described many times. It is contradictory everywhere you go. However, deep-seated orientations are already transforming within the new reality. In 1992, I posed the following question through VTsIOM: "Do you agree that the idea of individual freedom is more sacred than the Fatherland?" Almost 20 percent of those polled responded affirmatively. In 1994 that number reached nearly 50 percent. That does not mean that patriotism is no more, but simply that the value of individual life is growing.

This signifies that a civil society is forming.

In our conscience, of course, a painful break is taking place in our ideas. However, there is a portion of the population, of course, that does not live by democratic values. Nationalism also exists, but little of it. At the beginning of the 50s in the U.S. a well known book was written by Seymour Lipset, "Political Man." In the book, using the example of the countries of Western Europe and the U.S., he asserted that if approximately 10 percent of the population is held in the grip of strict nationalism, it will do no harm to the stability of a democratic system. In Russia now, according to all polls, about 15 percent of the population is held in the grip of strict nationalism. That is fantastic! For a society in a transitional state. a society in which traditional values have been destroyed... Lord, things are not all that bad.

Returning to real politics, does the creation of a customs union between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and the meeting held between CIS leaders in Alma-Ata constitute proof that the West is no longer being counted on?

There are a number of like examples to the contrary: Clinton's invitation to Moscow, Yeltsin's invitation to Canada to the "Big 7" meeting; and agreements on credits with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank. As concerns the union republics, they look upon Moscow with mixed feelings. This was their "Big Brother" - and in general, a disliked "Brother." It was not so bad to take a little money from him, but then to manage without him. Therefore, following the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] everyone ran helter skelter. Only after they all got their fill of independence and started to believe that Moscow and Russia did not intend to hold them by the throat, were the first steps made toward normalizing relations. Objectively speaking, this was entirely understandable: there were irreplaceable technological ties between enterprises, a virtually unified energy system, railroad transportation, and pipelines to Europe. In no way could we get too far from one another. In addition, a large portion of our output is not competitive on the global market.

What you want to say is that limitations of an economic nature are being placed on politics?

What I want to say is that now that the romantic feeling of running away and everything being great on our own has been overcome, and now that fear of "Big Brother" has passed, it is time to start renewing economic cooperation, and conducting joint programs on an efficient, mutually beneficial level. This is now possible because it has become acceptable not only for Russia, but also for the countries surrounding Russia. In 1992, 20 percent of the population in Belarus viewed Russia as its closest long-term partner. Now that figure is at 70 percent. In Ukraine it is happening slowly, but the thirst for economic integration is also growing. Gradually, in the social conscience a conversion in our frame of mind is occurring. In Russia, however, for the time being the tendency toward "individualism" is been maintained in this regard.

Here it is understood that Russia, at a minimum, is no worse off on its own.

But in fact, it is not good for Russia to go it alone. New cooperation must be established, but not in the sense of reversing the rivers in Siberia. In that case we would also not be able to right our situation.

But will we be able to right our situation, with Chechnya? It could turn into an economic black hole, into which money will be poured in an endless stream: inflation will pick up speed, the budget will be destroyed, democracy will lose the parliamentary and presidential elections...

That is a catastrophic scenario. I, in truth, do not think that will happen. All bona fide specialists, at least, assert that Chechnya will not turn into a black hole. Although, naturally, an infusion of resources will be necessary there. On the other hand, however, rectifying the situation in Chechnya will signify an end to those losses which Russia has incurred while Dudayev has been in power in Chechnya (falsified advice notices for hundreds of billions of rubles, the plundering of trains, the capture of hostages at Mineralnye vody, and so on).

As concerns the political dangers of the Chechen conflict spreading, the likelihood is not great. The Analytical Center has calculated the possibilities. There are instruments for localizing these tendencies. In the press it was said that with the onset of the crisis in Chechnya relations had become strained between the center and the regions, that the danger of a new wave of separatist sentiments had appeared. But in fact, relations were strained chiefly because several regions, having felt that the center was busy, began to pull the blanket over themselves all the more strongly. However, all of that fortunately did not go beyond the the bounds of the routine process of negotiations and the redistribution of powers.

What will be the general tendency in the next year or two? What kind of political force will appear on the forefront?

The traditional structure of the political world has been destroyed: reformists vs. antireformists, sentiments for and against the president. In place of the latter there is a mosaic, and a very polycentric one. Although it is now beginning to show signs of structure, everything was hastily thrown together in the meantime. Thus, the time has not yet come for an exact prediction. Generally speaking, that is natural. In democratic terms the state is still weak, there are no normal bona fide parties, nor is there a stable party system. And there cannot be, because a stable electorate has not yet formed that traditionally votes for one party or the other. The organizational structures of the parties themselves remain in an unrefined state. Therefore, any shake up causes migration between parties, and the disposition to erode within politics.

In this vacillating, unstable state, do the security services nevertheless present a threat to democracy with their plans of creating a presidential guard that could very likely become a praetorian guard serving its own interests?

Not long ago I was visited by a Japanese journalist who asked almost the same question. I said that the security services, like other state institutions, are going through a period of formation. I cannot give overall generalizations about whether it is necessary to increase or weaken their role. I do know, however, that they should become more a part of the new social fabric and meet the new social needs. I am in no way satisfied, however, with a situation in which the security services, due to limitations imposed by our legislation, are paralyzed in the fight against fascism and political extremism. (In a normal state this takes place automatically.)

One must understand with absolute clarity that while democracy is, without a doubt, pluralism, there are political movements and groups contradictory to democracy. Is our own experience from 1917, and the Weimar Republic not enough? We have, in reforming the FSK, for example, limited the possibilities for it to become involved in operations and searches, thereby weakening the possibility for the state to counter fascist movements through legal means. And there are many, they grow like mushrooms after a rain. It is another matter that their social basis is not very large, but the figure is already significant. And there are a multitude of publications that are openly nationalistic and extremist. Without constraint, they call for the forceful overthrow of the constitutional form of government. And, as it turns out, one cannot prohibit the latter, the legal basis remains weak. Therefore, strengthening the role of the special services is necessary here. Just as it is necessary to strengthen their role in the fight against corruption and organized crime, and for that purpose, to develop new laws.

And where does their role need to be weakened?

Let us say it should be the influence the special services have in the political decision-making process. Their influence must be counterbalanced with the influence of other institutions of authority. After that, a balance will be needed between society and the state.

[Box]

Forty-seven year old Mark Yuryevich Urnov is a graduate of the MGIMO [Moscow State Institute for International Relations], and is a candidate of economic sciences. He worked in academic institutes (VNIKI [All-Union Scientific Research and Design Institute], IMEMO [Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences], and IMRD [Institute for the International Workers Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences]), and later in the Gorbachev Foundation. Since April 1994 he has been at the RF Presidential Administration Analytical Center. In December of the same year he became head of the center

*Journalists' Role in Chechnya Conflict Analyzed

954F1841A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 11, 16-22 Mar 95 p 12

[Unattributed article under "Analysis" rubric: "The Average Age of Reporters in the Chechnya War Is 40"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **An investigatory group of a Russian-American information press center issued the bulletin "Journalism and War" (manager of the investigation is Piter Khlebnikov) that tells about the coverage of the military operations in Chechnya by the Russian mass media. The project was financed ($5,000) by the "Open Society" Institute that belongs to the Soros Fund.**

As you know, the war in Chechnya has become a great test not only for Russian military people and politicians but also for the mass media. For the first time in recent years, journalists worked in an atmosphere in which the attitude of both the authorities and the army toward them was very negative. In addition, for the first time in the last half century, the profession of military correspondent has become a mass profession.

In the course of the investigation, they carried out a special and unprecedented survey of the journalists covering the events in Chechnya directly from the zone of military operations. It turned out that the average age of this group of journalists is 40. The overwhelming majority are men. The average time of work in the zone of the conflict is 14.5 days, whereby the longest time was found to be 37 days and the shortest 4 days. At the time when they were sent to Chechnya, 91 percent of the journalists surveyed had already had experience working in "hot spots," whereby 91 percent had had this experience in the territory of the former USSR. Only 22 percent had previously come to the territory of Chechnya. Just 48 percent of the journalists used bulletproof vests and helmets in the zone of military operations and 61 percent had an insurance policy.

How was the work of the journalists in the region of military operations? Seventy percent of all those polled had an accreditation from the Provisional Information Center, whereby they spent an average of 1.6 days to acquire it—this is an inadmissibly long time under the conditions of wartime. But only 65 percent of journalists were asked to show accreditation documents. The services of the Provisional Information Center were used by 17 percent of journalists in Moscow and by 8 percent in Mozdok; 83 percent considered its work useless and 17 percent though it was partially useful. Twenty two percent of those polled obtained information from officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, 26 percent from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 17 percent from the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation, 56 percent from the administration of the Ingush Republic, and 78 percent from the administration of the Chechen Republic. In so doing, 83 percent of the journalists sensed the hostility of Russian officials and military people, 4 percent sensed that of officials of Chechnya, 9 percent that of local inhabitants who are Chechens, and 9 percent that of local inhabitants who are not Chechens. Seventy four percent of journalists utilized the services of local means of communication (telephone, telegraph, television relay) and 56 percent used a satellite link.

Several documents published for the first time by the Department of Defense of the United States are of enormous interest. Above all they are the principles of its information policy, which, as it turned out, are just five in number but quite comprehensive. The principles basically represent the obligations of the department for the adequate distribution of information to the society. It is curious that the U.S. Department of Defense is mainly concerned about the morale of the relatives of those killed and wounded in the course of combat operations and, quite naturally, about specialized military information that the opposing side need not know. It should be noted that the deputy secretary of defense for public relations work has direct responsibility for the realization of the principles of information policy.

It is worth citing that part of the American experience that involves the conditions of the work of the mass media in a region of combat operations:

Information on losses has particular significance that has to do with the concern about the relatives of servicemen who have been killed. The relatives of the killed must be informed only in person by an officer of the corresponding service. Photographs of killed and wounded servicemen, personal medallions, or other details that make it possible to determine their person may not be utilized until the relatives have been notified. The suffering experienced by relatives who have unexpectedly learned of the loss of their loved one from the mass media outweigh the news value of photographs, motion picture frames, or video tape.

Journalists are admitted to the zone of combat operations of the forces of the United States in accordance with the following rule: before or after the start of combat operations, special groups of journalists ("pools") are organized to cover the participation of units of the United States in combat operations. It is not recommended that journalists independently join combat units.

During the time of combat operations, the materials of the "pool" of journalists must be examined to determine whether they contain secret information on the plans for combat operations, the combat capability of units, and the guarding of installations. The material must not be examined for critical comments contained within it.

It is interesting that a difference of opinion between journalists and the censor is quite permissible. So that the journalist can achieve his aims, a four-stage system has been developed in which it is set forth to whom the author of the material may appeal if he does not agree with the opinion of the officer exercising the censorship. And still it is proposed that the final decision on the publication of the disputed material be made by the management of the information publisher that the journalist represents.

A particular column of the "rules" is the most significant and shortest of all, saying: "The journalist is not permitted to carry a weapon."

As you know, the degree of freedom of the mass media is tested in times of crisis. The war in Chechnya has demonstrated two different tendencies. On the one hand, there is the almost total internal freedom of Russian journalism. On the other hand, the reciprocal relations of the press with authority structures are absolutely unfree and in this sense they are abnormal. The authorities have turned out to be incapable of observing the principles of openness of information that they declared several years in succession and unwilling to help the mass media operate under extreme conditions. The analysis whose results were published in the bulletin "Journalism and War" is precisely one of the means of closing the colossal gap that has developed between the mass media and the authorities.

File: *The Russian-American Information Press Center (RAIPC) was established in Moscow in May 1992 as a joint scientific program of the United States and Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Center for the Problems of War, Peace, and the Mass Media at New York University. It is financed by the United States Information Agency (USIA), the Carnegie Corporation, and the Winston and Joyce Mertz-Gilmore foundations. The RAIPC performs a tremendous amount of expeditious reference and information work to assist Russian journalists. A special program of the RAIPC is to help regional mass media. Branches work in St. Petersburg, Nizhnyy Novgorod, and Novosibirsk. The bulletin in question is the second research project of the RAIPC (the first, in December 1993, was to monitor the mass media in the course of the last election campaign in Russia).*

*TV Anchorman Pozner Interviewed

954F1841B Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 11, 16-22 Mar 95 p 13

[Interview with Vladimir Pozner by Anna Kachkayeva under "Position" rubric: "Do Not Keep Silent: Vladimir Pozner on False Freedom and Public Television"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **It is practically impossible to find Pozner in Moscow. He comes to the capital for several days every month to record the programs "My" [We] and "Yesli..." [If...]. We were helped by chance. A few days ago, the well-known television personality and president of a television academy responded to the questions of journalists in connection with the establishment of the first national award in the area of television—the "TFNI" prize. Our brief conversation took place after the press conference in the "Slavyanskaya."**

[Kachkayeva] Vladimir Vladimirovich, what do you think about "public television," whose vignette will appear on the air of "Ostankino" on 1 April?

[Pozner] In the first place, it is necessary to determine what we mean, to define our terms. In the United States, for example, they have "public television." It is customary to call it public. But in reality it is one-fourth public, for just 25 percent is paid by the viewers and 17 percent out of the national budget. The rest of the financing comes from large corporations for whom this is a means of self-advertising. It would be more correct to call "public" television noncommercial television—it exists without advertising. So in our case, the name "public" [obshchestvennoye] is deceptive. Of course there is an obvious need to renovate "Ostankino." And it is accurate to say that the new television is capable of being better than the first channel in recent times. It is probable that the establishment of a joint stock company is the correct step in the present situation. But one cannot call our television public.

[Kachkayeva] There has been a substitution of terms. And you have confirmed this. It is hard to judge why this has happened. By the way, it cannot be ruled out that it is also out of ignorance. It is interesting to know whether anyone has turned to you, a professional, for advice.

[Pozner] The television people themselves did not turn to me. Never. They are not interested in my point of view. But one prominent businessman, now a shareholder of ORT, did indeed turn to me, unofficially to be sure. He repeatedly asked me to write my thoughts and to send books on programming and ratings. To be honest, I was flattered by such interest. The man was clearly concerned not only about money but also about the professional standards of the channel. I fulfilled the request of this businessman. But I repeat that it was all unofficial.

[Kachkayeva] On 2 March, on the day of the television "peak hour," approximately the following went over the air to the entire country: the well-known television personality Vladimir Pozner sent to Yeltsin a letter from America with the demand that he declare an emergency situation. They hardly expected this kind of reaction to the murder of Vlad Listyev from you. Many were perplexed: Can it be that Pozner has become an advocate of harsh measures.

[Pozner] I have long since ceased to be amazed at such happenings. Unfortunately, this is the style of today's journalism. When they told me that the very esteemed Yevgeniy Alekseyevich Kiselev interprepted my letter in such an unequivocal manner and then the chief editor of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA mentioned it among other things, I almost became despondent. But then I thought: Why? All of this corresponds to the level of our domestic journalism.

The text of the letter was disseminated from a fax of the Russian Foundation for the Development of Television and the Academy of Russian Television through the channels of the mass media. Besides Pozner, the letter was also signed by Viktor Litenko, general director of the foundation. The letter states, in particular: "We would *like to ask our president and our parliament a question: Is it not time to stop playing at democracy and freedom? What is happening today is only a game of freedom and democracy, because the only ones who are benefiting from freedom and democracy are those who took advantage of the moment and got rich. No, not all of them are murderers and not all are bandits but who can deny that money and power are synonymous in our country today? And if they are not synonymous, prove it: declare an emergency situation for six weeks, take away the democratic freedoms of those who do not care about the lives of other people, and remove them from our lives.... The murder of Vlad Listyev is your shame, mister president, and your shame, parliamentarians, it is evidence if not of your involvement then of your indifference, silence, and inaction. We appeal to our colleagues in the trade: do not keep silent, demand action, and use your weapons—television, radio, and the press—to create the conditions in which "killers" (a nice English word for the much less attractive "murderer") and their bosses could not exist. And God forbid that we think that the death of Vlad Listyev does not effect all of us. We would like to remind everyone of the words of the German pastor Martin Niemoeller, who prior to Hitler's coming to power headed the Lutheran community in Hamburg and later was sent to a concentration camp, where shortly before his death he recalled: '...First they came for the communists and I remained silent, because I was not a communist. Then they came for the Jews and I remained silent, because I was not a Jew. Then they came for the members of the labor union and I remained silent, because I was not a member of the labor union. Then they came for the Catholics and I remained silent, because I was a Protestant. Then they came for me and by that time there was no one left who could speak out.' DO NOT REMAIN SILENT."*

In general, I sent a rather personal letter to the president. I think that the excitement is understandable: Is it not time to stop playing at democracy, because the false freedom has become the privilege of a particular group of people? I realize very well that on this basis they may count me among the supporters of harsh measures. Let them, if that is what my colleagues want to do. For me, the question of democracy and force is really a painful one. I cannot say unequivocally whether or not it is necessary to apply nondemocratic means of establishing order in a democratic state. In the United States, for example, they announce curfews and other nondemocratic rules in some states when necessary. Of course such temporary measures have to be introduced legally. Probably no fewer than 75 percent of the parliamentarians must vote for such a decision. Of course extreme measures are bad. It is torture for me to write and talk about all this. And it is good that it is not up to me to make such decisions, because actually it is hardly likely that I would ever do this.

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*Interdepartmental Commission on Intellectual Property Decreed

954E0746A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Mar 95 p 16

[Russian Federation Government Decree No 228, issued 7 March 1995: "On Establishment of the Interdepartmental Commission To Ensure Protection of Intellectual Property"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to coordinate activities by law enforcement agencies aimed at ensuring compliance with Russian Federation legislation regarding protection of intellectual property and with obligations stemming from the Russian Federation's international treaties in that area, preventing unfair competition and creating a civilized intellectual property market, the Government of the Russian Federation hereby resolves:

1. To adopt a proposal prepared by the Russian Federation Committee on Patents and Trademarks and the Russian Federation State Committee on Anti-Monopoly Policy and Support for New Economic Structures, in consultation with the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice, the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Federation Ministry of Science and Technical Policy, the Russian Federation Ministry of Culture, the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation and other affected federal executive bodies, as well as with affected organizations, regarding the establishment of the Interdepartmental Commission To Ensure Protection of Intellectual Property.

2. To approve V. P. Rassokhin, chairman of the Russian Federation Commission on Patents and Trademarks, and N. Ye. Fonareva, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee on Anti-Monopoly Policy and Support for New Economic Structures, as co-chairmen of the Interdepartmental Commission To Ensure Protection of Intellectual Property.

3. The co-chairmen of the Interdepartmental Commission To Ensure Protection of Intellectual Property shall, in consultation with federal executive bodies and with organizations, including companies which manage the rights of authors, performers and manufacturers of sound recordings, present to the Government of the Russian Federation within two months a draft "Statute on the Interdepartmental Commission To Ensure Protection of Intellectual Property" and recommendations regarding its composition.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, Chairman, Government of the Russian Federation

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*Edict on Federal Program for Improving Voters' Legal Culture

954E0746B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Mar 95 p 11

[Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 228, issued 28 February 1995: "On the Federal Special Program To

Improve the Legal Culture of Voters and Election Organizers in the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to strengthen the foundations of the rule-of-law state, ensure the constitutional rights and liberties of the citizens of the Russian Federation and improve the legal culture of voters and election organizers in the Russian Federation, I hereby resolve:

1. to approve the "Federal Special Program To improve the Legal Culture of Voters and Election Organizers in the Russian Federation" (subsequently to be referred to as "the Program"; appended) as submitted by the Russian Federation Central Election Commission.

2. that the Government of the Russian Federation shall:

—consider inclusion of the Program in the list of federal special programs when drafting the 1996-98 federal budgets, as well as the amounts of funding required for implementation of the Program;

—approve the Russian Federation Central Election Commission as the contracting agency for the Program.

3. that federal executive bodies and executive bodies in components of the Russian Federation shall provide necessary assistance with the preparation and conducting of measures in connection with implementation of the Program.

4. that this edict shall become effective on the date of its signing.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, The Kremlin
28 February 1995, No 228

*Duma's Draft Law on Advertising Examined

954F1852A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Mar 95 p 4

[Article by Boris Pilyatskin, IZVESTIYA staff: "Antimonopoly Committee Wants Monopoly Control of Advertising and Is Trying To Take the Press in Hand"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the State Duma's Committee on Economic Policy, preparations are in full swing for presenting the federal Law on Advertising, which was planned for early April, for a second reading.

Since the Duma approved the draft law on first reading last December, more than 120 amendments and critical remarks have been received and they continue to come in. The sheer number of proposals for changing the text says something about the quality of its content.

In analyzing the draft law, the media has noted with rare unanimity that it would most likely enable bureaucratic structures to control all advertising to the detriment of citizens' right to information and free choice.

As evident from Section V of that document, the first one vying to be at the advertising helm was the law's drafter itself, the Antimonopoly Committee [Russian State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and Support of New Economic Structures], which endowed itself with rights to file judicial and arbitration claims, turn cases over to the procuracy for criminal investigation, and send out every conceivable sort of prohibitive order, as well as the right to interpret "what is good and what is bad" in advertising.

The room for exercising the latter function is especially wide, considering the vagueness and sometimes incomprehensibility of the draft law's articles. Here are just a few examples.

Article 8, point 1, speaks of the prohibition of "... portrayals pertaining to race, nationality, occupational or social category, age group or sex, language. ..." In that case, given a literal interpretation of the text, how could one, without falling into the Antimonopoly Committee's disfavor, create an advertisement for the popular film, "Ten Negro Children" [Desyat negrityat], or depict a woman looking in the mirror? Even Pushkin's old man and woman would become persona non grata in advertising just by virtue of their belonging to their age group.

Point 2 of the same Article 8 speaks of the right to protection in the event that an advertisement appears that defames one's honor, dignity, or business reputation. It would be hard to object to that. Here is how a simple idea, however, cast in an apparently scholarly form, becomes an absurdity: "A juridical or natural person, in the event of the **commissioning** (my emphasis—B. P.), production, or dissemination of an advertisement containing information that defames his honor ... has the right, ... through a court or court of arbitration, to demand that the advertiser retract such advertisement information by the same means. ..." So if Mr. X sends a print shop an order for an advertisement that, in the opinion of Mr. Y, defames the latter's honor, Mr. Y has the right to demand moral restitution by the same means, i.e., to demand that Mr. X send an order for an advertisement that does not contain the defamatory information. Obviously, this requirement lacks common sense.

The urge for prohibition that permeates the text of the draft law also manifests itself in the following masterpiece of legal thought (Article 9, point 3): "It is forbidden for the mass media to collect a fee for placing propaganda under the guise of informational or editorial material or the opinion of an individual author." Such concepts as propaganda for war or propaganda for sobriety are common knowledge, but who knows what propaganda in general is? Any printed word can simply be declared propaganda (just what it is propaganda for, judging from the text of the draft law, makes no difference), and sanctions can be imposed on the violator.

In the same fashion, in banning advertisements of an erotic nature (Article 8, point 1), the authors feign ignorance of the fact that not a single Russian legislative act contains a definition of erotic material or specifies how it differs from pornography. So the moralists on the advertising Olympus will decide: Is a lady wearing a negligee and lauding a skin cream or displaying well-shaped legs in panty hose worthy of appearing before our eyes or is this seditious material that undermines the moral health of the people?

Such examples could be endlessly cited, as could passages indicating that they were written by people who have a confused notion of the norms of the Russian language. Just consider the following pearl, for example: "discrediting responsibility" (Article 18)! Or how is one to understand the prohibition in Article 8 of a depiction pertaining to "philosophical, political, or other convictions" (one would still like to know, exactly what sort?)?

Naturally, the numerous critical observations that have appeared in the mass media have presupposed the possibility of a public debate, with the Antimonopoly Committee presenting arguments and defending its position before public opinion. Instead, it chose the course of lodging complaints against the press with the Russian president's Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes, which undertook to promptly consider those petitions. Although the presiding officer specifically stated that the judges did not intend to touch on the draft law itself (but how, then, could they judge the polemical newspaper articles without getting into the essence of the matter?), the chamber's decision—as surprising as it may seem—is aimed at defending that document.

Maybe one should not be surprised, and here is why: one of the amendments to the draft law sent to the Duma came from the Judicial Chamber. It pertains to Article 28, which aroused particular public antipathy. It refers to establishing some sort of special agency to monitor the mass media in the area of advertisements. In its version of that article, the Judicial Chamber would like to change only a few words. In place of "the president shall establish," it is proposed to say, "there shall be a special federal agency authorized by the president." So it goes throughout the text, in which the functions of that agency are made to perfectly fit the present functions of the Judicial Chamber, and why shouldn't it serve as a support for its executive branch brother, the Antimonopoly Committee, under the new law? What could be simpler? There would not be any need to create a new structure since one already exists, ready-made.

In the complaint that was recently considered by the Judicial Chamber, IZVESTIYA, among other publications, was reproached for "improper use of the legal term 'censorship'" with respect to the functions the Antimonopoly Committee would have if the draft law is passed. After all, how can one write about censorship, the judges lamented, since we have none? That would be contrary to the Law on the Press. Indeed, that could not be, since it could never be.

The point is that contrary to the law, the Antimonopoly Committee wants to become, specifically, the censor of advertisements. Isn't that what is stated in Article 17, point 1, of the draft law: the federal executive branch agency for antimonopoly policy "**prevents and puts a stop to** (my emphasis—B. P.) instances of improper advertisement committed by juridical persons and individual businessmen"? It is true, as we see, that there is no word "censorship," but could it be that that is only because it is hard to make a verb from that word?

*Government Communications Aide on New Information Systems

954Q0162A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 95 p 5

[Interview with Igor Romanov, deputy general director of the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information: "FAPSI in the Role of System Integrator"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **It is well known that in addition to resolving its own specific tasks the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI) under the president of the Russian Federation is studying a number of information systems for higher bodies of authority and is also working on the data base organization and management of regional administrative agencies. What is the ultimate goal of these studies and at what level is the provision of regional access to "federal information" today? Igor Romanov, deputy general director of FAPSI, responds to these questions.**

We see the ultimate goal of our studies to be the integration of information resources and the establishment of information-analytic systems in the interests of the effective management of the state. This is in full accord with the strategy for the provision of information that flows from the edict of the president of the Russian Republic "On the Improvement of the Provision of Agencies of State Authority with Information and Telecommunications and the Procedures for Their Interaction in the Realization of State Policy in the Area of the Provision of Information." This edict formulated the strategic idea of integrating information and telecommunications systems of agencies of state authority into a unified information space of Russia on the basis of international standards and the requirements for information security. This idea was reflected in the concept developed by FAPSI for an information and telecommunications system.

One can distinguish at least two directions in the realization of this concept at the regional level. The first is the provision of access of regions to information resources at the federal level. The second is the establishment, primarily through the resources of FAPSI, of regional information-analytic centers that represent computing complexes on the basis of highly productive servers, local technological computing networks, and user centers.

As for the first, about 300 regional subscribers have already been connected to federal information resources in the scope of the established electronic mail system.

In the scope of the second direction, two regional information-analytic systems have now been developed in St. Petersburg and Nizhniy Novgorod, where they are in trial operation.

Work is being done to improve the network for the transmission of open and confidential information providing for basic kinds of telecommunications services: electronic mail, exchange of juridically confirmed documents (electronic signature), circular distribution of documents, teleconferences, "on-line" work, etc.

Along with the resolution of technical problems, it is especially important to carry out coordinated actions for the development of information resources in the establishment and operation of data bases and banks, which would be the basic information resource for the resolution of tasks by analytic subdivisions.

In general, this theme is so multifaceted and deep that it cannot be raised in the scope of a short interview.

*Reasons for Veto of Draft Law on Savings Reported

954F1810A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 15 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Bekker: "An Unpopular Veto of a Popular Law. Why the President Is Against the Restoration of Savings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday the Press Service of the head of state distributed his letter addressed to Speaker of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin. In it Boris Yeltsin set forth his reasons why for the second time he vetoed the law "On the Restoration and Protection of Savings of Citizens of the Russian Federation." The latter was adopted on 24 February by the lower house of the parliament and approved on 1 March.

The claims of the president in regard to the law amount to three aspects. First of all, there is no mechanism for calculating the state obligations, in connection with which the upper limit of the debt has not been determined, and, naturally, has not been taken into account in the February budget. Secondly, the stated law contradicts the law "On the Domestic State Debt of the Russian Federation," which does not include the preinflation savings of the population in the make-up of the state domestic debt that is guaranteed by the Central Bank. Thirdly, in the proposed law, in the opinion of Boris Yeltsin, the procedure for determining the concrete types of special purpose obligations and their free circulation remained unprescribed.

No matter how convincing the president's appeal to the truth, his position in regard to the reanimation of the deposits of citizens is represented somewhat illogically. At first glance it seems that Boris Yeltsin "not on business" enters into conflict with the Federal Assembly and with his own hands "is killing" his prestige among the population. But in actual fact, it seems, not everything is so unequivocal.

Although the law created by the parliament has a kind of purely framework character and does not obligate the state to anything other than "acknowledgement of the debt", this simplicity is deceptive. This acknowledgement itself at once exaggerates the domestic debt approximately by $110-120 billion. It is clear that the state has to take this circumstance into consideration in dividing the income being received between the deposits lost by citizens and external creditors. It is clear that such a prospect is incapable of inspiring the Club of Paris and the Club of London, to which Russia is linked by a rather complex dialogue. The advisers of the president, one must suppose, did not lose sight of this collision, recommending to him that he veto the legislative initiative of the parliament, which, moreover, from the very outset had a decidedly politicized character (noisy meetings of the depositors that had suffered, headed by deputies Glazyev, Zorkaltsev, and Lipitskiy).

Another possible reason that prompted the head of state to block the law is connected with the future elections. If, following the law on the restoration of savings, the deputies issued a train [shleyf] of laws with concrete mechanisms for their realization, then, by the time of the elections of 1995 and 1996, the political trumps would be in the hands of the legislative power. It is obvious that the executive power did not want to give up the initiative. It is not coincidental that in his letter to Mr Rybkin Boris Yeltsin unambiguously declared that the determination of the policy in regard to the domestic debt of the state is carried out on the basis of proposals of the government, developed with the TsB [Central Bank]. And, in order to soften somewhat the toughness of the design, the president again proposed to the State Duma to form organs for the conduct of "a unified financial, credit, and monetary policy, the protection and guarantee of the stability of the ruble."

Without a doubt, the economic aspect of the problem played an important role in the president's veto. It is sufficient to recall that the first variant of the law at once introduced obligations to depositors having at first limited and then unlimited circulation. To put it in more simple terms, in essence parallel money. The last variant already did not include this "mine", but the president was not worried by this, and in the letter he mentioned the "unpredictable reaction of the securities market in the transfer of guaranteed savings of citizens into special purpose obligations, which will appear as securities."

It is worthwhile to add one not unimportant detail. For the time being the president is "holding back" the parliament, and the government is elaborating a federal program for the restoration of savings of the population. According to information from the Ministry of Economics, it will be ready precisely by mid-1996.

*Former Human Rights Commissioner Kovalev Interviewed

954F1844A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 11, 16-22 Mar 95 p 8

[Interview with Sergey Kovalev, former human rights commissioner, by Ilya Milshteyn: "The Unknown Kovalev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Last Friday the State Duma revoked its decision from last year on the selection of Sergey Kovalev as human rights commissioner of the Russian Federation. It is no secret to anyone that Kovalev was punished for the conscientious performance of his duties.*

In December 1994, having been sent to Groznyy, he defended those who were being bombed rather than those who were sending the bombers and this was a great surprise for the chiefs in the Kremlin. The astonished minister of defense exhaled from the television screen: "Well this is vrr-rakh!.." And they thought: this is a regular guy. Apparently they knew nothing about him. The few who knew the dissident, the editor of the samizdat "Chronicle of Current Events," and the political prisoner Kovalev do not find anything surprising about his present actions and words. They would have been shaken if he had done anything else.

We talked with Kovalev for several hours at his home. Sergey Adamovich is the same in his own kitchen as he is in the corridors of political power. That same "Belomor'-'.... That same tired and anxious look and slow, almost faltering deep voice.

[Kovalev] ...Well, I was born in 1930 in Ukraine. When I was three, my parents took me to Podiipki near Moscow.

[Milshteyn] And what were your parents?

[Kovalev] In terms of their level of education, my mother was a medical student who did not finish her studies and my father was a low-level employee. It is another matter that they were people who had learned much from the experience of life.

[Milshteyn] Apparently they generously shared this experience with you?

[Kovalev] On the contrary, they knew very well how to keep silent. And very eloquently. I remember how I was angry with mama on the day of the elections under the new Stalinist constitution. Judging by the radio reports, all of the Soviet people were rejoicing. "Mama, why are you not rejoicing?," I asked her. She did not say anything in response to my question.

[Milshteyn] How did your "dissident's" character develop? Your parents taught you to keep silent. Who taught you to speak—your friends, the street, the school?

[Kovalev] This is closer. You understand that life in a suburban workers' settlement differs greatly from life in the big city. Everything is visible and everyone works in one defense plant. The value of every person is known and the boundary between words and actions is clearly defined. In Moscow, a citizen solemnly swears his love for the Motherland and is believed, whereas in Polipki everyone knows that he goes to the back door of the store and gets his goods there and that he has reliable protection against the front. Later on I was surprised to hear Muscovites of my same age talk excitedly about their solemn assemblies in the schools.... Here an active member of the Komsomol [young communists] was considered a "rare bird." The provinces toiled silently and honestly.

[Milshteyn] And you also toiled silently and honestly in school?

[Kovalev] In general, I was an excellent student.... But, as you put it, I began to "speak." For example, I started an argument with a teacher in regard to Article 125 of the constitution, where it talked about freedom of speech, street marches, and demonstrations.... She and I argued until we were hoarse. She repeatedly gave me poor marks. I persisted....

[Milshteyn] What year was that?

[Kovalev] Probably 1943.

[Milshteyn] Did you understand what you were risking?

[Kovalev] No, of course not. I did not realize how they could make things unpleasant for my parents on account of my actions. But the director of the school turned out to be much smarter than me and the teacher. He called me to his office, listened to me carefully, and asked me questions. He did not yell at me. He said quietly but fervently: "Serezha, we adults have our own troubles. You will understand them when you grow up. Today let us agree on this. It is a little too soon for you to deal with the constitution. Know its text and I will see to it that the teacher will test your knowledge and not ask any extra questions." You understand that I after this I knew the text quite well. And I remember it to this day....

[Milshteyn] Can it be said that your path to the dissents was simple and direct?

[Kovalev] I would not put it this way. Hardly anyone became an opponent of the regime on his own initiative. Who wants to volunteer to go to a camp? But the authorities "helped" me to become a dissident. This happened because of the obtuseness of the authorities themselves. I remember that in 1956 the postgraduate students of the biology department, including myself, wrote a certain letter about how badly we were being taught genetics and whether it could not be taught a little better. The letter was reserved, mild, and loyal. And we were not appealing to the Central Committee of the CPSU but to our own dean's office.

[Milshteyn] But Lysenko was still in power....

[Kovalev] Yes, and therefore the letter had the effect of an exploding bomb. It started something that would be hard to imagine in a nightmare. They even dragged our parents to the university, blackmailed them, and demanded that they work on their own children, in a manner of speaking. But we were already 25-30 years old. Well, why the devil would they get the parents involved here? Of course after such treatment the ranks of the signers thinned greatly. There remained only a few stubborn people. The comrades from the Komsomol committee advised me not to wait to be expelled but rather to leave this organization myself. This is what I did.

[Milshteyn] So you joined the dissidents?

[Kovalev] I was not yet prepared for this. On the contrary, after the university I got involved in scientific work. I remember well a conversation with one close friend. He pronounced a phrase that was popular in those years: "Something has to be done." I shrugged my shoulders: "I do not see what and I do not understand how. I do science. This is an honest occupation. I do not want to throw bombs and I do not see any other way to fight the regime." I was wrong. And very soon I signed my first letter—in defense of Sinyavskiy and Daniel.

[Milshteyn] The arrest and in particular the sentencing of Yuliy Daniel and Andrey Sinyavskiy frightened some and forced them to remain silent, whereas it pushed others into the ranks of those fighting the regime.

[Kovalev] Yes, the movement in defense of rights developed precisely then, in the mid-1960's. In the spring of 1968, the intelligentsia was definitively split into those who "recognized their mistakes" and those who "persisted in their error." The people were summoned and it was demanded that they repudiate their convictions. Many did so....

[Milshteyn] Do you think that fear was all that was at work here?

[Kovalev] In general, yes. Although I knew people, by no means cowards, who explained their apostasy approximately like this: "I was sincere and I still think that I was correct in protesting. But I am profoundly grieved by the fact that my statement was available to unconscientious Western journalists who used it to slander the bright communist ideals and to help their own cause." This surprised me. They were smart people but what were they expecting? Their complaint did not move the Procurator's Office of the USSR or the Supreme Soviet. What a disappointment!

[Milshteyn] "Chronicle of Current Events" appeared in 1968. Apparently it was originally oriented to the West?

[Kovalev] No one expressly set this goal. But none of us had any objections in this connection. It was clear to everyone that otherwise the protest will not be heard here—neither by the authorities nor by the people.

[Milshteyn] I noted that the style of the "Chronicle" changed depending on who was editing it. Along as it was "headed" by the poets Natalya Gorbanevskaya and Anatoliy Yakobson, the texts were not devoid of emotionality. When the poets were replaced by scientists such as the biologist Kovalev and the mathematician Shikhanovich, the reports became much drier, more stringent, and more academic.

[Kovalev] You understand that here it is not just a matter of style but also of certain ideas having to do with the theme "power and the people." The disputes about this have not died down yet and therefore it makes sense to return to the old dissident discussions. Here are two concepts. According to one of them, we are governed by the mafia, dregs, and scoundrels, who are prepared for any crimes against the oppressed people. This point of view imposes an emotional style and, I think, is incorrect. It is too good for our country. To deal with a group of criminals, as large and as powerful as it may be, is still not the worst case. We have realized the very worst version: a sick society. You understand that the division into "our own" and "enemies" is conditional and unproductive. Rather, what has happened and is happening is our common misfortune and fault.

[Milshteyn] Well, if everyone is "sick," then the authorities and the state security people should have evoked not so much hatred as pity and compassion?

[Kovalev] So it was in part.

[Milshteyn] How did they arrest you, Sergey Adamovich?

[Kovalev] It was in December 1974. The arrest was preceded by a search. The telephone rang at six in the morning—it was Tanya Velikanova with the report that they were searching Tatyana Sergeyevna Khodorovich. Half asleep, I said that I understood and I got dressed and went out. We had the tradition of going to each other's searches to give morale support.... And here they were calling at my door! I asked Tanya to wait on the phone and I went to the door: they....

[Milshteyn] Were you prepared for this?

[Kovalev] Of course I was morally prepared. I even knew that they would soon arrest me. But precisely on that day I was poorly prepared for the search. In the entrance hall was a brief case crammed full of all kinds of seditious materials. Unfortunately I did not even think about throwing it from the balcony.

[Milshteyn] You were arrested after the search?

[Kovalev] Not immediately. They took me and my wife to the KGB, at Lubyanka, for questioning. Then they released us. After that they called us in for further interrogation. I arrived on time and turned my passport over to the duty officer.... I waited about 40 minutes. This is a kind of psychological processing: they "pickle" you for a long time in front of the mysterious door.

Finally I got fed up with this, went up to the duty officer, and said with displeasure: "For some reason your bosses have been delayed." "Well, you have to wait," he answered haughtily. I became angry: "That is your point of view. But from my point of view, there is no need! What you have here is a brothel but I have things to do...." I turned and left. Later they apologized to me by telephone and asked me to come and pick up my passport. I came for the passport and that is when they took me to Lefortovo. The next day they brought me to Vilnius by special convoy.

[Milshteyn] You were tried on 10 December 1975, the same day on which the academician Sakharov was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize....

[Kovalev] Yelena Georgiyevna received the prize. Andrey Dmitriyevich stood before the closed doors of the "open trial" of the dissident Kovalev. They did not admit him to the courtroom.

[Milshteyn] Do you still intend to be involved with the protection of rights?

[Kovalev] You understand...that we live in a sick society....

Federal Assembly

*Sobchak on Political, Economic Activities

954E0739A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 17 Mar 95 p 4

[Article by Georgiy Urushadze under the rubric "Political Elite of Russia": "Anatoliy Sobchak: 'Political Con Men Will Not Be Allowed To Hold Power'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Only two of the democrats of the "first wave" have been able to maintain their position. Boris Yeltsin and Anatoliy Sobchak—they are the only ones remaining from the Interregional Deputy Group. The president of Russia and the mayor of St. Petersburg have more in common than just their political past and similar election programs—they have also their date of election—12 June 1991. Sobchak is considered to be a master at reembodiment: In one day he can deliver a lecture at the law school, grant an interview, and hold a meeting of the city government. The mayor is becoming increasingly interested in economic issues. He is considered to be one of the brightest representatives of the Russian regional political elite. The St. Petersburg mayor emphasized that he does not wish to rise to the federal level, that is, run for president. But it is known that politics is a deceptive thing... therefore KOMMERSANT-DAILY thought that a monologue of the mayor of St. Petersburg would not be without interest.**

I Was Able To Maintain My Independence

I see how people who came to state service on the wave of the democratic movement got bogged down in intrigues, and how ambitions overshadow the main things. They cannot nominate a common candidate to parliament and they do not understand that this makes defeat inevitable. Possibly the defeat will even be followed by physical destruction. We must join forces so that we do not allow sergeant majors in generals' uniforms, our Khlestakovs, and other political con men into power.

As for myself, I have learned a lot during these five years. I am always learning something. I try to maintain a peaceful life, normal work, and not to support radicals—either right or left. A good deal has been done. When I took charge of the city it was second, and then it was first in terms of cost increases, competing with Moscow. Today it is in 68th place. One of the most pleasant results of last year was that the birthrate increased by 7 percent. This is a surprising result for Russia. Perhaps the atmosphere in the city has changed, a belief in the future has appeared. Here they have introduced a food combine for nursing children—they produce 40 tonnes every day....

At the same time I have managed to maintain complete independence from financial and industrial and political structures. Although I work with everyone and help everyone. But not selectively—I am not creating a financial structure under myself or for myself. There simply are no such structures in the city (as distinct from, say, Moscow). But I have an idea and I am realizing it—the creation of a large financial center in St. Petersburg. This would be for the good of all of Russia. The disgraces that are being created in the capital are largely linked to the fact that 80 percent of all the country's money is circulating in Moscow. We have taken measures to prevent crude buying up of the city's financial structures. We have administrative and financial means with which we can beat back any attempt to buy up our banks.

I am not using the banks as an instrument for influencing politics—those are more Moscow's games. Banks can influence politics through parties. Of course I would not like this influence to be used to support our political opponents. We are looking into this.

Listyev's Murder Was Reflected in the Life of the City

We have also had many failures, and the main ones were linked primarily to what has happened in Russia. There were no investments that brought in significant amounts of money. If you think about how much time was spent on negotiations with foreign partners during this time! And then all the plans failed. Obstruction from the deputies drove away one investor, lobbying by deputies for others' interests—another. There were other factors—the struggle between the parliament and the president, Chechnya. Such events as the murders of Listyev or Kholodov were immediately reflected in the city's life. We either put off plans or declared that they would not be implemented in this situation.

In February a large delegation from the city government and entrepreneurs within the framework of the Kissinger

Commission conducted negotiations on the implementation of investment projects. I explained that all discussions about the chaos and the crime were greatly exaggerated: There are more people killed for every 100,000 residents in New York than in St. Petersburg. I am convinced. But here they killed Listyev. And we still have not received confirmations from our investors about implementing our agreements. I think that this is linked to the hysteria campaign that is now going on in the West with respect to Russia.

Listyev's murder was a political provocation. The people who arranged it are closely linked to the opposition and they are pursuing one goal—to discredit democracy so that the people will lose faith in it as a system. This murder caused colossal harm to Russia's image and we will have to compensate for that harm for many long years.

Only projects of large companies are now being implemented in the city. Gillette is developing projects and investing money in the Leninets association because it knows that gangsters will not get in there. Coca-Cola is building a new plant. They are not interested in politics: People drink Coca-Cola under any regime. So far I have not heard of a single case of serious investments by our merchants. If we were to create conditions for our entrepreneurs and bankers who have earned billions and if they had not pumped this money abroad—in two or three years we would not need any foreigners. They would be standing in line and we would be picking and choosing. We would be dictating the conditions to them! But now we are forced to agree to any conditions.

It Is Easier for Me To Resolve Issues With Soskovets and Chernomyrdin

We have always worked in a normal way with the federal government. If they have not agreed with something—they have criticized. We have spoken out against the law on privatization—that was Petr Filippov and his ideology, which I fought against back in the Leningrad Soviet. But nonetheless we were able to conduct privatization more intelligently than other regions did. The Government of Russia is not meeting its financial commitments and so far has not covered its debts to the enterprises for 1994. One can give dozens of other examples as well.

Three years ago we commissioned the Volodarskiy Bridge after reconstruction. The night before they cut the cables for all the trolley lines in one night. I appealed to the president and the prime minister (at that time it was Gaydar): There is mass theft of nonferrous metals, and I submitted a proposal to prohibit private individuals from selling nonferrous metals for industrial purposes. We still have not received a decision. I fought for three years to close the border with Estonia and prevent mass shipment of goods out of Russia. They finally closed it. It has been reported to me that they are now shipping them out through Belarus and other regions.

I do not especially count on the lobbying, the more so since certain members of government who come from St. Petersburg are undergoing strange metamorphoses. Chubays was one of the main developers of the free economic zone. As soon as he came to the government he became an opponent of free economic zones in general. Nonetheless we maintain normal relations with our workers who have gone to the federal government. I cannot say that it is much easier to solve problems with them than it is with other members of the cabinet. In general I have good relations with all of them. It is easiest of all to solve problems with Soskovets and Chernomyrdin.

As for the Duma, it makes decisions based on expenditures for the local budget. In this respect the law "On Veterans" is a disgrace. It is clear that soon there will be elections, but the law will not hold up under any criticism from the standpoint of common sense. I am being forced to install alarms in veteran's apartments free of charge: and I also have to install the telephones free of charge and give them medicines free of charge! It would cost the city R640 billion to implement this law. In order for the veteran to receive free medicine we would have to close the schools and hospitals or raise apartment rent. Last year 25 percent of the turnover tax went into the federal budget. I told Rybkin, Yeltsin, and Chernomyrdin: Return this money to us and I will implement the law on veterans. But, unfortunately, there has been no decision, because they need to pay the money for the operations in Chechnya and other absurd things.

I Will Run for Mayor

I have already been through several election campaigns. The next one will be the most difficult. It will not be calculated for the average voter but will be addressed to the hearts of everyone. It is one thing with veterans whose lives have been marred by events of recent years, but it is another thing with youth. For them today the communist system is something like Port Arthur or the First World War. Who are Stalin, Brezhnev, or Khrushchev to my 14-year-old daughter?

The hardest thing is to visit scholarly institutions. What can I say to workers of the Academy of Sciences, whose wages are downright degrading? It is a federal institution. They see me not only as mayor but also as a person who exerts an influence on Russian affairs.

Unfortunately, my influence is less than many imagine. Today the results of the elections are unpredictable, but the matter is determined by more than just money. My independent nonparty position (the Movement for Democratic Reforms has practically fallen apart and I have left it) enables me to implement a more independent policy. And, incidentally, the voters like this more. The rank-and-file voter is probably irritated by my appearances and presentations at salons. This must be taken into account. But what can I do? You understand that life takes place in various dimensions—with poor, with people of average means, and with the wealthy. I cannot exclude a person from the sphere of my communication just because he is rich.

[Box, p. 4]

Who are you, Doctor Sobchak?

—He was born on 10 August 1937 in Chita. He graduated from the law school at Leningrad State University and worked on the Stavropol Kray board of advocates, taught in the Leningrad special school of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, in the Leningrad Technological Institute of the pulp and paper industry, and Leningrad State University; he is a doctor of sciences, an honorary doctor of Portland, St. Petersburg (in the state of Florida in the United States), Brussels, Madrid, and so forth universities. In 1989 he was elected a USSR people's deputy and a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and he headed the commission for investigating the events in Tbilisi. In 1990 he was elected deputy of the Leningrad Soviet, and from 24 May 1990 he was chairman of the Leningrad Soviet. Since 12 June 1991 he has been mayor of Leningrad (St. Petersburg).

—He is a person who is difficult to predict. The apparatus does not like him and is rather afraid of him. He is a leader without a team: Since 1991 only two of his deputies have maintained their positions. He is ambitious and not indifferent to flattery. Sobchak is very concerned about how he is regarded in high society in the West. He loves social receptions. Recently he has been very self-confident and calm. He is apparently satisfied with his present position and is not trying to get anywhere.

—In the elections to the State Duma he headed the list of the RDDR [Russian Movement for Democratic Reform]. The bloc was defeated (RDDR garnered about 8 percent of the votes in St. Petersburg and the movement did not manage to cross the 5 percent mark in Russia as a whole). Sobchak himself explained this circumstance by the ineffective work with the population "in the remote areas." On 19 January 1994 he spoke for the last time at an RDDR conference, after which he dismissed the movement with a wave of the hand.

—He supports Moscow's policy during visits to the capital and when receiving high guests (the president, the prime minister) in St. Petersburg. For these occasions he prepared numerous requests, usually pertaining to the budget. Money is requested according to a two-stage process: First there is lobbying for approving the largest possible number of programs with the status of federal, and then money is requested for these programs. Of course he supports the demands of the military-industrial complex for payment for orders from the Ministry of Defense. He supports Yeltsin strategically.

—In industrial policy he has spoken in favor of conversion of the military-industrial complex (the military-industrial complex does not like him) and the creation of joint-stock companies from enterprises. He frequently signs documents without paying attention: There was a case when he signed an edict from the president which had been sent for his information. Confidential: In 1993 the mayor's committee on economic development (headed by Anatoliy Chubays, who at that time had not yet left for Moscow) kept the list of founders of the Interinvest association under wraps. The chief of the association was the second person in the destroyed Pavlov government—Vladimir Shcherbakov. The association's task was to search for large investments for the largest Russian projects. The advantage for the association and each of its founders was reflected in the percentage of the amount found. Anatoliy Sobchak was included on the list of founders of Interinvest. At that time he was lobbying for construction of the Luzhskiy port for Viktor Kharchenko, director of the Baltic Sea Shipping Line. In the end Ilya Baskin won the competition. The construction was estimated at $2 billion.

—Scandals: the receipt of an apartment in the center of the city at the beginning of his term as mayor, illegal firing of Deputy Mayor Shcherbakov and the chief of the tax inspectorate, Dmitriy Filippov (the court restored the rights of both), judicial proceedings with Federation Council Deputy Aleksandr Belyayev regarding the provision on the elections to the city assembly (Belyayev's plea was satisfied), extension of the elections to the city assembly for one day in the spring of 1994, and the arrests of the mayor's adviser Viktor Kharchenko and the chairman of the mayor's committee on trade, Lev Savenkov.

—Prognosis: Sobchak will probably run in the next mayoral elections. As for his desire to run for the post of president of Russia, it seems, after the collapse of the RDDR in the parliamentary elections a year and a half ago Sobchak has rejected it. If he does not manage to become mayor again, Sobchak promises to devote himself entirely to a noble cause—educating students. Apparently, in order not to lose his teaching skills, a month ago (at the beginning of the second semester) he took a part-time job on the legal faculty of Leningrad State University. Additionally, the mayor intends to actively write books, mainly about political subjects, naturally.

[End box]

Regional Affairs

*Decree, Sample Statute on Regional Securities Commissions

*Text of Decree

954E0759A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Mar 95 p 4

["Text" of "Russian Federation Government Decree No. 193 of 28 February 1995 on Adoption of a Sample Statute on a Regional Securities and Stock Market Commission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In implementing the Russian Federation President's Edict No. 2063 of 4 November 1994 "On Steps for State Regulation of the Securities Market in the Russian Federation" (Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation No. 28, Article 2972, 1994), the Russian Federation Government **decrees:**

1. that the accompanying Sample Statute on a regional securities and stock market commission is adopted.

2. that the Sample Statute on a regional securities and stock market commission is the basis for statutes on regional securities and stock market commissions being drafted by the organs of executive authority of components of the Russian Federation.

[Signed] **Chairman of the Russian Federation Government**
V. CHERNOMYRDIN

*Text of Sample Statute

954E0759B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Mar 95 p 4

["Text" of "Sample Statute on a Regional Securities and Stock Market Commission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. The regional securities and stock market commission (henceforth called commission) is a collegial organ formed by an organ of executive authority of a component of the Russian Federation to organize supervision of adherence by professional participants in the securities market to the requirements of Russian Federation laws on securities, as well as supervision of adherence by issuers to the procedure for registering the emissions of securities and the conditions for their distribution stipulated by emission prospectuses.

2. The commission is guided in its activity by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, edicts and directives of the Russian Federation President, decrees and directives of the Russian Federation Government, and decrees and directives of the Federal Commission on Securities and the Stock Market attached to Russian Federation Government (henceforth called the Federal Commission), and statutes on the commission.

3. The commission operates on the territory of the Russian Federation and performs the following functions:

a) supervision of adherence by issuers and participants in the securities market to the requirements of Russian Federation laws on securities;

b) supervision of the issuance and circulation of securities issued by the organs of state authority of Russian Federation components and organs of local self-government;

c) establishment and jurisdiction of a register of professional participants in the securities market operating in the territory of a Russian Federation component (except for self-regulating organizations of professional securities market participants);

d) creation of a public information data base on issuers and professional participants in the securities market;

e) organization of inspections—or the conduct of inspections jointly with the appropriate organs—of the financial and economic activity of the issuers and professional participants in the securities market and their self-regulating organizations and associations;

f) transfer to law enforcement organs of materials concerning issuers and professional participants in the securities market if there are signs of criminal actions or administrative law violation in their activity;

g) organization and conduct of consultations to explain the rights of shareholders and investors;

h) supervision of adherence by issuers and professional participants in the securities market to the requirements and standards for the disclosure of information;

i) supervision of the authenticity of information on the results of economic activity provided by issuers to the holders of securities;

j) supervision of observance of the rights of shareholders and investors and implementation of measures to ensure fulfillment of obligations to investors by issuers, banks, insurance and credit and finance institutions, and professional participants in the securities market;

k) receipt and registration of information on violations of the law in the securities market and verification of it in the procedure established;

l) quarterly analysis of the condition of a regional stock market and the dispatch of materials to the Federal Commission no later than 20 days after the end of the quarter;

m) drafting and submission to the Federal Commission of proposals to improve Russian Federation laws on securities;

n) submission of conclusions in response to inquiries by the Federal Commission on the activity of issuers and professional participants in the securities market; and

o) receiving citizens and considering letters, complaints, and other appeals from natural persons and legal entities related to professional activity in the securities market and the organization and activity of stock exchanges.

4. The commission has the right:

a) to introduce proposals to the Federal Commission, as well as to the appropriate organs of executive authority of Russian Federation components, on the suspension of licenses issued to perform professional activity with securities;

b) to send issuers and professional participants in the securities market obligatory orders to eliminate violations of Russian Federation laws on securities which they have permitted. The orders sent are subject to consideration by officials with obligatory notification of the commission of the steps taken within no more than 15 days from the day that orders are received;

c) to introduce in territorial administrations of the Russian Federation's State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and Support of New Economic Structures reports on violations of antimonopoly laws so that steps may be taken to eliminate these violations;

d) to introduce proposals to the Federal Commission related to state registration of stock exchanges and the stock divisions of commodities exchanges organized in the territory of Russian Federation components;

e) to enlist specialists in the organs of executive authority of Russian Federation components to check the activity of issuers and professional participants in the securities market and their self-regulating organizations and associations; and

f) to ask for and receive from issuers and professional participants in the securities market and their self-regulating organizations and associations and the officials concerned the information and materials needed to perform the monitoring functions with which the commission is charged.

Results of checks on the activity of issuers and professional participants in the securities market are subject to obligatory publication in the mass media in the procedure established by the commission.

5. The commission does not have the right to adopt standard documents which regulate the activity of issuers and professional participants in the securities market.

The commission does not have the right to interfere in the current activity of professional participants in the securities market.

6. The commission is established, reorganized, and abolished by an organ of the executive authority of a Russian Federation component. The statute on the commission is approved by the chairman of the Federal Commission upon submission by the organ of executive authority of a Russian Federation component.

The commission is accountable for its activity to the Federal Commission.

In coordination with the Federal Commission, the commission may establish its own branches in local areas.

7. The commission chairman is appointed and relieved of his position by the chairman of the Federal Commission on the basis of representations made by the head of the executive authority of the Russian Federation component concerned.

8. Decisions by the commission related to the organization of supervision of adherence to Russian Federation securities laws in the region concerned, as well as supervision of the activity of issuers and professional participants in the securities market and their self-regulating organizations and associations, are realized in the form of decrees and directives by an organ of executive authority of a Russian Federation component.

9. Expenses connected with organizational and technical support for the commission's activity are financed with funds from the budget of a Russian Federation component.

10. The personnel and structure of the commission are approved by an organ of executive authority of a Russian Federation component.

No less than half the members of the commission are to be representatives of professional participants in the securities market and their self-governing organizations and associations.

The staff of the commission also includes the managers or deputy managers of local financial organs, property administration committees, property funds, regional administrations of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, territorial administrations of the Russian Federation Tax Service, territorial administrations of the Russian Federation State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and Support of New Economic Structures, and organs of justice and internal affairs.

Members of the commission conduct their activity without compensation.

11. The commission drafts and approves the schedule for its work independently.

12. The commission chairman:

—supervises the commission's activity;
—signs documents adopted by the commission;
—organizes the preparation of materials for their consideration at commission meetings; and
—assigns responsibilities among members of the commission.

13. Decisions of the commission are adopted by a simple majority vote, and they are valid when no less than half its members are present at the meeting. In a tie, the chairman of the commission casts the deciding vote.

14. The commission has the right to establish expert and consultative groups to perform its tasks.

*Problems of Delivering Supplies to Far North Examined

*Difficulties With Northern Flights Described

954E0743A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Mar 95 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Dudinkov, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent, reporting from Salekhard: "Annushka's Tears: The Far North May Be Left Without Air Transportation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An-2 aircraft—popularly referred to as "Annushki"—have been at work in the skies of the Far North since the 1950's. They were used to form a separate polar aviation service. The wings of its planes were coated with a special bright red phosphorescent paint. So each plane shone in the darkness of the polar night like a hot coal.

Nowadays these workhorses of the sky are mainly used to transport passengers and freight from remote northern regions where there are no landing fields in year-round operation.

In the Yamalo-Nenets and Khanty-Mansiisk okrugs the "Annushki" service more than 70 population centers. And, in the opinion of aviation experts, there is no more reliable aircraft for local northern routes available today.

That reliability depends not only on the flight crew, but on many other things. The people of the Yamal Peninsula remember an accident involving an "Annushka" four years ago. Upon takeoff from an airport in Yarsale, it almost immediately began losing altitude. The engine died. The crew managed to put the plane into a glide. No one was killed, but the fuselage was shredded.

"Well, a single-engine plane is always dangerous. But if that engine is not in proper repair, an accident can happen at any moment," says V. Kalyuzhnyak, director of the Khanty-Mansiisk division of Tyumenaviatrans.

"Problems repairing the 'heart' of the An-2 have worsened in recent years due to mutual non-payment. So now all the spare parts in our warehouse are cleaned out down to the bare shelves. So we spend all our time trying to figure out where to find the things we need."

Yu. Boldyrev, chief engineer of the Salekhard Aviation Enterprise's aircraft maintenance section, seconds his colleague: "Centralized shipments to our facility are a thing of the past. And the Aviation Technical Supply Division of the Russian Air Transportation Department immediately decided to profit by the situation. Here is one example: Kirovskiy Zavod sold us relays for the 'Annushka' for R180,000 per set, but Aviation Technical Supply is asking a million..."

But just having the spare parts still would not solve the problem. How can one expect a guarantee of high-quality repairs at local aircraft service facilities when their instruments and machine tools are worn out? Finally, according to long-standing regulations all engines are supposed to be rebuilt from top to bottom at a special plant. And that plant was in Irkutsk. And it shut down without warning.

Study of the northern air route situation indicates that of all the areas in trouble, the most difficult situation exists at Mys Kamennyy Aviation Enterprise.

Since customers pay their bills irregularly and with much delay, it has only enough money to repair one aircraft. But while that amount was being collected the a penalty was incurred equal to the cost of repair. Now there is another problem. The oil tank has frozen. So if people are dying out in the tundra or on the sea, no An-2 will be able to reach them from Mys Kamennyy.

Of course, it should be honestly acknowledged that the "Annushki" long ago ceased to meet modern standards in terms of comfort and navigational equipment. But it is so easy to get rid of the old without creating something new to take its place. We have seen plenty of examples of that, especially in recent years. And the An-2 does have a number of positive points. Name just one modern Russian-made aircraft that can land on skis in snow- and ice-covered terrain. The "Annushka" is the only one. And it is because of that feature that it is so widely used in the Arctic and the Far North.

All in all, the North is in danger of being left without its "wings." How can that be averted?

The Transportation and Communications Committee of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug has been agonizing over a solution.

"And here is what we concluded," says committee chairman V. Vasilyev, "We can only provide assistance to aviation enterprises out on the periphery if we separate them from the Tyumenaviatrans aviation enterprise. We are currently making preparations to do so. We are already getting offers of An-2 repair services. And according to our initial estimates, tickets on Yamal planes will be cheaper than those purchased through Tyumenaviatrans.

*Decree on Overcoming Crisis in Supplying Far North

954E0743B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Mar 95 p 16

[Federation Council Decree No 383-I SF, issued 1 March 1995: "On Urgent Measures To Overcome the Crisis Connected With Supply of Products (Goods) to Regions of the Far North and Equivalent Areas in 1995"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After considering the issue of urgent measures to overcome the crisis in connection with supply of products (goods) to regions of the Far North and equivalent areas in 1995, the Federation Council hereby decrees:

1. To propose to the Government of the Russian Federation:

—to speed up the passage of decisions regarding state support for the supply of products (goods) to regions of the Far North and equivalent areas in 1995, including through funding of supply out of a federal fund for state support of supply of products (goods) to region of the Far North and equivalent areas, not only of energy resources, but also of basic food and non-food products;

—to ensure by 1 April 1995 the allocation of 30 percent of the funding set aside in the 1995 federal budget to provide state support for the supply of products (goods) to regions of the Far North and equivalent areas;

—to establish favorable rates for rail and air shipments during the period of supply of products (goods) to regions of the Far North and equivalent areas;

—to use treasury obligations issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, and also paper credits when arranging the procurement and supply of products (goods) to regions of the Far North and equivalent areas;

—to recommend to the Russian Federation Central Bank that it, in conjunction with the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, restructure in 1995 the existing debts as of 1 January 1995 of those enterprises and organizations which are involved in the shipment, storage and sale of products (goods) in regions of the Far North and equivalent areas using centralized loans extended in 1993-94 out of the credit resources of the Russian Federation Central Bank in the amount of R2.0 trillion [rubles], restructuring the indebtedness of the aforementioned enterprises and organizations into debt to the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance by agreement with the former and under a guarantee from executive bodies in components of the Russian Federation, with repayment scheduled for a period of 10 years beginning in 1995. This debt, in an amount of R2.0 trillion, shall be added to the Russian Federation's internal state debt within the limits of the ceiling established for 1995 through the issuance of bills by the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance to the Russian Federation Central Bank, to be repaid, beginning in 1996, over a period of 10 years in equal payments and at a rate of 5 percent annual interest;

—to propose to the Russian Federation Central Bank that it extend until 1 January 1996, with equal payments over the course of the year, the repayment of interest accumulated on centralized loans extended in 1993-94 to enterprises and organizations under all forms of ownership which are involved in the supply of products (goods) to regions of the Far North and equivalent areas, without applying penalties for past payments currently overdue;

—to increase the responsibility of executive bodies in components of the Russian Federation which are in regions of the Far North or equivalent areas for the proper use of funds allocated to them out of the federal fund for state support of the supply of products (goods) to regions of the Far North and equivalent areas, and to ensure timely repayment of those funds upon sale of the products thus received;

—to consider the creation in regions of the Far North and equivalent areas of necessary stockpiles of petroleum products, other resources of materials and equipment, food and consumer goods during the 1995-96 period;

—to review the procedure for granting financial aid to regions, bearing in mind when establishing the actual amount to be transferred the contribution made by each of them to the Russian Federation's foreign currency revenues and the actual cost of living in each area;

—to speed up consideration of a draft decree entitled "On Emergency Measures To Stabilize the Agro-Industrial Complex in Regions of the Far North and Equivalent Areas";

—to prepare a concept for the socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation and its components over the next 15-20 years.

2. To submit a proposal to the President of the Russian Federation asking that he resolve in conjunction with the Government of the Russian Federation to establish a Ministry for the Socioeconomic Development of the Northern Territories of the Russian Federation and assign to it responsibility for the economic and social development of regions of the Far North and equivalent areas.

[Signed] V. F. Shumeyko, Chairman, Federation Council, Russian Federation Federal Assembly
Moscow, 1 March 1995
No 383-I SF

Kemerovo 1994 Privatization Figures Cited

954F1966A Kemerovo KUZBASS in Russian
24 Feb 95 p 6

[Report from Kemerovo Oblast Committee for State Statistics: "Privatization in the Kuzbass: 1994 Results"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In 1994 privatization applications were filed by 535 enterprises, half of them under municipal ownership, 47 percent federal, and 3 percent oblast. The total value of their property was R107 billion (rubles) (at 1 January 1992 prices), and they employed 330,000 people. Of the enterprises applying for privatization, 274 were profitable, and 67 percent of that group were federally owned. A total of 589 properties were privatized in 1994, bringing the total since the beginning of privatization to 2,300.

The largest numbers of privatized properties were in cities: Kemerovo (103), Prokopyevsk (95), Novokuznetsk (63) and Leninsk-Kuznetskiy (62). There were also a number of areas where the rate of privatization lagged behind the oblast average. Only eight properties were privatized in Guryevsk, seven in Polysayevo, five in Topki and one in Tayga. Individual rayons recorded between one and four privatizations. No privatization at all occurred in Krapivinskiy, Kemerovskiy, Mariinskiy and Yayskiy rayons.

Throughout the year there was a trend toward a higher percentage of privatized enterprises which were previously federally owned, while the proportion of municipally-owned enterprises declined. In 1994 the percentage of federally-owned properties out of the total number of enterprises changing their form of ownership was 48 percent, or 29 percent more than in 1993. The share accounted for by municipally-owned enterprises fell during the year from 72 percent to 48 percent.

The rate of privatization decreased markedly in 1994. Whereas in 1995 [sic] approximately 83 enterprises changed their form of ownership each month, in the year just completed this figure was approximately 50.

Changes have also occurred in the breakdown of privatization by sector, with industrial enterprises now predominating. They accounted for 31 percent of all enterprises privatized during the year. The percentage of sales enterprises was 24 percent, decreasing relative to 1993 by a factor of two.

Issuing stock remained the primary means of privatization (48 percent of enterprises). In fact, in the city of Belovo and in Izhmorskiy, Novokuznetskiy, Tisulskiy, Tyazhinskiy and Yurginskiy rayons the percentage of joint-stock companies out of the total number of privatized enterprises was 82-100 percent. The largest joint-stock companies in terms of their start-up capital were established in the coal industry, with an average of R124 million per enterprise, the chemical industry with an average of R94 million, and the ferrous metals industry, with an average of R70 million. State participation through retention of a controlling block of shares occurred at 145 enterprises (61 percent of the total number of joint-stock companies). These were mainly in the coal, machine building, transportation and construction industries. The state owns a "golden share" in the following enterprises: the Kuzbasselement Plant in Leninsk-Kuznetskiy, the Barit Quarry and the Guryevsk Ore Administration.

In 1994 a total of 22 million shares of stock were issued in connection with the establishment of joint-stock companies, with 40 percent being placed with enterprises' employees, 7 percent sold to other enterprises and organizations and 15 percent sold at public auctions, through competitions or at investment auctions, while 38 percent remained unsold.

Notable among the other means of privatization were commercial competitions, which were used to sell 144 enterprises (24 percent). Almost one out of six enterprises was privatized through the purchase of previously leased property. This method was most widely used in Prokopyevsk (43 percent), Topki (80 percent) and Tayga and Yayskiy Rayon (100 percent).

Large differences were observed between the sale price of privatized enterprises and their original estimated price. With sale price relative to original price increasing by a factor of 2.2 throughout the oblast, the difference in Tashtagol was by a factor of 4.9, in Mezhdurechensk by a factor of 7.6, and in Berezovskiy by a factor of 11.2. In Topki and Polysayevo and in Promyshlennovskiy, Yayskiy and Leninsk-Kuznetskiy rayons properties were sold at the prices originally established.

During the year a total of R24.9 billion was received from privatization of enterprises (including funds for enterprises privatized prior to 1994), of which 58 percent came from the sale of federally-owned properties. In addition, 754,400 privatization vouchers were received and 753,200 paid off (including vouchers received in 1993).

The largest cash sums were received from privatization of properties in the following cities [in rubles]: Kemerovo (8.2 billion), Novokuznetsk (6.5 billion), Tashtagol (1.4 billion) and Leninsk-Kuznetskiy (1.3 billion). Leaders among rayons were: Tyazhinskiy (74 million), Prokopyevskiy (43.3 million), Chebulinskiy (37.4 million) and Belovskiy (31.6 million). The smallest revenues were generated in the cities of Polysayevo (21.6 million), Kaltan (7 million) and Tayga (4.4 million) and in Novokuznetskiy Rayon (5.3 million), Krapivinskiy Rayon (4.6 million), Izhmorskiy Rayon (4.2 million) and Tisulskiy Rayon (4.1 million).

Kemerovo Television Controversy Continues

954F1966B Kemerovo KUZNETSKIY KRAY in Russian 16 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Vasiliy Popok: "Victory Celebration"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest session of the Kuzbass Public Chamber was held the day before yesterday. The main topic of discussion was a report from Mikhail Grebennikov, chairman of Kuzbass Television and Radio Company, regarding the new television broadcasting concept created by him. Grebennikov said that the times are changing, and we are changing with them. And that television should change along with us.

According to Grebennikov there are no political or ideological motives behind his actions. He is doing what he is doing solely as the manager of an enterprise (albeit an enterprise with a specific status, i.e. one that produces an audio and video product for the general public) that is faced with the problem of inadequate budget funding. Before being appointed to his current position he was informed of his task: firstly, to increase the amount of television broadcasting (and consequently the amount of revenue, since advertising time on state-run television may not exceed 15-20 percent of total broadcast time) and, secondly, to increase the amount of broadcasting that is consistently popular with listeners. That is to say, the amount of entertainment broadcasting.

And he has begun to take action. That is, to create a new concept. When he actually began implementing it, some things had to be cut, and some things expanded. When cutting and expanding he was guided by the television programs' ratings. The ratings were ordered by the oblast administration. According to the ratings, the most popular shows (after the news, of course—a majority of people watch the news, though perhaps not always very attentively) are programs like "Spokoynoy nochi, malyshi" [Good Night, Kids], while the most "unwatchable" are ones which criticize Mikhail Grebennikov's employer—the oblast administration. That includes shows by the informal creative group "Otdel 5" [Section 5]. That means that "Otdel 5" should be cut... The cuts are implemented by means of an offer to choose a slot in the new programming schedule, withdrawal of already-completed programs from broadcast, and penalties for violation of operating rules.

The Public Chamber, *a priori* aware of what was behind the events occurring at the television and radio company (i.e. elimination of political affairs shows) got ready to shatter Mikhail Grebennikov's conclusions. But it was unable to. He successfully fended off tricky questions by using two main arguments: firstly, that he is a businessman who needs money so that those who work for him can have a decent life, and also maintain his equipment; secondly, that he is an employer, and if some employee does not agree with a change in the nature of the work (like in a furniture shop that stops making stools and starts making bentwood chairs), then let him find another employer. When the public officials began making angry speeches, Grebennikov simply left the room where the Public Chamber was meeting, and the Public Chamber meekly sighed, as if to say, well, that shows how much clout we have...

However, the Public Chamber did remain in session, heard several more speakers, and even passed a resolution. That resolution stated that, firstly, the establishment of a "state" ideology (an ideology that currently apparently consists of an effort to eliminate all political affairs shows, particularly those that are not to the liking of the authorities) on television is unacceptable; secondly, social and political broadcasting should be expanded (an argument in favor of this is that voters are not going to the polls because they do not see anything acceptable about politics, feeling that it all comes down to a fight between Tweedle Dee and Tweedle Dum, with what caused it of no great importance); and, thirdly, a conflict-solving commission is needed to evaluate incidents of political censorship on television (a program by Stanislav Korneyko entitled "Dossier" was banned from airing—it discussed violations of housing legislation by some very important oblast officials). And, finally, the Public Chamber resolution set up a Trustee Council which will help Kuzbass State Television and Radio Company become better, for starters by taking a look at the new concept of radio and television broadcasting proclaimed by Mikhail Grebennikov.

It is quite clear that this resolution by the Public Chamber (just like any future resolutions by the Public Chamber) will not require Mikhail Lvovich Grebennikov to do anything. He is going his own way. His path is logical and simple, because it was chosen based on a truth that was already well known in the time of Gogol's college registrars: "the boss is always right, because he is the boss." One of the stations on that path is to fire those who are troublesome. How will "Otdel 5" be fired? There are many methods—our citizen bosses are skilled at getting rid of us...

Now for one final and of course extremely subjective thought. The government that is in power today is behaving just as suicidally as did its predecessors, the CPSU and the soviets, which at the peak of their omnipotence were able to gag the media. The apolitical attitude of the "masses" is a temporary phenomenon, and the miners' strike on 8 February demonstrated that, so knowledge of "what the people want" is never absolute. And one last thing: a lack of professionalism in the way journalism is managed is much more dangerous than a lack of professionalism in the furniture business.

*Stavropol Loses Revenue as Businesses Move to Tax-Free Zone

954E0785A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent Lyudmila Beldyugina, Stavropol Kray: "Carry the Money in Suitcases: Stavropol Is Losing Many Billions Because Taxpayers Are Fleeing to the Offshore Zone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Stavropol Duma has enacted a decree that has caused panic among the local entrepreneurs who have registered their enterprises in the "Ingushetiya" favored economic zone.

The disgrace came to a head in Stavropol Kray long ago. What served as the detonator for it was the situation with the Stavropolnefteprodukt AO [joint-stock company] (which has already been mentioned on the pages of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA), which left to go under the wing of "Ingushetiya" while having production structures and all its real estate on the territory of Stavropol Kray and which "led away" from the kray's budget approximately 10 billion rubles payable in the form of taxes.

The legislative and executive authority of Stavropol Kray decided to take a closer look at all those who had fled. There are things to be enraged about: the agricultural region that had prospered at one time has now proven to be in a gloomy economic blind alley—the subsidies from the federal budget already exceed 80 percent. And the kray's own funds, it would seem, are experiencing the shagreen leather effect: the income side of the budget, which is supplemented almost exclusively by means of taxes, is losing a rather noticeable part of those taxes as a result of the "exodus" of the taxpayers to the economic paradise on separately taken territory.

However, in the opinion of the administration and Duma of Stavropol Kray, the crux of the matter is not that people are fleeing to the "Ingushetiya" economic zone, but that the enterprises that are registered there are violating the legislation in the crudest manner. The Duma decree that was adopted several days ago was indeed linked to this. This is also confirmed by the joint letter of RF Minfin [Ministry of Finance] and the State Tax Service, entitled "Violation of the RF Tax Legislation in the 'Ingushetiya' Favored Economic Zone."

The crux of the matter is that the favored economic zone that was formed by Edict of the President of Russia (25 February 1993, No. 280) and by decree of the RF government on the territory of the Republic of Ingushetia, does not grant any tax benefits to those very enterprises that are registered on its territory. The benefit lies only in the fact that Ingushetia has been allocated a budgetary loan in the amount of the taxes and mandatory payments to be paid into the federal budget by the newly formed enterprises during the period that the experiment is in effect. Putting it another way, the deadline by which the republic makes payments to the federal budget has been postponed. And that is all.

By making the zone attractive for entrepreneurs, the Ingushetia government in its turn developed a number of normative acts in accordance with which the enterprises that are registered in the offshore zone are relieved of almost 80 percent of their taxes and other mandatory payments, not only the federal ones, but also the local ones. Obviously, many enterprises did not fail to take advantage of this tempting possibility, especially the major enterprises whose turnover constitutes many millions and billions of rubles.

Those giants who rushed into the economic paradise from their unfriendly hearths and homes caused panic among the local authorities who, even without that situation, do not know how to patch up the holes in their territorial budgets. There was reason for indignation: they are removing the resources, they are destroying the ecology on their territories, and someone else is enjoying the fruits of taxation.

But, on the other hand, Ingushetia has not made any secret of its normative acts that were enacted in development of the government's decree concerning the organizing of the favored economic zone: a clip about it traveled over the telex, perhaps, much less frequently than the MMM masterpieces. If something not quite right had been in the Ingush initiatives, the Russian government would have corrected them immediately and loudly, the Stavropol "offshorers"—the enterprise and firm managers—feel. But the "nice guys" pampered the local authorities, as it were by issuing the challenge to the government in this way.

The fact is that the Stavropol "offshorers" view the "challenge" and the "touchstone" in the formal elimination of the kray administration that is hiding behind the Duma's decree. That administration, they say, is awaiting a reaction from Moscow.

Apparently that reaction will follow. At least it should follow. Because the initiative of the Stavropol legislators certainly will cause a chain reaction in other subjects of the Federation that have suffered from a draining away of budgetary funds.

Meanwhile the Stavropol legislators are firmly resolved not only to put an end to the draining of the money from the kray, but also to make up the income that has been illegally taken from the budget. The measures that have been stipulated with respect to the "offshorers" are severe. The decree prescribes keeping on the tax records the enterprises that are located on the territory of the kray but that have re-registered in other regions of the country. Furthermore, to locate and to put on tax records and other types of records all the enterprises that have been registered outside the confines of the kray, but that actually have separately operating subdivisions permanently in operation on the territory of Stavropol Kray. The decree proposed to the tax agencies that they suspend all the operations of those enterprises in the kray's banking institutions in the event of failure to submit to the tax agencies the accounting reports, balance sheets, and other documents linked with the computation of taxes and other mandatory payments.

"If there are no such accounts, that means that they are carrying cash out of the kray in suitcases," Viktor Cherepanov, chairman of the account-monitoring house of the kray's Duma, states. "Consequently this violates the procedure for working with money in cash form, which was established by the Edict of the RF President, dated 23 May 1994, No. 1006. In such instances, financial sanctions against enterprises and their managers are stipulated. The penalties are harsh: twice or three times larger than the payments to be made. Moreover, the decree of the Stavropol Duma recommends to the tax inspectorate that it confiscate documents that attest to the concealment of profit and other objects, and that it recover for payment into the budget all the underpaid amounts, including the penalty and fines for the entire period of the extension of payments. In addition, the managers of those enterprises are to be brought to administrative responsibility."

"Do you really mean that money is being taken out of the kray in suitcases, or is that hyperbole?" I asked Cherepanov.

"I assume that this is so. According to the most tentative computations, the kray and local budgets have had a shortfall of 24 billion rubles during the half-year, and more than 60 enterprises have registered their boards of executive directors in Ingushetia. In actuality, however, no one in the kray knows how many enterprises like that there are. There may be several times more, and consequently, that means that the amount that is failing to go into the budget is of a greater order of magnitude. And we are talking not only about Ingushetia. 'Our own' enterprises, which are, however, registered in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other cities, are also failing to pay their taxes."

"In that case, what, then, will remain of the favored economic zone, and the good intentions of Edict No. 280, 'Urgent Measures to Provide State Support For the Growth and Socioeconomic Development of the Ingush Republic'? How can Ingushetia attract those 15,000 enterprises for which it has been given a quota? The newly created enterprises will not want to register in Ingushetia without their own interest. Especially since the explosive situation in the region does not promote such a desire. This certainly was also understood by the government when it enacted the decree. Does it not follow from this that there exists a kind of silent consent to 'freedom of the hands' between the creators of the offshore zone and the government officials?"

"Possibly this is the most realistic explanation of the prolonged and stubborn silence of the top governmental officials to all our indignant protests," Cherepanov feels. "Because the legal, true task of the offshore zone lay essentially in one thing: to attract investments and the capital of newly created enterprises to Ingushetia. People were told, 'Build enterprises, schools, hospitals, and housing. Start up new shops and production entities in the zone, and in exchange you will not have to pay part of your federal and local taxes, which the republic has the right to dispose of.' But it turned out that the republic disposed of taxes belonging to other subjects of the RF, where, practically speaking, enterprises that were registered in Ingushetia are operating. By using this trick it would be possible to free the entire country from paying taxes, by registering all its enterprises to one and the same address in Nazran, as the Bin finance corporation does: it operates on the territory of Stavropol Kray, and registers its management subjects in Ingushetia.

"In a word, what is going on freely and openly in front of everyone's eyes is a real swindle that is causing the regions a large amount of damage, which may shortly become completely widespread," the Stavropol legislator concludes sharply. "In this situation the regions must begin actively and immediately to defend their own interests in conformity with the law and the Constitution. And it is improper for governmental officials to play a double game: with one hand giving out funds, and with the other taking away the funds from the unfortunate and indigent people in other regions."

In the opinion of legal experts, economists, and analysts, the decree of the Stavropol Duma created an unprecedented situation: the interests of two subjects of the Federation—Ingushetia and Stavropol Kray—have collided on the legal field.

"Nevertheless the suit that Stavropolnefteprodukt has initiated against the administration lies in the court of arbitration. It is completely obvious that many Stavropol 'offshorers' will respond in the same way to the Duma's decree. Can the court cancel your decree?"

"Definitely not!" Cherepanov asserts.

"What about the Russian government?"

"It also is not legally competent. Because we adopted the decision within the framework of the powers of a subject of the Federation."

"Then it turns out that the normative acts of Ingushetia with regard to the favored economic zone cannot be canceled. Who, then, can become the arbitrator between Ingushetia and Stavropol Kray, to whom, possibly, other subjects of the RF may also join?"

"Only the Constitutional Court. Obviously, if the Russian government, by a new decree, does not define in detail the fundamental principles governing the offshore zone. Or if it does not cancel its previous decree completely."

*Political, Economic Situation in Vorkuta Discussed

954F1848A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 11, 16-22 Mar 95 p 9

[Article by Yevgeniya Pishchikova with photographs by Ruslan Yamalov: "You Do Not Get Paid for Work, and on the Table—Wild Game!: Report From the City Which Has Conquered Communism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **In places in the south and in the north in the coal basins lives a working and in addition contentious (like the Arakcheyev settlements) breed of miners who once a year frighten the government with the new weapon of the proletariat, the miner's pick. This is painful and ridiculous for it (the government), but the miner is threatening to throw the government out the window like garbage. That in general terms is the typical view of the mass information media (and, accordingly, the public imagination) of the worker activism of the miners. The dumb simplicity of the picture is justified by the following consideration: we are talking not so much of economics as of political economics. Before the 1993 events themselves, miners who were dissatisfied with the government welcomed the rebellious Rutskoy to Vorkuta, and they have already chosen and will again choose Zhirinovskiy and may choose someone even worse—finally, one of the worker trade unions of Cherepovets metallurgists not long ago signed an agreement-declaration with Mr. Barkashov "on forming a national-social movement with the aim of introducing the Russian nationalist idea into Russia's workers movement." Consequently, we must suffer the intrusion of workers into big-time politics.**

Meanwhile, however, while these immensely logical constructs are being discussed in the Center, the miners are undergoing one of the most excruciating periods of their class life. They go back and forth between hatred for the state as such and the need to constantly "demand" money from it, and the desire to get back a strong state with a nationalized economy in the near future. They believe that the directors have deceived them but are forced to cooperate with the directors in order to survive. They have not outgrown (and based on the logic of their work cannot outgrow) the concept of collective service (if not collective obedience) to the state, but the ethics of personal success are presented to them as the state concept for all the rest of their lives. But in order to achieve "personal success," the miner must cease to be a miner—we get the strong impression that it would be advantageous for the present state to have 70,000 greengrocers and haberdashers instead of the 70,000 miners of the Pechera Coal Basin. The OG [OBSHCHAYA GAZETA] correspondents set off for Vorkuta to find out how miners live and what they are thinking.

We Erred Along With History

The corners of the office of the workers committee of the city of Vorkuta even now are crammed with election posters for Mr. Yeltsin. The leaders of the workers movement who at one time covered half of Vorkuta with these pretty papers are now making a utilitarian use of the remaining posters: they spread them on their desks preparing for the lunch break: "Some people may perhaps be eating off gold plates, but we are eating off Yeltsin!" It turns out that all they get to eat from the president is potatoes and bad, cheap sausage: all the members of the workers committee receive their wages at those mines whose workers once delegated them to the struggle; and if the money is not paid for 4 months in his own mine, then the worker activist does not get any wages for 4 months either. "We do not just have to strike," says Abdulabek Khidirov, chairman of the workers committee, "we have to use strikes to fight the CRIMINAL REGIME. Trade unions are splitting up the workers movement in order to weaken it; they put off strikes which have already been declared—every time, just as soon as the government promises them it will 'pay off the debts' and appropriate budget money which the sector can use to hold out a little longer and pay the miners wages for November of last year, or for January of this year at the most prosperous mines. So then, they do and are going to continue to do whatever the directors tell them to—they are dependent. But we are free people and so we can lead the miners to freedom..."

The free man Khidirov has three children, and the last time he went to Moscow to fight for workers rights, he could not leave his family any money at all. For the duration of his work in the capital, his wife made homemade bread from flour which she had stockpiled in advance, since she had nothing to buy bread with.

"I am constantly analyzing the very start of the miners movement," says Khidirov, "and more and more I see that the strikes began when they were spurred 'from above.' The first strike occurred on 19 July 1989, and in the Vorkuta Gorkom on 17 July, our important people were in fact discussing whether to take charge of the strike or whether to organize one for two or three days to let off steam. But at the same time, the famous pro-Yeltsin 'Solidarity' was holding meetings and made the decision to take charge of the strike in time. And after that—from 1989 through 1991—all strikes were paid for. Why was this? So that the miners could be used to shake up the power which other people wanted so much to take over. And so, a strike. A thousand people do not go to work, while a hundred do, they got scared: what will we feed our children? And these hundred as a result receive their wage rate for the days worked and are labeled strikebreakers, while the thousand receive the average wage, that is to say, more! Who would refuse to strike under those conditions?"

Khidirov himself understands that these maxims of his are somewhat outdated and more likely come under the well-known city proverb: "If only we were all as smart 'before' as my wife is 'after'!" He is infinitely devoted to the idea of the workers movement, although the miners have not always repaid him in kind: for several years while the miners trade unions were working with worldly reasonableness on dislodging budget money from Moscow to operate the coal-extracting sector, some miners were inclined to consider the workers committee a bunch of political extremists cast out by the winds of fate. From absolute support of Yeltsin to complete painful rejection of him. However, a great deal has changed in the last year, and the miners' feelings have acquired harmonious finality: when in Vorkuta we were asked for our identity papers before every insignificant conversation, we were told: "Do not be offended, our occupation is such that we do not trust anyone. We are miners!"

Above all, in the sixth year of the strikes the miners have ceased to trust their own trade unions, which, it would seem, are doing "everything possible to make things good for the worker," but are doing this on the basis of a highly polished scenario that conveniently fits somewhere between blackmail and compromise. This ordinary compromise, which is fine for the government (make promises and go into debt), hits the workers hardest: "Give us anything, just not this uncertainty!"

The miners do not forgive the trade unions for having made political demands in the strike decree for the first time in the period 1989-1991 and then postponing the strike as soon as the government made its "latest" promise to wipe out the indebtedness on wages and allocate 10 trillion rubles [R] for 1995 to develop the coal-extracting regions. They are not interested in the trade unions' private struggle for power. "What is it to us," say the miners, "that to spite the coalminers trade union, the chairman of the independent trade union of miners, Mr. Marmalyukov, declared a hunger strike starting on 15 March and made a mandatory trip to

Vorkuta by the vice premier a condition to terminate it? And then in a few days he received an apartment in Belgorod Oblast out of turn from the joint stock company 'Vorkutaugol' [Vorkuta Coal]. We would have gone hungry for an apartment outside Vorkuta too, especially if the newspapers wrote about it. But we must go hungry for free and quietly. Like rabbits..." They believe that both trade unions, the coalminers (NPRUP) and miners (NPG), have become professional sellers of labor and together with the directors are working as general suppliers—they dislodge money from the state. Independent trade unions have become a real Christmas and Easter gift to the directors of mines and Mr. Lobis, the chairman of the joint stock company "Vorkutaugol." If it were not for them, the directors would have had to visit all Rosugol's [Russian Coal] offices with nothing but corporate demands in reserve, while now the directors have learned how to obtain money on behalf of the miners—by threatening the government with a governmental crisis.

And meanwhile, Khidirov is now not at all convinced that the miners really know how to "remove the government." Recalling the events of past years, he sees that the much more serious political forces always knew how to use the miners to remove losing politicians, paying the leading detachment of the working class for this with promises of money and putting obsolete social technologies into their minds.

"If you recall," he says, "we have really never been taken seriously!"

Vladimir Potishnyy, the amateur ideologue of the workers movement and chairman of the society of disabled miners and family members of miners who perished, interprets the conditions of the "past" even more harshly: "With our help and our example, the government is ridding itself of its guilt complex before the working class, at the same time destroying the working class as such. We are being declassed. The government is reducing social groups to castes, to estates where workers are assigned the status, traditional from the standpoint of any Russian power, of 'children,' the lowest caste, where being a member inevitably makes you an 'illiterate' supplicant and a hired mourner of the economy. Workers are 'children' who must be 'helped'; miners are spoiled children with whom one can play politics. Trade union figures are striving for social maturity, that is to say, they are trying to shake off their estate affiliations and begin to play adult games with the 'adult' directors and laugh at members of the workers committee—how clumsy they are, how juvenile their political thinking is in every clumsy movement! We workers have proven to be unneeded by the Yeltsin government whom we brought to power!"

Were we deceived in 1991 or did we deceive ourselves?—that is a question which is pathologically important to miners even now. From this standpoint, Yeltsin continues to be a symbol for them: "He was with us first!" The miners try to figure Yeltsin out like a mysterious character in a detective novel: in such a complex country, nobody becomes president by chance—who did his presidency benefit? They are beginning to think that history played a dirty trick on them: the freedom they won proved suitable for their own senior leadership and a few "new" people whom the directors were forced to allow into power. Did they really wait so desperately for changes just to see the "old guard" sharing power? The miners remember their own demands of 1989-1991.

"Economic reform must be put into practice. Let enterprise independence, self-financing, and economic accountability finally become realities. One of the deputies to the Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet which was underway asked himself and everyone else this sensible question: 'Tell me, are the bosses striking?' And he answered himself: 'No, the bosses are not striking!'

"We were ready for anything to become independent," Khidirov observed, "but on this bright path we found an even greater, dual dependence."

It is a well known story: when the haberdasher goes off to take the Bastille, his armed brothers go to take his haberdashery, and when the worker goes to fight for freedom, he receives only the freedom to fight. And for someone else's benefit. That comes from the world practice of redistributing power and property.

"We were trying to get permission to consider part of the coal extracted as our own property," said Potishnyy, "and we did. The mine administrations immediately formed commercial structures and then companies trading in 'our' coal. Nobody knows who got what money; the miners were given canned vegetables, clothing, and televisions with video recorders. A real positional struggle was played out for each television—the trade union distributed them and it was the most important thing (in the workers milieu). It was the year of the Great Barter.

"While we were trying to devise our own economic model of development of the sector, the coal-selling firms under the mines and the 'Vorkutaugol' association were gaining extraordinary strength. We let our cause get out of our hands..."

They truly did. Now the real financial means of "Vorkutaugol," which is now a joint stock company, are completely closed off to miners.

At our meeting, the miners tried simply to clarify what salary the director of their mine receives; they were not told. And most likely there was nothing pathologically offensive in the salary. But—there is no reason for you to know, you have not grown enough to understand subordinate institutions.

The members of the workers committee told us that an activist of the movement, Anatoliy Poznyakov, had been killed at the entrance to their building in 1993 for trying (at the committee's instruction) to check on the financial activity of one of the coal-selling firms where the mayor of Vorkuta, Mr. Segal, was a figure. A member of the strike committee, Volodya Avramichev, was killed when he went to "check on" the miners recreation base in Gelendzhik. And the workers committee had issued him a handwritten paper saying that by the workers' decision, he would now be director of the base. The revolutionary youthfulness of the action can certainly be seen here, but he was killed "like an adult."

Mr. Yevgeniy Leontyev, the owner of the coal terminal in Riga, according to the workers committee's reports is one of the most tormenting of the new figures—he is actively involved in charity, but many workers see mockery in this: "He is barely past 30, so how did he earn all his money? He sells our coal and so he is selling us!"

"And our coal king," said the miners, "Valeriy Sardyukov, is the former secretary of the party gorkom. He is now involved in marketing coal at the 'Vorkutaugol' Joint Stock Company. That is what we call him, the coal king..."

So all right, the working class has not become an important social stratum for the new authorities. They could still have reconciled themselves to that, although the political loss gravely oppresses the hearts of miners. Something else is worse—the new same old authorities have assimilated and adapted one more brilliant turn of history and have finally taught the workers real fear. Not diffuse fear, and not fear shared with the entire country, but fear prepared specially for them by the logic and character of the new economic system which was chosen through the miners' efforts.

In July 1989, when the miners struck for the first time, the newspapers came out with daring headlines: "The Most Progressive and Organized Working Class Came Out on the Streets and the Managers (Today's 'Novoyaz'—the Authorities) Did Not Recognize It, But Some (Read—All) Were Frightened."

As it turned out, the fright did not last long. In 1995 it has become absolutely clear that the authorities are by no means afraid of the miners, but the miners are truly afraid of the authorities. In 1990, the miners did not believe that they could be frightened at all: "So punish me, exile me to the north! For example, to Vorkuta, to the mines!" But now they come out on the streets so that they are not thrown out onto the street. This is the kind of European, American banality that has happened to the workers movement.

With a catch of emotion in his voice, Vladimir Potishnyy read to us the scenario of development of the coal sector developed by International Monetary Fund experts: "The Pechora coal basin is becoming the main coking coal supplier in the Central Region, but it will reduce extraction of energy coal from 30 to 45 percent and the number of coal-extracting enterprises from 18 to 5-7 mines, the number of employed workers may decline from 70,400 to 21,000-32,000, and this basin's share may account for 9-10 percent of the total decline in jobs in the coal industry."

What the developers wrote about is called "cleansing of mines" in their semi-Russian language. That is to say, sensible economists sensibly believe that it is not worthwhile keeping old mines which have in fact exhausted their potential on budget financing—they must be closed.

"Our trade union fellows already have their own term for this business," says Potishnyy. "The mines which are not to be closed are called 'mines of the next century.' Consequently, all workers who had the misfortune to link their lives with the old ones must be called people of the past century."

All Vorkuta is immobilized and is closely watching the story of the Khalmer-Yu Mine, the most distant one and the only one that has been "cleansed." "When the Khalmer-Yu mine was closed," Mikhail Kotelnikov, a member of the workers committee, told us, "the next step was natural—closing down the village. For under the cleansing law, all miners who work at the mine were supposed to receive apartments on the mainland. In middle Russia. But we found out that after the mine was closed, another 200 (!) families were assigned to the village. Obviously they were such important families that they were unable to get on an ordinary waiting list for an apartment in a warm area. But naturally not all the miners themselves were resettled. There are another 600 families remaining in the village. People go out of their minds from nothing to do and lack of money (there is nowhere to work and the mine is 70 kilometers from Vorkuta), but they receive their average wage with the very same costs like everyone else—once every 4 months. The youth from the village go to Vorkuta to rob people; there is nothing for them to do or eat, because everyone there drinks like a robot. Their raids are called 'health trips'—they come, tip their hats, and go back. Try to find them there. A. Malyshev, the chairman of Rosugol, said: 'We invested R25 billion in the village! Khalmer-Yu is the last village where we will invest that kind of money.'

"What this is, here we are, trying hard, fearless, shameless, and life tosses us not some kind of fear, but horror. Not some kind of shame, but disgrace. It is terrifying to leave Vorkuta without money and an apartment in 'warm' Russia; that is the same as creating a new type of refugee—the economic refugee. But living in Vorkuta without money is terrifying too."

A City of Frightened People

A miner from the Yun-Yaga mine, Mikhail Kotelnikov, did not go to work on 23 February. He had to make a simple arithmetical calculation: taking the bus to the mine costs R2,700 one way, and he had spent the last R5,000 on milk, sour cream, and bread for his children.

"I am forever in debt to my children for bringing them here," says Mikhail. "I understand that this situation is humiliating for a man, but my children have not seen an apple for one and one-half months, even though my son was removed from the rolls of the tuberculosis treatment center not long ago. I am supposed to be paid wages of R1.5 million for December, but I already owe R1.7 million; and before that, in order to hold out, of those goods the mine once received by barter, we sold the refrigerator and sewing machine."

Provincial Russia knows very well what it means not to receive wages for 4 months. But what does it mean not to receive wages for 4 months in Vorkuta, where there is permafrost and nothing grows, where there is no concept of a private plot and green fodder, where potatoes cost R4,000 and butter—R30,000?

Perhaps for the first time in their lives, the miners have encountered such a crude Ethiopian concept as the fear of not having enough to eat.

The average miner's family still retains all the material signs of respectability normal for the elite of the working class, which the "miners with northern pay supplements" customarily consider themselves. In almost every apartment, we saw items left over from the era of the great coal barter, the expensive video recorders and other "perks" without which the look of a prosperous Soviet dwelling is unthinkable. It is even more absurd to look into the kitchen furnished with Czech furniture which was prestigious just a few years ago, and see lunch set for the whole family—boiled potatoes and bread.

It is even more difficult for young families from the generation of 30 year-olds who did not manage to obtain even that—now when the mines have stopped building housing. In addition to everything else, they must also buy themselves apartments. "I do not know myself how we are making it," says Polina, standing near an empty refrigerator but also near a griddle with potatoes and fried chicken. Her husband Polin, a miner from the Severnaya Mine, was issued several kilograms of chicken today against the wages which he still has not received for December. Last year Polina and her husband bought a two-room apartment for R5 million. They borrowed the money to buy it from the mine (a loan at 10 percent interest) and still owe R3 million. They bought a set of stuffed furniture for a million. Beyond this there is nothing of value in the apartment except, of course, their two children.

"Meat, which we used to eat, we of course no longer eat," says Polina, and adds with sudden lustful dreaminess: "Oh, how it used to be: a first course on meat, the second with meat, and compote... And now if, say, there is chicken, we make bouillon, take out the meat, and make the second course. And not the whole chicken as before; we divide it into four parts. So there is enough for the week." It was impossible to distract Polina from the topic of chicken—her husband's booty was too valuable to her—she showed us her last can of stewed meat from her stockpile, which they must now make every time wages are paid: they store dry milk, canned goods, and concentrates.

Olga, Polina's friend, has her own method of adapting to life without wages: "My husband is a hunter. That saves us, of course. Borshch made of partridge, pilaf from partridge, and stewed partridge with potatoes. If there is a hare, it is a holiday. He is a miner but on his days off, he takes his skis and is off. We have a dog, a spaniel. Our breadwinner."

When he goes underground, a miner takes a lunch bag with him; the idea is that it should contain his lunch, what he will eat during the whole work shift. Just what do the husbands take to the mine with them when their families are in such a state? Luckily, it was explained that the directorate provides the "lunch bags"; each miner receives a coupon which he uses to get two pieces of bread and several pieces of sausage or cheese. But both Polina and Olga confessed that recently they had been without any money for 2 months. Even for bread. Their husbands received the "lunch bags" and brought them home, and they fed the children the bread and sausage. "And they did not eat anything there at the mine themselves.. They brought us food to eat from the mine. And then there was the week when the kindergartens were closed. There was nothing to feed the children at the kindergarten. The adults left their children with neighbors who did not work. Or they simply locked the door and went to work..."

At that time there were probably days when the miners fell over in the mine, fainting with hunger. "You can only live that way," they told us, "if you know what kind of future it is for, why you must live that way."

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"Why live that way?" echoes throughout the whole city, whose obvious "temporality" serves as a pledge of oppressive permanency for the residents. The idea that the city in which the government has invested enormous amounts of money for so many years should look like a coal-based Kuwait resides in the world of questionable thoughts. The coal-based Kuwait of Vorkuta gives a strong impression of a populated point collapsing before one's eyes. What can be done with a city where the Vorkuta residents advise visitors to find the best buildings by the slogans standing above their roofs? Andrey Smirnov, a trade union leader, explained to us on the first day of our visit that we would recognize the residence of the "Vorkutaugol" association by the nearly meter-high letters saying: "Coal—the Pure Bread of Industry." With quiet horror we sought this terrible phrase everywhere in the whitish polar sky until we figured out that a more modern dictum, "Our Coal for the Motherland," crowned the tower of "Vorkutaugol," while we finally found "the pure bread of industry" (undoubtedly the unalterable quotation of one of the great leaders) on the facade of the Miners House of Culture. But those are the delights of the very center;

overall all of Vorkuta from the suburbs to the main streets is built up with completely time-worn five-story Khrushchev buildings with flat Muslim roofs.

The very look of their home streets can arouse among Vorkuta residents nothing but the type of aesthetic depression which in European countries is called "cheap region stress." A typical city courtyard looks roughly like this: three five-story buildings are set in U-formation, streaks of paint on the facades (usually ochre) extend from the fifth to the first floors, and in addition the end walls are painted with drastically peeling geometric patterns which are supposed to decorate the space. The balconies, if they are not cemented shut, are simply boarded up with roofing and other materials of all shades of discoloration. This is not so the heat does not escape as we first thought, but to prevent theft. Throughout the city, balconies are used as the main refrigerator for the stockpiles of produce which must be created.

In almost every courtyard, there is one commercial kiosk which looks more like the machine gun emplacement of a position under constant attack. On top of the glass is the inevitable grill, and the walls are welded of sheet steel which is of a thickness not found in Moscow. The reasons for the barricades are obvious, crime and cold. Vodka and cigarettes are sold in the stalls. The prices are Moscow prices or even higher. Cheap cigarettes are R3,000, while adulterated vodka is R5,000.

People drink in the city and at the mines out of desperation—the cleaning woman from the Ayach-Yaga mine complained in front of us that she should receive more wages for taking bags of vodka bottles from the washroom. "Just turn them in, old woman, and there will be a profit," the trade union leader advised. "I would be glad to," answered the cleaning woman, "but they all drink imported stuff, the bastards." The leaders of the workers movement told us that comrades are lost from people drinking uninspected vodka. Mikhail Kotelnikov told how his friend, his own age, born in 1959, died after drinking vodka that was sold, and no one will pay benefits to his family. Vodka used to cost more than butter, but now it costs less than a round trip bus ticket to the mine!

Price parities in Vorkuta are peculiar in general—a car costs roughly 20 times more than an apartment:

"No one needs apartments here, but you can take a car away on a railroad flatcar." You can buy a two-room apartment in a traditional Khrushchev building for R5 million in Vorkuta, while a million will get you an apartment in wooden barracks. It is difficult to imagine anything more ridiculous: in one of the barracks, for 2 months now a family has been climbing into their own dwelling using a step ladder going to the window of the attic because the inside staircase caved in.

What kind of response other than an eruption of political activism can such a life provoke among miners who are used to fighting? But meanwhile the Center's political life (as it has taken shape as of this point) is repugnant to the average miner. He will probably talk about the first strike of 1989 rather than about Chechnya (although one draftee from Vorkuta has already been killed, and another one was taken prisoner).

"People cannot reason any more," Potishnyy said to us. "They are desperate. It turns out that it is very easy to train a person like an animal: he must be fed irregularly. There is no hint of the former political zeal. It has become clear that it is not starving people who make revolutions, but well-fed ones who have not eaten for 3 days."

Hungry Days and Hunger Revolts. Feel the Difference

There is no hint of revolutionary zeal only from the standpoint that a revolution made by a definite social stratum assumes that equally definite political forces will come to power. Oh, in this sense the government can continue to sleep: the miners do not have their own program nor their own party of the Laborite persuasion, and there is no clear leader. But then our good authorities have forgotten one other form of public activism—the thing known as a spontaneous hunger revolt. An alternative to Yeltsin does not have to be devised in order to revolt.

"The time of organized strikes is over," we were told at the workers committee, "now spontaneous strikes will begin. Now every worker who in the cloakroom yells 'I want to eat!' can be the organizer of a strike. And then there will be no time to figure out who has more influence on the miners: the coalminers trade union, the miners trade union, or the workers committee. It is perfectly possible that no one will. And it is certainly not a fact that trade unions, having seen that the miners' feelings are heating up, will decide to take charge of this strike. But then those political forces which manage to take charge of it will obtain a considerable advantage."

"We know whom to strangle if our children begin to die of hunger," the miners told us, but even so there was little discussion of who would come to replace the strangled ones. Agitators from different parties are beginning to concentrate in the city: birds come in the spring, and agitators come for elections. A folk characteristic.

"At present we do not have an ideology, we only have hatred," the miners told us in addition. "Historical parallels can be cited here," we observed stupidly and received the response: "Just draw the lines!" "The trade unions, our native shepherds, let us down a bit," said a worker from the Yun-Yaga mine. "They shouted 'Wolves, wolves!' for such a long time that we stopped being feared. But to no purpose!"

"We must strike until Yeltsin adopts an edict banning rallies and strikes," said Potishnyy. "It is not impossible that he will do that soon. After the edict, we will no longer picket: he has a second, repressive army ready. At the officers' assembly in Moscow where I went, I was given figures: the number of Ministry of Internal Affairs troops already approaches the size of the regular army. And if there is a clash, in Moscow later you will be arguing from the historical perspective 'that, you will say, the worker is also to blame for the tragedy on the Lena.'"

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When we were already back in Moscow, we found out that despite the decision of the miners trade unions to give the government a break and wait for the promised money to be transferred, spontaneous strikes had begun at the mines in Vorkuta.

*Tambov Admin Chief Election Controversy Reported

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[Article by SR correspondent Vladimir Toporkov, Tambov: "Power Passions—*Who Is Frightened by the Elections in Tambov*"]

[FBIS Translated Text] They have been trying to convince the inhabitants of Tambov Oblast lately that the aphorism from the anecdote "the king is always right!" meets their aspirations in the best possible way.

The start of the new Tambov battle goes back to the adoption of the oblast charter, which conforms entirely to the Constitution, by the oblast Duma. The deputies proceeded from it last November, by the way, adopting the document by majority vote. The voting was preceded by prolonged discussion of the charter in the press, in the deputies' commissions, and with legal study by legal scholars and specialists of the Federation Assembly. A law was born, in short, that from now on should be the foundation governing social life and the rights and freedoms of the citizens of the oblast.

It would logically seem that one could only be glad of this, that democratic principles will triumph in the life of the large region. But the first to meet this document with bayonets fixed were precisely those who loudly call themselves "democrats." An impressive battle was launched when the oblast Duma announced the holding of elections for the head of the administration of the oblast on May 28 of this year (this legal democratic norm is inherent in the charter). You must see what a scrum has now developed in Tambov, somewhat reminiscent of the crush of the herd around the trough of swill.

What did the deputies proceed from in making the decision to hold the elections? Primarily from the interests of the oblast and its citizens, whose life on Tambov soil is becoming more and more depressing, and the dissatisfaction with its current leaders is growing stronger among the people. There is collapse in whatever sector of the economy you take today. Take, for instance, industry. The output of industrial products has declined by 44 percent over the years of rule of the "democrats." Dozens of enterprises are simply padlocked today, the people are "walking around" on forced vacations, and have not been paid in months. There are more than 25,000 unemployed for an oblast average in size.

What about matters in the Tambov countryside? They cannot be called anything but pitiful. The procurements of milk and meat have dropped by exactly three times over four years, and the productivity of the dairy herd was 1,551 kilograms last year, or 61 percent of the 1990 results. Whole sectors of agricultural production have disintegrated. The number of swine, for example, has dropped to 35 percent, and only 20 percent of the sheep remain. The number of livestock has dropped by almost half today. Many enclosures on the farms are standing empty today, and prices for the products of animal husbandry jumped by several times last fall alone and became "ceiling" prices that few can afford. I have had occasion to be in Tambov villages, and with one voice they call the policies of the authorities rapacious. And they cannot be called anything else, when the indebtedness in wages for rural inhabitants has exceeded 30 billion rubles.

So who should answer for all of this bedlam and chaos? The deputies felt unequivocally that the voters should be making the assessment of the years of "democratic rule," and first and foremost "governor" V. Babenko. It is for them to decide if the president of Russia was correct in naming the chief surgeon of the oblast hospital, a urologist by training, head of executive power in Tambov. But even his adherents are forced to acknowledge that V. Babenko, without any skills in working within an apparatus, "is politically unstable and inconsistent in his actions." And the governor's team? Far from all of them have withstood the "test of power." V. Babenko, for example, was recently forced to dismiss the first deputy chief of the administration, L. Kudinov, under whose supervision the funds released for social needs were filched. V. Babenko himself, by the way, having "built" a two-story private residence in the town of Lyada near Tambov, remains modestly silent regarding the sources of his income.

The facts cited would seem to suffice entirely to resolve the issue of power by democratic means—by means of elections. But that is precisely where the passions are boiling like a Spanish *corrida*. The governor himself was the first to take a stance. He hastily undertook an appeal to the oblast Duma, the sense of which could be phrased very succinctly as "no elections whatsoever." The Tambov procurator, Ye. Tamozhnik, evidently taking into account the "wishes" of the governor, also submitted a protest in which he substantiated his decision that the given decree was adopted in violation of prevailing legislation and is subject to abrogation. The chief law enforcer of Tambov cites as his main argument the presidential edict of 3 January 1994, and the fact that a federal law on the general principles for the organization of a system of bodies of state power in the entities of the

Russian Federation has not yet been adopted. One can only admire the logic of the procurator! It looks like he has not read our Russian Constitution, Article 77 in particular, which explicitly states that the system of bodies of state power in each subject of the Federation is established by it independently.

Mr. S. Filatov has also not stood aside from the Tambov passions. I think it is worth citing the government telegram he sent to oblast Duma Chairman A. Ryabov in its entirety: "Dear Aleksandr Ivanovich! We direct your attention to the fact that the decree on elections for the head of the oblast administration adopted on January 27 of this year contravenes the edict of the president of Russia of 3 October 1994.

"The question of calling elections for the head of the oblast administration, until some other procedure is established by federal legislation, is resolved by the president of the Russian Federation. In this regard I ask you, Aleksandr Ivanovich, to raise the question of canceling this decree at the next session of the oblast Duma. I ask you to inform the administration of the president of the Russian Federation of the decision made. Administration of the President of the Russian Federation Manager S.A. Filatov."

The dispatch from the Kremlin augmented the forces of the local democrats. Letters from the true "comrades-in-arms" are now flying to the president. The gentlemen from the committee of Russian reforms wrote spiritedly that "Taking into account the necessity of a competent resolution of urgent problems, the social committee of Russian reforms proposes consideration as governor of Tambov Oblast V.F. Semchenko, born in 1947, Russian, candidate of agricultural sciences, who has worked for a long time at Agroprom. He is currently the head of the administration of the largest rayon in the oblast. Understanding the necessity of reforms, he has been working actively on them. He never worked in the structures of the CPSU, and was at the same time not a member of the democratic organizations, so everyone accepts him—both the nomenklatura and the democrats."

In short, as Grigoriy Rasputin wrote, "Darling, dear one, take it, don't refuse." These gentlemen are echoed by representatives from the Council of the Union of Democratic Organizations. They sent an irate letter to the president: "We direct your attention to the arbitrary act taken by the oblast Duma, which shamelessly and grossly violates the edicts of the president... Such actions can be prosecuted under the law in accordance with Article 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation."

One would like to take a time out here and ask the authors of the letter if it could really be that the actions of those individuals that violate Article 77 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation do not fall under that article? You hardly need wait for an answer, when the principle of "the king is always right" is in force. The courage of the Tambov deputies, meanwhile, cannot be denied. They have repulsed all of the terrible philippics, from wherever they may come, from the walls of the Kremlin or their own "White House," with the conviction of their own correctness, and have not altered the decision they have made. At the session they rejected the protests of the head of the administration and the procurator, and expressed their negative attitude toward the telegram sent by Mr. Filatov. The more so as the Federation Council expressed its support for the Tambov deputies, declaring that no substantial discrepancies of the charter—among those cited by the head of the administration—to the Constitution of the Russian Federation had been detected that would violate the foundations of the state order of Russia. It is also interesting to read the findings of the Committee of the State Duma: "The actions of the Tambov Oblast Duma in dismissing the protests of the head of the administration should be deemed legitimate, and the accusations of the head of the administration of a lack of conformity of the charter to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and of a violation of the foundations of the state order of Russia invalid."

So what then, the crisis has passed? The more so as candidates are already being put forward for the impending elections. Perhaps Tambov Oblast will really get governors invested with public confidence?

Even the most hopeless optimist would refrain from that prediction. In a state where corridor games deprive the people of the legitimate right to elect their own authorities, where they hang onto their chairs at any price, where they try to evade responsibility for their actions by all means fair or foul and bordering on crimes, anything is possible. That is why the "power passions" are not abating. The oblast Duma recently appealed directly to the president, where they clearly described the situation in the oblast, noting that the administration has lost control of the situation and asking, in order to protect the rights and interests of Tambov Oblast as an entity of the Russian Federation, that he support the decision to hold the elections.

Time will tell whether the President will heed this request.

*Region in Sakha Denies Intent To Separate

954F1958A Yakutsk RESPUBLIKA SAKHA in Russian 24 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by RESPUBLIKA SAKHA correspondent M. Morozov, Neryungri: "'Great-Power Advocate' Mikhail Yefrimovich and 'Separatist' Eduard Yakovlevich"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Dear Editor, I have been living in the city of Aldan for half a year. I like everything here—the people, my work, the city. Of course, the natural surroundings are different from where I was born. I was born in Tajikistan, but because of recent events I left there. But that is not why I'm writing. Recently I heard a discussion between two men. It can be summarized by**

saying that our neighbors, and specifically Neryungrinskiy Rayon, never considered itself, and even now does not consider itself, to be part of Yakutia. Therefore the administration head of Neryungri frequently has conflicts with the president of the Republic. The situation has even gone so far that the president does not want to converse in Russian and speaks only in Yakut. So their dialogue is conducted through an interpreter. Is that really the truth? Could you please ask Comrade Esterleyn to answer the questions in this letter I have heard a lot of good things about President M. Ye. Nikolayev, I do not think anything bad about administration head Esterleyn (unfortunately, I do not know his first name and patronymic), but nevertheless please understand me correctly. I would not want even my enemies to live through what I have had to live through. Please answer through RESPUBLIKA SAKHA newspaper. Respectfully, V. S. Nikolenko. (Please excuse the words I had to cross out. I'm too upset. *The editorial office asked its correspondent in South Yakutia to meet with the head of the Neryungri administration and to comment on the letter to the editor.*

Dear V. S. Nikolenko, those crossed-out words are no problem. We did not even touch a word in your letter. Let me hasten to assure you that you are living in a civilized land, and our chiefs at any rank are educated people. For the most part, they are real intellectuals. My personal acquaintance with the Neryungri administration head and especially with the president of the Republic is not close enough to know how far into his own internal world each of them is capable of allowing his conversational partner to go, or to gauge the degree of the smiles when they are talking to one another. But I do know that when conversing with one another, or with other people, they both reveal a sufficient amount of attention, patience, and good will. It is not my task to provide qualitative descriptions of the personal properties of these administrators. I shall cite certain facts simply for your information, and also for the purpose of refreshing the memory of my own older countrymen. Then it will be possible to understand how Mikhail Yefimovich and Eduard Yakovlevich (that is the name of the Neryungri head) relate to one another.

In late May 1992 you could not shove your way into the assembly hall at the Neryungri Coal Mine. A noisy rally was going on—this was the first meeting between the people of Neryungri and the recently elected president of the Republic and the head of the Neryungri city administration who had recently been appointed by his edict. Basically, the discussion was about things that were still uncustomary at that time—salary delays and days off. But the group of rally participants did not actively perceive E. Esterleyn in his new quality and they energetically "harped upon" that topic. One person demanded that the head be eliminated. Another told the president, "This person is discrediting you." A third, in the heat of polemics, promised, in the event of the replacement of the Neryungri leader, to call his soon-to-be-born grandson Mishka [nickname of Mikhail]. In his concluding speech, Mikhail Yefimovich stated softly, but firmly: "I consider the elimination of the administration head from his position to be undesirable. Why eliminate him?"

Half a year went by. Somewhere in late November 1993 the city newspaper printed items written by participants at that rally. Referring to E. Ya. Esterleyn, the authors, without any penitential statements of loyalty, but observing human dignity, admitted the erroneousness of their previous views and positions. Then, in the very beginning of December, in the very same closely packed hall, the candidates for election as deputy to the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, Nikolayev and Esterleyn met with the very same people. After the presentation of their platforms, those who had gathered there bestowed lavish applause on them. It was definitely not hypocritical applause. Dear Mr. V. S. Nikolenko, I am not adding a single personal note of my own. It is simply that I do not speak words from a song, and I speak only about what I myself have seen and what I myself know. All this is in answer to your question about interrelationships.

As for separatism, that evil disease, South Yakutia has never been subjected to it. Once again we would like to recall a few things from recent history. At the beginning of the construction of the South Yakutia Complex,the region here was considered to be the pride and hope of the entire Yakutia. Reports about it were eagerly listened to in all the cities, settlements, and villages. It was bad form for the Republic newspapers and television and radio broadcasts to fail to contain a bit of news from the "south." Then, when the period of the first rapture passed and everyday life began, and that life was further complicated by the problems in all spheres, many people suddenly regained their consciousness: so this is what South Yakutia is like, with its unprofitable subsidized coal industry! And people began to lose consciousness of the fact that the southern region continues to be the hope of the entire Republic.

I will tell you, dear V. S. Nikolenko, and will also remind my fellow countrymen, only about a few facts of our life today. A rehabilitation center for children suffering from a terrible disease—cerebral palsy—is operating in Neryungri, and it one of the most effective ones in the world and the best in the CIS. Public organizations, with the energetic support of the city administration, have achieved a situation in which that center has been given republic status. It is obvious what consequences evolve from that. By receiving greater and more varied support, the center is actually operating for the entire Republic, and it is already receiving hundreds of grateful letters from many *uluses* [nomad camps]. The same thing can be said about the Republic's Rehabilitation Center for children, as well as adults, with hearing impairments.

Two years ago people in Neryungri established contact with a certain German firm and came to an understanding concerning the creation of a joint venture to produce diamond metal-cutting tools. On the insistence of the Neryungri administration, the founders included five *uluses* in our Republic. But it was not necessary to insist too much—the benefit from this kind of cooperative action is obvious for everyone. On the same production base—the Neryungri Mechanical-Repair Plant—since last year the joint enterprises have been producing splendid South Korean vacuum cleaners and Italian irons, French plumbing fixtures, and Korean bread machines. In conversations with correspondents from the Republic's newspapers, E. Esterleyn asked to express a claim against his associates, the *ulus* administrators: this output, of world quality, is selling rather poorly throughout the Republic, and the demand for them is not being organized in the outlying areas. But we are doing all of this not only for the people of Neryungri and not for exporting items beyond the confines of the Republic, but for our own people! There is a small but touching fact: out of several splendid German grand pianos that were shipped in for Neryungri's musical schools, the first one was sent to Yakutsk—to the Theater of Opera and Ballet.

One could give a large number of other examples. It is mandatory to speak about the central problem, which possibly constitutes one of the chief concerns not only of the president of the Republic, but also of the head of the local administration and any far-sighted person. Without the creation of our own industry, our Republic is doomed to long and guiltless vegetation. But where can we create an industry that consists of many branches, that is high-tech and productive both with regard to volume and with regard to the variety of articles, an industry that creates jobs that are worthy of people and that is ecologically impeccable? Where a railroad exists—in Neryungri and in your hometown, Aldan. In our city not everyone has fully accepted that idea. And Nikolayev and Esterleyn will have to fight with all their might against the official structures of the Russian Federation, and even moreso. To prove that the development of the Berkakit junction station is necessary, that the laying of a railroad at least to Tommot is needed, and so is the comprehensive assimilation of the natural wealth. The south of the Republic remains the main hope for the Republic. Just as the North of Russia is the main hope for all of Russia. Just read M. Nikolayev's articles in the central and local newspapers—they sometimes express true pain for the North and its separately taken regions.

On instructions from the editorial office I asked E. Ya. Esterleyn to make a few comments. This is what he added:

"The author of the letter to the editor did not have any previous opportunity to read our Republic press. Otherwise he would have known about the truly businesslike, warm relations that have developed between Mikhail Yefimovich and myself. Never, under no circumstances, has the question about the language of communication arisen. It is another matter that, if I were a bit younger, it would indeed be necessary to study the Yakut language, since we are living in a national republic. And the initiative for doing that ought to come from me, don't you agree?

"The South Yakutia Complex has always sensed the attention and concern of the entire Republic, and was created with its aid. Currently, as well, not a single one of our major measures or reforms is carried out without the approval or direct personal participation of the president. It would be erroneous to think that our region has been left to itself or has been cast to the arbitrary will of fate. On the other hand, as an inseparable part of the Republic, it is applying its efforts to assuring that our common fate develops more successfully. I would like to add a few more examples to what has been previously said. The first Republic puppet theater is situated in Neryungri. Or, what prompted the Neryungri city administration to establish specifically designated scholarships for students at the Suntar Polytechnical *litsey*, or the students at Yakutsk State University [YaGU]? And who knows how many lumps your humble servant, 'a major separatist of modern times,' received in the fight to open a branch of YaGU in Neryungri?

"I might mention also that there had been a powerful movement—the union of the hammer and sickle." The collectives at the enterprises and sovkhozes and of Neryungri as a whole and certain agricultural *uluses* rendered a large amount of aid to one another. The vicious tongues of the true separatists used to say that 'the industrialists' had built the villagers a cow barn or substation, and the thanks that they got in return was just two or three concerts by amateur performers. That's rubbish! The sovkhozes provided rather good support to the collectives at our subsidiary farms, and carried out seed and bloodline work there. For whom is it beneficial to forget all of this? Everyone has economic difficulties, and they will not end tomorrow. But we shall strengthen the economic and spiritual cooperation. If we try to live separately, we cannot survive, much less guarantee a life that is worthy of everyone."

What has to be added to the Neryungri mayor's words? We must recall, dear V. S. Nikolenko, that fabrications similar to the ones that you have heard are set in motion by provocateurs, and then are seized up and disseminated by fools. But please do not take this comment personally—your alarm and pain are understandable and, judging from your letter, you have had to suffer hard times. At some stage in someone's selfish interests we confused collectivism (and it has been so wrongly reviled) and the herd instinct. But the herd instinct, as Boris Pasternak so aptly noted, is the refuge of every untalented individual. And, we might add, the social base of separatism. People who are untalented, who have failed to achieve success in production activity or in creativity, who have not become successful in life, but who are ruled by immoderate ambition, frequently want to crack the whip over the heads of at least a small group. It is then that they take on as standard equipment the ancient principle "divide and conquer."

But we do not want to divide, and we have another motto: "Let's take ourselves in hand, friends!" Subscribe to RESPUBLIKA SAKHA, dear V. S. Nikolenko, and read it. After reading the statements of the president of the Republic, you will be convinced that he is fluent in Russian. And that the Neryungri head knows how to work and wants to work, and therefore he is not afraid of any election, as he has repeatedly stated. And all of us together are not afraid of schisms or confrontations. Because the people of Neryungri, all the people in Yakutia, as well as all the inhabitants of the CIS want least of all to be pushed into separate herds under the whips even of our own herdsmen. We are tired of suffering for the sake of someone else's inflated vanities, and for the sake of the struggle of ambitions and vainglory.

I extend my best wishes to your family in becoming adjusted to life in this stern but good land. I know that you will get to know good people. Today there are still more of them than there are of bad ones.

*Sverdlovsk Administration, 'Uralmash' Conflict on Privatization

954F1942A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 95 pp 1-2

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Aleksandr Pashkov: "Political Duel on the Field of Privatization: The Sverdlovsk Duma Against Uralmash"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The Sverdlovsk Oblast procuracy has handed over to the oblast court of arbitration the suit to recognize as invalid the plan for privatization of Uralmash insofar as it pertains to the privatization of the Spetstekhnika AO [joint-stock company]—a plant that produces heavy artillery arms.**

In order to make sure that everything is clear subsequently about what is being discussed, we shall give a brief historical summary. From the moment of launching the plant of plants, production capacities for producing and repairing various types of arms have been located on its territory. In 1946 the special production entity was transformed into an independent enterprise—Plant No. 9, which in 1958 was eliminated with the transferral of capacities to Uralmash as part of the small-series production. The "*melkoseriyka*" [small-series production], with rights of a branch, became part of the Uralmash AO, which subsequently leased those capacities to a newly created enterprise—Spetstekhnika AO.

The procuracy feels that the privatization of the plant occurred illegally, since enterprises such as Spetstekhnika are privatized on the basis of a governmental decision, and there was no such decision. It also feels that, also with regard to the formation of Uralmash into a joint-stock company, no such decision exists, and it is possible to raise questions here.

Now it is time to explain why Spetstekhnika's problem became so burdensome, whereas many other enterprises in the defense industry that had found themselves in similar situations—the absence of military production orders, long nonpayments of wages, the curtailment of social programs—failed to receive this kind of attention. Uralmash is an important-sounding name. Any scandal linked with it attracts attention and becomes the object of public attention. Certainly it is not accidental that initially the oblast Duma attempted to bring action in the court of arbitration—the attention to Spetstekhnika's problems could considerably raise the rating of the local Duma members. Alas, the legislative agency simply did not know that that kind of suit, from the point of view of the law, is simply illegal. It was then that the procuracy took over the case.

The following circumstance can serve as proof that the case, most likely, had been directed at a scandal, at the achievement of political goals. The initial suit in the court of arbitration was signed by Eduard Rossel, chairman of the oblast Duma. But in February 1993 he had also signed the following document: "The Uralmash AO, in the person of Director General V. V. Korovin; the Main Administration for the Development of Heavy, Energy, and Transportation Machine-Building, of the RF Committee on Machine-Building, in the person of administration chief L. D. Slavin; and the administration of Sverdlovsk Oblast, in the person of administration head E. E. Rossel, concluded this contract concerning the following: Uralmash AO, as the successor of Uralmashzavod, assumes the following assignments: the creation, development, and preservation of the mobilization capacities for the production of arms and military technology and very important civilian output. Uralmash AO pledges to preserve the mobilization capacities, and to maintain them in readiness."

In other words, the Spetstekhnika capacities became part of Uralmash at the time of the formation of the joint-stock company. Therein lies the crux of the secret document. There is one more document that pertains to this problem. It had not been signed by the then administration head, but he was informed about the situation. That finding, which had been signed by Slavin, as well the deputy chief of the Main Administration of Special Technology and Conversion, of the RF Committee on Machine-Building, and by the deputy chief of the Main Administration of Structural Policy, Demonopolization, and Privatization, of the RF Committee on Machine-Building, authorized for them the privatization of Spetstekhnika.

"We were preparing a draft of the government's decree dealing with the conversion of Uralmash into a joint-stock company and with all the problems linked with that," Viktor Yanin, chief of Uralmash's legal department, says. "But it was explained to us that there was no need for such a decree, since the government had approved a list of enterprises and objects whose privatization was being carried out in accordance with a decision of the RF State Committee on the Administration of State Property. We were in that list, just as, for example, the Turbomotornyy Zavod PO [production association] was."

It turns out that Eduard Rossel, by signing the suit, wanted to be asked how he had promoted the transfer of Spetstekhnika's property to Uralmash. We shall assume that this is the normal desire of a manager in a democratic society—to ask himself questions by way of the court. The procuracy also has the right to have its doubts about any document, regardless of whose signatures are at the bottom of it. But first it would be a good idea to study those documents.

Incidentally, whatever the decision of the court of arbitration will be, it first of all will not correct the state of affairs at Spetstekhnika itself. For a long time Uralmash has been offering it to the Nizhniy Tagil Railroad-Car-Building Plant, which uses its output. They are not taking it. There is no production order. Spetstekhnika cannot accept production orders, for example, from Dudayev. Only the state can formalize a production order. It does not have any money. Hence the problems for people, and there are already plenty of problems without any political scandals.

In the autumn of 1991, Vladimir Sokolov, chairman of the Federal Property Fund, headed the Sverdlovsk Oblast Committee for Administration of State Property (SOKUGI). The first steps to privatize Uralmash were undertaken in front of his eyes and with his participation. IZVESTIYA requested Vladimir Sokolov (which, incidentally, is a member of the Uralmash directors' council) to comment of the situation that has developed.

The first privatization document pertaining to Uralmash appeared on 18 September 1991. It was a directive issued by our oblast KUGI [Committee for Administration of State Property], which, in response to the plant's request, authorized its privatization. I consider, Vladimir Sokolov emphasizes, two factors to be fundamentally important. The SOKUGI directive had been coordinated in writing with Mikhail Maley, the then chairman of the RF State Committee on the Administration of State Property. And, secondly: that directive can be viewed as the embryo of the practice itself for the procedure of coordinating the questions of privatization with the government.

People can object to this that, if the oblast had not tried to run faster than the locomotive, if it had not rushed to carry out privatization, we would not have today's problems with Uralmash. I want to recall, Sokolov says, that Sverdlovsk Oblast and its then head, Eduard Rossel, were among the leaders of privatization and were attempting to be the first people to do a lot of things. Rossel himself, in February 1992, by a special directive of the president, was given special powers to carry out accelerated privatization. The oblast privatization program appeared earlier than the federal one.

The main complexity with which, properly speaking, the problems of the disputed Spetstekhnika began was the lack of a military production order for its output. The oblast Duma, which acted as the initiator of the review of the results of the privatization of Uralmash, recommended to the administration head that he form an "oblast state enterprise" where jobs could be found for the entire Spetstekhnika collective. That recommendation, possibly, will allow the local legislators to attract the votes of their constituents in the defense industry. But the oblast has neither the funds, nor the powers to issue a military production order to Spetstekhnika.

An audit of the privatization of Uralmash, Sokolov feels, might undermine the confidence in the privatization policy in Russia. That review will strike an especially severe blow to the interests of thousands of stockholders, many of whom are workers at Uralmash itself.

*Mayoral Decree on Bills of Exchange

954F1873A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 20 Mar 95 p 6

[Decree of 6 February 1995, No. 141: "On Implementation of the Mayor's Program for Bills of Exchange"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In compliance with existing legislation of the Russian Federation and with a view to reducing the city's budget deficit, improving the condition of settlements, and normalizing the financial condition of the enterprises, and in execution of the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 9 August 1994, No. 907, "On Conducting Mutual Settlements of Indebtedness of Enterprises on the Territories of Components of the Russian Federation," I decree:

1. The program for issuing bills of exchange of the office of the mayor of the city of Novosibirsk for the first quarter of 1995 (Appendix 1) shall be approved.

2. The procedure for settlements using bills of exchange of the office of the mayor of the city of Novosibirsk among enterprises, organizations, and institutions (Appendix 2) shall be approved.

3. It shall be established that the bills of exchange of the mayor's office must be accepted for the payments indicated in Appendix 3 to the present decree on any day from the moment the bill of exchange is issued.

4. It shall be established that bills of exchange of the office of the mayor of the city of Novosibirsk shall be issued by the finance the tax policy administration of the city mayor's office (L.T. Koroshko) in volumes and by deadlines established by directives from the city's mayor.

5. The Novosibirsk Municipal Bank (V.G. Zhenov) shall be requested to conduct operations for servicing the circulation of bills of exchange of the mayor's office.

6. The Department of Economics (V.A. Voronov), in conjunction with the finance and tax policy administration (V.V. Bichev) shall provide constant monitoring of the implementation of the bill of exchange program and

regularly report to the mayor on the course of its implementation, and, if necessary, prepare proposals for adjustments on the spot.

*Graham's Visit to Novosibirsk Reviewed

954F1873B Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 21 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by N. Zubritskaya: "U.S. Diplomat Fell in Love With Novosibirsk"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This was the third time Thomas Graham, first secretary of the U.S. Embassy, had visited Novosibirsk. He met with Novosibirsk Mayor V. Tolokonskiy, Deputy Chairman of the Oblast Council V. Karpov, Bishop Tikhon, businessmen, journalists, and students.

The diplomat, the head of the embassy's internal political department, justified his third trip to Novosibirsk by his special interest in Siberia, which, in his opinion, will be of immense significance to the future development of our society. He is engaged in a study of our possibilities of arranging cooperation in various areas of activity. Then he will send his conclusions to the U.S. Government, which will transfer the necessary information to business circles.

The highly placed guest admitted that in terms of the development of certain technologies, especially in space research, Russia is ahead of the United States, and so we should join forces in these areas. Russians need consumer goods, and this demand is immense. In the final analysis, he said, there will also be a supply. The lack of the necessary foundations prevents the establishment of contacts: "Americans simply do not know what you can and cannot do." They are stumped by our bureaucrats, since "the American bureaucrat is very much different from yours." The high crime rate is also a problem. True, at the same time, the guest noted that in Moscow he feels better in this regard than he does at home: "Perhaps because I know Washington better than I do Moscow." But, he admitted, Siberia is more interesting than the capital of Russia.

*Compensation for Swindled Investors Assessed

954F1873C Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 20 Mar 95 p 10

[Article by Irina Borisova: "Unquenchable Desire for Satisfaction... 80,000 Residents of Novosibirsk Oblast Deceived by Financial Swindlers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **We live in funny times! The Zayeltsovskiy People's Court has filed a number of claims against the Styling Industrial-Financial Corporation. This name, which means nothing to the Russian ear, still rings in the ears of the people of Novosibirsk. And the face of the company's founder, it seems, is becoming just as ubiquitous as those of television anchors. Without going into the details of the affair (enough is being written about it), I will give just a couple of figures. The aforementioned court has received a total of 654 claims, and approximately half of them have been settled for a grand total of R670 million. Which certainly does not mean that the investors have received their money back.**

As of 10 march, according to the writs of execution, little more than one-sixth of this amount had been paid. The Zayeltsovskiy Rayon procuracy submitted 70 claims against the corporation on behalf of pensioners and disabled persons. The court has attached whatever property belonging to Styling it has been able to find so far: the recreation base, five motor vehicles, a boat, 17 computers, office furniture. As they say, it is not much, taking into account the size of the debt. So what is funny about this? Can you really laugh when people are deceived, duped, hit, as it were, right in the heart?

But there is the fact that during these same days, while one group was piling up claims in court, another took exactly the opposite step. Angered, seized by a common emotion, the investors rushed directly to the oblast procuracy, burst through to see the main man himself, and presented their demands. Namely—to stop persecuting Styling, to let the corporation function, because they believe, they believe, and again they believe!

When you learn about this inextinguishable fire of faith, you automatically think: No, it was not in vain that the Russians went through those years after the October Revolution, the flame ignited during those extremely long years has not died out. But perhaps it is quite a different matter, if you fantasize. Perhaps these all-believers were simply promised a piece of the crumbling "pyramid" of the corporation. Literally in the last two weeks, the powerful Russian language has given birth to a new word—swindlistics. And it seems that for a long time to come we will be amazed at the infinite ingenuity and cleverness of our domestic swindlers. What is curious is that some firms have, excuse me, gotten the hang of it so well that while paying some "investors" under writs of execution, they are taking money from others for that same promised interest. The head of one such company took for an extremely large sum from not simply an old woman pensioner but a fairly close acquaintance of his, one might say, a friend.

As it turns out, approximately 80,000 people have been cheated in our oblast. The most active of them met at a meeting recently, where after the debates an action group was created with the task of providing objective information on financial structures, legal aid, etc. Perhaps this means that the people on the lower rungs of the ladder do not want to live in the old way. But what about those on top?

You cannot say much here. Most likely you will have to limit yourself to questions. Where are all those many bureaucratic structures through which the founders of firms must pass—those that collect deposits from the population? Where are the bureaucrats who could be strict during registration? Where were our authorities and our legislators looking when granting freedom to create such corporations and firms?

And why have the legal acts not undergone criminological expert appraisal? The court and the procuracy have entered into the process of investigation, but they are not able to grant licenses or check the registration, authorized capital, and other such attributes of the companies that thrive on soil fertilized by Russian stupidity. Yes, the procuracy is monitoring the execution of the law on banks and banking activity. Now, it seems, this monitoring is being stepped up. But is it really possible to do much when the crime wave is getting stronger and stronger?

Indeed, the law enforcement organs cannot keep up with the race where one swindler drives out another. A couple of days ago a newspaper reported on how an "action group of investors" elected an energetic person to defend its interests and took up a collection of no more and no less than 15 million for his "forthcoming costs" and "greasing palms." With that they said farewell, and now the police are looking for the "energetic" one.

And here are some completely different stories. After inviting guests, the hosts find that some of their things are missing. Or when children bring friends home, later they are unable to explain to their parents where mama's ring disappeared to. Or another banal occurrence. Three peasants meet to share a bottle. When a corporation meets with the investor, this too is like sharing a bottle. When the peasants are good and drunk, one of them sticks a knife in the other, not in the heart but in the stomach. The victim later explains: He does not remember what happened between him and the defendant, yes, he was stabbed but he asks that the punishment not be too severe. Does this forgetful drunken fool not remind us of the behavior of certain groups of duped citizens? These are quite different occurrences. But still one senses that they have a common basis. Perhaps that notorious Russian "off chance," or perhaps the desire simply to gain satisfaction that way—with high interest rates or a "heart-to-heart" conversation with the bottle. Swindlistics, drunken exploits with stabbing—perhaps I see too much in common in these markers of our current life? But they are cooking in the same kettle of our current Russian reality. Laughter through tears—regardless of how long ago it was said, it is still true....

*Mayor on City's Land Ownership

954F1927A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 27 Mar 95 p 7

[Article by Olga Kasatkina: "Whom Should the City's Land Serve?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **A conference conducted by Viktor Tolokonskiy, mayor of Novosibirsk, was devoted to the study of new approaches to land relationships.**

When we talk about land, we immediately recall the first socialist idiom: "The land to the peasants." The next one, cunningly modified, sounded at least as abstract, but more accurate. It stated that the land is the people's property. So, that is the way we are living. With the realization that the most important thing is tangible, that it cannot under any circumstances be subject to inflation, and that the wealth of the country belongs to everybody. At the same time, in an absolute legal vacuum and the complete absence of important regulating documents that would make it possible to buy, give as a gift, or transfer land under indefinite or temporary ownership.

Viktor Tolokonskiy is convinced that it is precisely in spite of this vacuum (and possibly because of it) that the municipality must itself perfect, and in some areas also develop, a legal basis for land relationships. In order to employ it in the interests of the city.

It is no secret that land, in spite of everything, serves selfish interests by virtue of its permanent attractiveness. Universal commerce and speculation in this basic value is going on. There are extreme forms, such as the unpunished appropriation of a plot that was allotted at one time and its resale. There are more subtle and mild forms, but all of them impoverish the budget, absolutely ignoring the interests of the city. There are other examples, when the owners of a privatized enterprise cannot buy out a plot under their own immovable property, and this means that they are not able to feel like real owners. Or the alienation of property. How is it to be conducted and formulated? There are a lot of absurd situations in our city, when the owner of a building that only borders upon someone else's territory is compelled to pay an astronomical sum for land not to the municipality, but to a rentier. In general, rentiers, who are increasing their capital on national property, are prospering in our country. There is not one institute in the city that does not lease its premises. What is more, there are among them some in which there is no longer a single laboratory, and all drawing instruments and tracing paper are dumped down in the basement. So what happens? Not a kopek goes to the budget! The buildings and land are already under the banks. And it is difficult, it is said, to find a reason for expropriation, inasmuch as the scientific research institute and all kinds of "projects" are former federal property.

So specialists gathered in the mayor's office, in order that the circular of rules not be formal and indifferent to the fate of the city, but normal, reasonable, and, in the final analysis, a procedure that induces business activity. Land managers, builders, economists, lawyers, procuracy managers, and architects. They have not yet decided how to change the situation that has set in over the years, but it was decided that it had to be changed, and as quickly as possible.

A plan of new approaches to land relationships has been proposed. It was developed at the Municipal Investment Center. Its main idea boils down to finding legal levers of accumulation in the budget and incomes that have rental sources. There are also specific proposals. But we will not discuss them as long as there is no calculated or valid project concerning them. We will say only that literally within a two-week period the competent group will have to develop general normative documents on the allotment and transfer of land plots to ownership and lease. Obviously, the declaratory principle of leased use of land will be introduced in the near future. Each owner will have to specify borders, conditions, and other important facts. All the state organs, including tax organs that will familiarize themselves with the balance sheets of enterprises, will be drawn into these relationships. The absence of a land description has all the grounds for being considered a flagrant violation. Naturally, the task is being set to reduce the entire bureaucratic procedure to a minimum, but inventory taking should be hypercritical.

The working group on development of the drafts was headed by Valentin Zubov, chairman of the Economic Committee of the mayor's office. A hearing is scheduled for 30 March.

*Municipal Investment Center Director Interviewed

954F1874A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 20 Mar 95 p 6

[Interview with Sergey Vitalyevich Tyurenkov, director of the Municipal Investment Center, by Olga Kasatkina; place and date not given: "The Investment Center—Control for Tomorrow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The Municipal Investment Center (telephone 22-61-95, 1 Trudovaya Street), which was organized by a decree of the mayor of the city, will play one of the leading roles in searching for money for development of the city and, as a matter of fact, in attracting ideas, projects, and executors. The Municipal Bank, which in the stage of organization influenced the formation of the new structure, acted as founder of the center together with the mayor's office. Our interviewee is Sergey Vitalyevich Tyurenkov, director of the Municipal Investment Center.**

[Kasatkina] In what way does your center differ from other companies whose names contain a similar adjective; for example, how does it differ from investment funds?

[Tyurenkov] The idea on which the center is based is to give investment flow two-way movement. First, our own city itself possesses a definite and rather high investment value. Land, real estate, the sites of firms, and the implementation of programs—this and much else is to a very high degree attractive to entrepreneurs. In view of this, it is possible to talk about a reciprocal movement; that is, the flow of projects under given guarantees that do not yield to inflation, but, on the contrary, only increase in price.

Investment funds are an entirely different matter. They attract the resources of investors under projects that bring a profit to the fund, and to the investor—certain previously stipulated dividends.

[Kasatkina] Can the center be viewed as an intermediary in search of a common language between the municipality and the investor?

[Tyurenkov] Yes, completely. This is mediation that is directed at satisfying and protecting the interests of both parties to the fullest extent.

[Kasatkina] In what way will it be possible to do this?

[Tyurenkov] The city is developing and looking to tomorrow, and for the time being it can build. We have a lot of building sites on which we could erect new homes that are able to improve Novosibirsk's appearance. But their attraction for investors and builders is reduced to a significant degree by the presence of dilapidated buildings. Expenditures are necessary to tear them down, including compensation to the tenants.

The mayor's office is also interested in other projects; for example, in reconstruction and restoration of the facades of homes, engineering communications, heat and power services, and so forth.

The mechanism for carrying out mutual obligations is simple and is implemented realistically in the following manner. For example, an entrepreneur undertakes to tear down an old dilapidated dwelling in order to build an office, store, restaurant, or any building on this site for his own purposes. In approving the project, the Municipal Investment Center grants him certain privileges that are adequate for the expenditures. In this way, the expenditures of the project executor are minimized, and progress in the implementation of technical conditions is facilitated. How important this is, and how long it is possible to look after the technical conditions, the coordination of a lease, and so forth, only those who have had occasion to build know this. The center takes on all the troubles. In addition, we can facilitate the granting of land tax privileges and energy privileges, and privileges for other tariffs, and also the extension of credit for a project...

[Kasatkina] In this case the center performs as a kind of guarantor, is that not true? But on what grounds?

[Tyurenkov] Absolutely correct. Moreover, inasmuch as our founder—the Municipal Bank—intends to extend the credit, answerability to the creditor as well as to the debtor will be extremely high. Therefore, simultaneously with the guarantee functions, we also bear the analytical control function. For this, specialists have been invited to the center who are capable of evaluating the attractiveness of an investment in a particular project, the date of its practicable recoupment, and financial and other conditions.

There are economists, specialists in the sphere of real property, financial operations, export-import, and so forth, among the expert analysts.

[Kasatkina] The Investment Municipal Center has announced project bidding. Its conditions are rather tough. Are there proposals?

[Tyurenkov] There are. But few for the time being. The reason probably lies in the tough conditions, compliance with which is not that easy. The bidding will be continued. And we are expecting interesting projects that resolve problems of the socioeconomic development of the city. We would also like the ideas to be original and of the kind that will pay themselves off rather quickly. Then the center will assume patronage over the projects.

[Kasatkina] What other directions will there be in the work of the center?

[Tyurenkov] I have already talked about the expert analytical activity. Thus, we are planning to direct the efforts of our specialists, besides the expertise of investment projects, to analysis of the effectiveness of using uninhabited premises and development of recommendations on approaches to a lease payment and other incomes to the city budget. Our task is to help the city get rich, using our own reserves and attracting reserves from the outside. The same will have to be done in the analysis of the activity of firms that are building their own activity in the purchase and sale of real estate. Realty firms sometimes operate like sharks. An enormous amount of "black cash" circulates in this business. The center has to look into a lot of things, and we will possibly rather soon resort to licensing realty firms. There will also be other directions. But we will talk about them somewhat later.

*Nizhniy Novgorod's Nemtsov Interviewed

954F1845A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 11, 16-22 Mar 95 p 6

[Interview with Boris Nemtsov, governor of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, by Aleksandr Trushin; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Boris Nemtsov was born in Sochi in 1959, the son of a construction engineer and a doctor. His parents were soon divorced, and his mother took 5-year-old Boris back to her native Nizhniy Novgorod. In the Nemtsov line, the greatest successes in administrative matters were achieved by his maternal grandfather (secretary of the Avtozavodskiy Raykom in the 1930's) and his father, who was chief of a construction main administration in the 1960's with the rank of deputy minister.**

After graduating from secondary school, Boris entered the radio school at Gorkiy State University, which at that time was a hotbed of free thinking and dissident attitudes. After successful completion (diploma with distinction) of higher education in 1981, he worked at the radio physics research institute. He defended his candidate's dissertation. He held a respected place among young physicists.

With the beginning of perestroyka, like many young scientists Nemtsov took up political activities. He was a leader of the first mass movement in Nizhniy, which got the Gorkiy AST [nuclear thermal power plant] shut down. The charming and telegenic Nemtsov became popular among the people of Nizhniy Novgorod. In 1989 he was nominated as a candidate for USSR people's deputy. His program included the most rebellious ideas of that day: multiparty system, equality of all forms of ownership, direct election of the president.

After a series of abusive articles in the press, a district meeting refused to allow him to run for election. In 1990 he was nominated for deputy again under the slogan "Build Churches and Roads," but this time it was for the Russian Federation. He was elected.

At the very first Congress he showed his activism; he spoke often and pointedly. Then the future governor was noticed by the future president. In 1990-1991 he worked at the Committee for Legislation under the direction of Shakhray. In the 1991 presidential elections Nemtsov was a Yeltsin elector. During the August coup he was among the defenders of the "White House." After August his political career took a sharp upward turn. He was appointed president's representative for Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, and on 30 November of the same year he became governor.

He is an outstanding tennis player. He lives in a small, two-room apartment with his wife and 11-year-old daughter. He has declined numerous offers by the city leadership to improve his housing conditions. As governor, he has a Volga car and a suburban dacha for his use.

[Trushin] Can there be a president from the provinces in Russia?

[Nemtsov] Not in 1996. The election of a provincial president is a sign of developed democracy. In our country the outcome of the elections will be decided by the national mass information media, the power structures, and big capitalists. All of these are either concentrated in Moscow or directed from Moscow. An understanding of this drives the ambitious provincial voter away from the elections. There are exceptions, of course—Tuleyev, Obolenskiy—but they have no chance at all.

If the concentration of money and power in the capital becomes less formidable, say by the next election, then it may be possible to talk about a president from the provinces.

[Trushin] All the same, let us picture the presidential election. We will not discuss specific candidates, but in principle, how will we choose? By actions, by programs, by the eyes, by party membership?

[Nemtsov] I can tell you that we will not choose by actions or by programs because those who want to be president today have no good actions to their name. As we know, people in Russia do not read programs. They would rather look into a person's eyes.

I am against election by party affiliation because the candidate is more accountable to his party than to the voters. The same thing applies to elections for the representative branch on all levels. The party slates contain people who are absolutely unknown to the voters and are not accountable.

I think that what will be important in the presidential election will be first the reputation of the particular individual and second the money which the particular candidates are able to invest in the election campaign.

I do not exclude one other factor, which is familiar from the history of English parliamentarism: free distribution of vodka with the candidate's picture at voting precincts. It is a disgusting technique, but it might stir up the apathetic part of the population. Zhirinovskiy is already laying in stocks of alcohol at warehouses in Ryazan Oblast, and he is doing it openly, under the eyes of the authorities.

[Trushin] In general, you do not believe that the gap between the promises made in the last election and our present reality is too great?

[Nemtsov] That is possibly one of the reasons for the general lack of direction that reigns in society.

Of course, one cannot live in this condition. It seems to me that people have begun thinking more about themselves, their own city, town, or oblast. I see greater pride, more self-respect, among Nizhniy Novgorod people in their own "little homeland."

It is as if people are finding new vital supports. They are beginning to take a different attitude toward their own history and traditions. Sometimes this comes out in amusing ways: in their offices the mayors of our cities are hanging portraits of all their predecessors from the last century. Sometimes it is useful: during "Maslenitsa" [week before Lent] the most luxurious restaurants in Nizhniy feed the poor free of charge. This is an old tradition among our merchants. If they did not participate, they would not be respected in the city.

Russia has certainly changed; we have moved in the direction of federalism. I think that Yeltsin deserves credit for this. Each region has its own character and political coloring. One oblast is "red," while another is "gray-brown-raspberry." That is fine.

[Trushin] Doesn't this conflict with strengthening Russian statehood?

[Nemtsov] The way Rutskoy and Zyuganov understand it, yes, it does. Russia cannot just be strengthened from above by reinforcing the administrative apparatus, army, and special services. Without the sense of the "little homeland," this is a bad idea. We will not get anything except corruption, thievery, and decadence on a "super" scale.

The country's present leadership does not have a clear philosophical pivot. If decisions and actions at the state level depend on who was the last one to drop by the office, that is tragic for the country and the people.

Where power ought to be used against extremists, for some reason softness is shown. I cannot watch calmly as fascists run wild in the streets and freely distribute their mongrelized, misanthropic fliers. I would put them all in jail based on the Constitution, but it is apparent that many people in Moscow are using them, secretly hoping that by saddling the nationalist idea they can keep their power. In my opinion, these politicians are underestimating the Nazis' bloodthirstiness. If you let them anywhere near power they will swallow up everything. To be loyal to them is to demonstrate your political impotence.

[Trushin] Does the Chechen crisis arouse an equal emotional reaction in you?

[Nemtsov] You know that before 11 December I proposed a very firm blockade and very firm negotiations with Dudayev. Now there is nothing to say on that, when we are entangled in a war.

This is what I think we need to do now. The president should go to Groznyy. First he should look to see how his orders are being carried out. Second he should meet with Dudayev personally and demand that he stop resistance on the condition that federal troops will discontinue their combat operations. Then he should suggest that Dudayev grab his hat and get out. I would even give him money for a ticket.

As for a disposition, the Dniester region version is possible. Presidential rule is introduced north of the Sunzha where the primary oil fields and plants are. An autonomous entity, Chechen self-rule, is created in Greater Chechnya.

It is better to undertake such a compromise, negotiations, than to keep ruining the army. If negotiations save the life of just one person they should be conducted. Here we are talking about thousands of lives. If the president is a responsible person, not a self-willed aristocrat, he should undertake negotiations.

[Trushin] Have you made mistakes?

[Nemtsov] Constantly.

[Trushin] How have you corrected them?

[Nemtsov] Publicly. With the mayoral election I acted incorrectly. I took part in the election campaign. What is the meaning of a mistake by the governor? I offended thousands of people. I apologized.

Sometimes I am mistaken about people. You trust a person and he turns out to be a crook.

[Trushin] Do you still insist that the governor should be elected by the people, not appointed by the president?

[Nemtsov] My position is the same as it was in 1991. Right after my appointment I told Yeltsin that I needed the mandate of the people's trust in order to begin reforms and have the right to make unpopular decisions. I have repeated this to him consistently. The last time was when the president was cruising on the Volga in the summer and said in front of journalists: there is no doubt of the necessity of elections, and he gave his word that this would occur in the near future. Nothing happened.

In the words of Mr. Filatov, the president is not afraid that I would lose, but that a precedent would be set. This is a short-sighted and dangerous position for Yeltsin himself.

The heads of administration cannot be dependent on just one man. On the threshold of the presidential election many people will start figuring which candidate to support in order to keep their jobs. Do not be too quick to condemn: this is normal behavior for members of the nomenklatura. Yeltsin, with his current popularity, is depriving himself of the support of the governors, which they would give him if they were elected. The best option would be for oblast elections to be held concurrently with the presidential election. Such a command would be very strong and reinforced by a common interest: a truly presidential party, independent of the ideological passions of each governor.

[Trushin] The volume of industrial output in your oblast rose 2.6 percent in January 1995 compared to January of last year. How was this done?

[Nemtsov] This is the first time it has happened since 1991. I cannot say yet that we have found a way out of the crisis, but the growth continued in February. The birth rate also rose last year.

Above all we are supporting auto making, machinebuilding, and the chemical and petroleum refining sectors. This is done with investment, liberal tax policy, conversion credits, assistance with exports, and privatization, which we are conducting, especially in the small and medium-sized business sphere.

We have correctly defined several lines of development that lead to stabilization. First, demonopolization of the processing of agricultural output. We gave the peasants the opportunity to set prices themselves, but we did not give them subsidies. They spent the money to build new meat and dairy plants.

Second, we support private housing construction. The most precious thing a person can have is a home, and the state can and must help people build them. The methods are simple and well-known: subsidies, assistance to the cooperative movement, capital investment in infrastructure, and housing loans. If you have purchased bonds for five square meters today, you will not stop there. All Russia can be drawn out of crisis by a construction boom.

There has been a structural reorganization of industry during these years, and for our oblast it has been very painful. Most of the military plants are doomed. This means unemployment and deprivation for thousands of people. They have to be retrained and find themselves in those sectors where production is increasing.

In general I am in favor of people making decisions for themselves, but to do this they must have property and manage it. When we privatized motor vehicle transport the trucks were bought by drivers, not bankers, and they themselves started thinking about where to go and what to carry.

If people say to me, "Boris, we have a problem with sugar," I know that we have dozens of companies working in sugar and hundreds of people are already thinking about this. When many people are thinking, not just one, there will be no mistake.

[Trushin] Are there matters that you do not entrust to anyone else?

[Nemtsov] Above all, targeted social protection: payment of allowances to the poor, grants for the birth of a child, securing homes for the elderly, and the like. We help specific people, not "categories." Each unemployed person or each person earning less than 90,000 is entered in the computer and receives an individual grant from the oblast budget.

My second program is conversion and free economic zones at military plants. After all, they are standing idle anyway. We have authorized the formation of new production facilities, but not trade or warehouses, on their grounds and we exempt them from taxes. Competitive project selection is now under way, and there is a line at the plant entrance.

I do not entrust anyone else with land reform. This is the most important issue for the country's future.

I already spoke about the housing program. I work on that myself, too. We still have some new ideas related to infrastructure and road construction. We bought German road-building equipment and have invited engineers here from Germany.

[Trushin] So will Governor Nemtsov be a candidate for president?

[Nemtsov] The people who are pushing to be president today do not understand the responsibility that awaits them. They fall under the "Peter Principle:" every individual strives to reach his level of incompetence.

I am not a missionary. If I am thrown out I will be hurt but not bitterly. I can carry out my ideas in this position, and I am happy if something comes of it. Like any young guy I need to have an interesting life. Who knows what tomorrow will bring? I may worry more about my family. After all, they are not to blame for anything. I have not done wrong to anyone and I sleep peacefully at night.

I would need to grow more, however, to reach the president's job.

*Local Association of Commercial Banks President Interviewed

954F1876A St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA in Russian 22 Mar 95 p 1

[Interview with Sergey Popov, president of the St. Petersburg Commercial Banks Association, by NEVSKOYE VREMYA correspondent Dmitriy Travin; place and date not given: "Moscow Is Rife With Scandals but Everything Is Quiet in St. Petersburg: Which Banks Are the Safest?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Everybody is talking about the banking sector's problems. Debates are going on about the safety (it was rocked by major bankruptcies for the first time last year); about the risk ratio between putting money in banks or financial companies offering high yields; about the position of Moscow banks in St. Petersburg; about the conflict around the St. Petersburg Bank; and so on. Our correspondent Dmitriy Travin asked Sergey Popov, president of the St. Petersburg Commercial Banks Association, to share his thoughts on this set of problems.*

[Travin] Sergey Anatolyevich, so where is the best place for a St. Petersburg resident to keep his money after the succession of scandals that swept through the financial world last year?

[Popov] I would like to take issue with the opinion, frequently proffered lately, that the best thing to do is keep money in large—first of all Moscow—banks that have branches in St. Petersburg. If we take the bankruptcy statistics for last year, the list of losers will show first and foremost Moscow banks. More than 50 banks have already gone out of business in the capital. Now the number of failures continues to grow. Literally every week the Central Bank publishes a list of 10-15 banks whose licenses have been revoked. Mainly, I want to repeat, these are Moscow banks.

[Travin] But this is quite natural. There are considerably more banks in Moscow than in other regions in the country. Accordingly, the greatest number of bankruptcies has occurred there.

[Popov] If we take proportional data, in this respect too the comparison between Moscow and St. Petersburg will not be in favor of the former. In our city, only one bank went out of business last year—Innovation Bank. And even this bankruptcy happened with minimal losses for depositors, since the stockholders decided to direct all the funds that will become available into paying off the population. In Moscow, on the other hand, there were such major scandals as the Chara bank, which fleeced half of the city, and the Favorite bank, which promised huge interest rates and then stopped payments.

I think it is precisely the activities of Moscow banks that have resulted in the stereotype growing in the public mind: "A bank is not a very safe place." With respect to St. Petersburg banks, one can say that these are organizations that do not put depositors' money at risk and use it only in the safest undertakings.

[Travin] But is such an a priori division of banks into Moscow and St. Petersburg fair? Would it not be more correct to speak of large and small banks? After all, it is mostly not very sound structures that go bankrupt, while leading credit institutions, including in Moscow, do not give cause for concern.

[Popov] In Moscow the degree of criminalization of all of life, including political life, is very high. This has a certain negative impact on the entire Russian banking sphere. In my opinion, blame for this rests with not only on the small but frequently on the large Moscow banks.

A group of large banks (Imperial, National Credit, Menatep, Alpha-Bank, Capital Savings Bank) is currently emerging; they became the founders of Public Russian Television (PRT). They are fighting against another group represented by Most-Bank. This is spilling over into a major political confrontation. This casts a shadow over the entire banking structure.

[Travin] How is this fight manifesting itself? After all, PRT's creation does not prove that this group is fighting against someone.

[Popov] There is a fight for clientele (including budget organizations), enterprises, entire economic sectors: power generation, television, and so on. Administrative levers are being used. All this is acquiring the quality of a confrontation between economic groups drawing on banks for their strength. I do not want to say that there is a direct connection between banks and criminal structures, that all this is directly linked with Vlad Listyev's murder or the events that took place in December around the Most Group, but stormy Moscow life does cast a shadow over the entire banking system. In St. Petersburg life is more calm and quiet, including in the banking sphere.

[Travin] If we take the viewpoint of an ordinary depositor, it is not at that bad when a group of powerful banks with the help of authority structures gains increasingly serious positions in the economy. If, for instance, I have an account in National Credit, and the latter is increasing its influence through connections with influential persons, the safety of my investment increases.

[Popov] I would not look at it this way. Today's political life is the main source of instability. The main financial risks stem from political decisions. When some financial group or individual bank links its fate with a specific political leader, or specific party, or group of professionals in the government, the probability that they will keep their positions after the next elections is very low.

Elections will be held soon. In my opinion, the first thing the winning group will do is get even with those who were demeaning it and blocking its opportunities for economic growth at the time a different group was close to the authorities.

[Travin] For instance, if Luzhkov becomes president, Most-Bank will sharply "rise," while National Credit and others will sink?

[Popov] In a general sense, yes. By way of an example.

[Travin] St. Petersburg is indeed a more conservative and quiet city than Moscow. There is no question about that. But it is no secret that the leaders of St. Petersburg banks participated rather actively in our latest elections. The All Petersburg bloc was put together with the direct participation of Astrobank and some other structures. The Democratic Unity of Petersburg bloc—with the participation of Baltic Bank.

[Popov] As a witness to informal contacts between St. Petersburg bank leaders, I can tell you with certainty that our situation is far more calm than that in Moscow. Whatever disagreements exist, they are much more muted. There is no reason to fear serious confrontations and influence on St. Petersburg policy. Also, the degree of influence the city authorities have on banks' activities is much lower than that of the federal authorities.

[Travin] Some time ago I wrote about the problems of St. Petersburg banks and expressed the opinion that the attempt to buy up a block of shares of St. Petersburg Bank originated from Promstroybank (NEVSKOYE VREMYA, 8 December 1994). This view was not officially confirmed, but neither was it seriously refuted. Does an attempt to take over St. Petersburg Bank not show that the conflict between St. Petersburg banks is quite strong indeed? Especially considering that Promstroybank never got to become part of the recently created St. Petersburg Interbank Alliance (which St. Petersburg Bank dominates), despite all the talk of its open-door policy.

[Popov] These two large St. Petersburg banks were among the first to become joint-stock companies. Due to restrictions of a political nature imposed by the federal authorities, they were unable to register as large authorized capital as they wanted. This was a manifestation of a certain jealousy on the part of Muscovites, on the part of the federal authorities (in particular the Central Bank, whose chairman at the time was Georgiy Matyukhin). But the banks successfully developed, and the yield of their stock—and subsequently its value—increased sharply. In 1994 they set all-Russia records, which attests to the considerable safety margin of St. Petersburg banks as compared to others.

[Travin] I cannot quite agree that high dividends are an indicator of a bank's safety. After all, as you yourself pointed out, their authorized capital was artificially kept low. Should it be brought to normal size, the ratio between the amount going into dividend payments and the bank's capital would be considerably lower. A bank's high profitability is sometimes illusory.

[Popov] But for the stockholders—physical persons—these dividends were important. A small authorized capital was one of the elements of the bank's development strategy, which now is undergoing changes. This was aimed precisely at expanding the circle of physical persons-stockholders, for whom dividends are of considerable interest. In this respect I am ready to agree with your objection.

Going back to the relationship between these two banks, I do not see any grounds to support your hypothesis. The Lenstroymaterialy brokerage firm is still keeping its trade secret and not making public the name of the company that placed orders to purchase shares with it. I believe that this was not an attempt to take over the bank completely. Perhaps it was a failed attempt to play the stock exchange, betting that the stock would rise. But the underlying cause was that from economic standpoint this stock is very attractive for investment. This incident only confirms the thesis of St. Petersburg banks' safety.

As to the alliance, its documents emphasize that it is open to anyone. I think that any bank joining it (including Promstroybank) will only be welcomed.

[Travin] Do you believe it will eventually join?

[Popov] The question is who invites who. When younger brothers invite the older one to come over and be on equal footing with them, this grates on the ego. Perhaps this is why the two leading St. Petersburg banks will be acting separately.

[Travin] Does the alliance's creation mean that the banks that joined it will eventually merge?

[Popov] There were two objective reasons for the alliance's creation. One is to save on major investment in development, for instance, setting up a shared center for plastic card authorization, a common SWIFT ((Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Communications)) system. Further on, they may specialize. For instance, one bank will specialize in investment activities, another—in savings, working with the population. The money attracted can be put into major common projects. The second reason is to safeguard themselves from the influence of criminal structures and undesirable groups of stockholders, who could sharply change a bank's policy. To this end, mutual penetration of capital and the creation of horizontal structures is desirable, since it ensures the future stability of operation of the entire St. Petersburg banking system.

Kazakhstan

*Kazakhstan's Ambassador on Republic Political Crisis

954F1828A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 15 Mar 95 p 4

[Article by Yekaterina Akopova, under rubric "Political Crisis in Kazakhstan": "Even an Ordinary Person Can Prove To Be Useful to the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Yesterday's press conference of Kazakhstan's ambassador to Moscow, Tair Mansurov, had the purpose of proving the constitutionality of the actions of the KS [Constitutional Court] and President Nursultan Nazarbayev. And also, incidentally, the lack of any crisis in the country and the unshakability of the foreign-policy course. But, despite the apparent clarity of the situation, the number of questions is only increasing. It is unclear whether the KS had the right to transfer the suit from the private area to the state-wide area (until yesterday it was not even published) or when the new election will occur. For the time being, however, it is possible to establish confidently only Mr. Mansurov's profound regret that "all of this has turned out like this." Comments by Yekaterina Akopova.**

[Box]

History of Suit by Tatyana Kvyatkovskaya

Journalist Tatyana Kvyatkovskaya, who ran for election in the Abylaykhan Electoral District of Alma-Ata, lost the March 1994 election to the Kazakhstan VS [Supreme Soviet] with a minimal advantage to the deputy chief of the capital's administration. In April she initiated a suit at the KS, seeking the recognition of the election in her district as being invalid. At the first stage, the suit was of a private nature and pertained to violations of the electoral system exclusively in the Abylaykhan District. In the words of a KS representative, "many candidates running for the position of deputy made statements about violations, but only Kvyatkovskaya's suit was drawn up in a legally proper manner and was accepted for review." The hearings began in July and ran intermittently until 15 February. In the course of the proceedings, questions linked with violations in Abylaykhan District were isolated into a separate file and were sent to the civil court. On 15 February Kvyatkovskaya made a statement which, in the words of KS members, "was initiated by the plaintiff's exhausted nerves, rather than by solid reasoning." She demanded the recognition of the unconstitutionality of the entire method of counting the votes, that had been established by Tsentrizbirkom [Central Electoral Commission] in the 1 February 1994 decree. Late in the evening of 6 March 1995, the Kazakhstan KS satisfied Kvyatkovskaya's suit and the parliamentary election was recognized as being invalid on the entire territory of Kazakhstan.

In the ambassador's words, the election laws were executed precisely. The problem is that those laws were incorrect. And the blame for that lies with Tsentrizbirkom, which formulated the electoral districts, where the difference in the number of voters varied from 16,000 to 100,000 persons. In the ambassador's opinion, Tsentrizbirkom, having made such gross mistakes, should resign *in toto.*

But why did it take a year to notice those miscalculations? Mansurov feels that the KS needed time, and he adds: "A year passed, and we became more efficient." It would have been more correct to say that a year ago the mechanism of today's crisis was efficiently set in motion. In addition, the question of the legitimacy of the actions taken by Nazarbayev, who dissolved parliament prior to the promulgation of the corresponding edict, is also open. The ambassador only noted that the electronic mass media in Kazakhstan (which broadcast the edict) are equivalent to the printed mass media. The development of Kvyatkovskaya's private suit (details concerning which are also printed on this page) into a state-wide case, in Mansurov's words, is explained in an extremely simple way: "Kvyatkovskaya is a well-known journalist and ex-candidate for the position of deputy in one of the largest districts in Alma-Ata." In addition, the KS could formally, by resting upon the private suit, ascertain also the unconstitutionality of the election as a whole.

According to the law, Nazarbayev prior to the election to the new parliament (and the date for that election is not yet known) will engage in law-making activity: he will reconsider the laws that were adopted by the VS. A new makeup of the government is also being hurriedly formed. The already appointed premier and heads of MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs', Minoborony [Ministry of Defense], Minfin [Ministry of Finance], and MVD were joined yesterday by vice-premier Vitaliy Mette, and vice-premier Imangali Tasmagambetov. A new position of head of the Sovmin [Council of Ministers] apparatus also appeared. That chair was occupied by the ex-head of one of the departments of the government's business office, Berdybek Saparbayev.

The essence of the current situation in Kazakhstan lies in the fact that, most likely, the president simply wanted to replace his team (what politician does not sometimes get ideas like that into his head). And he did that in virtuoso style and without any losses.

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Official Version of What Occurred, as Set Forth at the Press Conference of Kazakhstan's Ambassador in Moscow, Tair Mansurov

The reason for the parliamentary crisis was the 6 Mach decision of the KS, which recognized the actions and decisions of Tsentrizbirkom with respect to the formation of one of the districts in Alma-Ata and the methodology of counting the votes to be unconstitutional.

On 8 March President Nazarbayev spoke on television and expressed, in conformity with Article 131 of the

Constitution of Kazakhstan, his objection to the KS decree, and the action of that decree was suspended. On 9 March the VS speaker also expressed his objection.

On 10 March the KS overcame the objections that had been made in conformity with Article 131 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan: "If the KS, by a majority of no less than two-thirds of the votes of the total number of judges, confirms a previously enacted decree, it goes into effect as of the moment of its enactment."

On 11 March Nazarbayev, "as the guarantor of the observance of the Constitution," made an inquiry to the KS concerning the legal consequences of the decree. In conformity with the KS decree, the president had signed an edict entitled "Measures Evolving From the KS Decree": the activities of the VS were to be discontinued, the deputies were to be rendered assistance in finding jobs, and the integrity of the VS property was to be guaranteed. In order to carry out these tasks, a State Committee under the chairmanship of Vice-President Ye. M. Asanbayev was formed.

In view of the absence of a parliament in Kazakhstan, the law entitled "Temporary Delegation of Additional Functions to the President of Kazakhstan and to the Heads of Local Administrations," which was enacted on 10 December 1993 by the Kazakhstan VS, second convocation, went into effect.

Because the illegitimacy of parliament had resulted in the dissolution of the government, which on 11 March resigned in entirey, the president appointed A. M. Kazhegeldin to the position of premier and instructed him to form a cabinet. Simultaneously, vice-premiers, and heads of MID, Minfin, Minoborony, and MVD were appointed. The new government will carry out an inspection of the decrees that were enacted by the previous cabinet. The president, however, will approve the decrees of the ex-VS.

Tajikistan

Islamic Revival Party Structure, Ideology

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[Article by D.V. Mikulskiy under the rubric "Central Asian Alternatives": "The Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (History of Creation, Structure, Ideological Principles)"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IPVT) is among those religious-political organizations of the post-Soviet geographical environment whose reputation, rather than being limited to the bounds of a single country, extends to other Muslim regions of the CIS as well. Its controlling groups took an active part in the civil war in Tajikistan in 1992-93, on the side of the so-called democratic Tajik opposition. The organizational structure of the IPVT is based on the family-clan mahallah and Sufi-order institutions of chiefly two subethnic regional communities of Tajiks—the Karategins (intrinsically in Karategin, the northeastern historical area of Tajikistan, as well as in the regions of their forced migration to Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab oblasts) and the Matchins (New Matcha in Leninabad Oblast). The IPVT leader class is formed primarily of ishans, of the class of hereditary rulers of the Sufi orders. The traditional foundations of the organizational structure of the IPVT have been preserved, to all appearances, in the emigre environment as well, which conveys considerable stability to the party, along with the ability for a rapid restoration and expansion of its influence in Tajikistan in the event of a settlement in the republic.*

Islam, as one of the leading socio-political forces that took part in the civil war that engulfed Tajikistan, is represented in the republic by two groups: the adherents of the former leader of the caziyat, the spiritual administration of the Muslims in Tajikistan, and the supreme cazi (Muslim judge) hajji Akbar Turadzhonzod, first, and the advocates of the IPVT, second.

The first flashes of the social trouble in Dushanbe, strictly speaking—the many-thousands rally in front of the building of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan that started in September 1991 and led to the fall of the regime of Kakhkhor Makhkamov, and then to the establishment of the power of Rahmon Nabiyev, and later to confrontation between him and the Islamic democratic opposition—arose out of the demands of the officially registered regional structure existing then of the nationwide Islamic Revival Party (IPV), on the basis of which the IPVT[1] was also later organized. Today, regardless of the formal victory of the advocates of the so-called "reds" (the Leninabad-Kulyab group), the IPVT, whose leaders have ended up in Afghanistan, continue to control some of the groups opposed to the Dushanbe authorities that occasionally come into contact with the Russian border troops at the southern borders of Tajikistan. The representatives of the IPVT play a visible role in the negotiations between the republic leaders and the opposition. There are grounds to suppose that the IPVT remains one of the leading and prospective political forces in the country, as a consequence of which a study of its organizational structure and ideological principles has both scientific-theoretical and practical significance.

The documentary foundation for the article is field materials that were collected by the author during trips to Tajikistan in 1990-92, information gleaned by him from conversations with the leaders of the IPV in Moscow, and the Program, Charter and other materials of the IPVT, as well as features in the Russian press.

The Appearance of the IPVT

It may be assumed that one of the sources of this party was the Islamic groups that arose on the territory of Tajikistan, in the same manner as other regions of Central Asia, in the 1970s. The local and capital Soviet press at the time hastily christened these groups as

Wahhabites, possibly under the influence of insufficiently qualified experts who equated the newly appeared Islamic strain with Wahhabism, the official ideology of Saudi Arabia, only on the basis that its activists demanded a simplification of the prevailing Muslim rites and permitted themselves attacks on the official Muslim ministers of the religion. Regardless of the absurdity of the name, the term "Wahhabites" apropos of Muslims of the entire Central Asian region and particularly Tajikistan took hold. It began to be used even by some Tajik religious figures. The imam-hatib of the major Kulyab mosque, Haydar Sharifzoda, stated that he considered supreme cazi of Tajikistan, A. Turadzhonzod, in his opinion an ally of the IPVT, a Wahhabite but not a true Muslim.[2]

The common descriptions of the Muslims and their adversaries as *"vovchiks"* (Wahhabites) and *"yurchiks"* (advocates of the "reds") evidently took shape precisely as the result of this erroneous naming at the beginning of the 1990s.

According to one of my correspondents, an academic associate in the humanities and a native of the Kulyab area residing in Dushanbe, the IPVT traces its roots back to the youth groups that began forming in the 1960s and 1970s around the underground Muslim elementary schools that operated under the guise of village teahouses (village inns where tea was drunk)—the maktabs—which had become widespread in regions where the settlers from Karategin resided in Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube oblasts. The elders of the ishan (Sufi) clans, esteemed by the Karategins in their new places of habitation as well, provided instruction. These elders, according to my correspondent, came regularly to this or that village, assembled the children of preschool age and adolescents, and taught them the Arabic language, the Koran and the Hadith for several weeks at a time. All of this took place under the protection of the portraits of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee that decorated every teahouse. The training was intensive, and so profoundly affected the consciousness of the children that upon coming to conventional Soviet schools, they even read Cyrillic from right to left. It was no secret to the school's pedagogues that these pupils of theirs had already been with the ishans. Judging from everything, all of the local inhabitants were aware of the existence of the maktabs. The authorities knew about them as well, but they looked the other way.

There was evidently a unification of the hitherto fragmented groups in 1977. That is the date that was cited to me by IPVT Deputy Chairman Davlat Usmon. The Islamic groups were consolidated to an even greater extent, on the scale of the entire republic, in 1983, when the first print organ of Islamic thrust, the journal KHIDOYAT ("Leadership") began to be published underground. In 1991 to November 1992, *i.e.* before Dushanbe was occupied by the forces of the "reds" (which occurred at the beginning of December 1992), the IPVT widely distributed the weekly newspaper NADZHOT ("Salvation") on the territory controlled by the Islamo-Democrats. The author of these lines was able to see a copy of the Islamic newspaper SHAKHODAT ("Testimony") in February of 1992, and it also evidently was published by this party, although more likely locally rather than for the republic.

The activity of the Islamic groups entered a new and more active phase with the start of restructuring. A tendency toward the unification of the Islams across the entire USSR was manifested at that time. The contacts among their leaders in various regions of the Union led to the founding congress of the IPV, held in Astrakhan on 9 June 1990, where the Avar Akhmatkadi Akhtayev was elected amir (leader), and the Azerbaijani Geydar Dzhemal his deputy. The Tatars Valiakhmed Sadur and the future deputy chairman of the IPVT, Davlat Usmon, played a visible role in the IPV. Most of the members of the IPV during this period, in the words of the latter, were Islams from Tajikistan, who were also numerically predominant at its founding congress. D. Usmon confirms that the initiative in the creation of the IPV came from the Tajik Islams. The number of Tajiks taking part in the founding congress of the IPV, according to other data, was actually not all that considerable.

Soon, in the words of IPVT Chairman Mukhammadsharif Khimmatzod, the leaders of the Islamic groups of Tajikistan decided to proclaim officially the creation of a republic organization of the IPV. A truly united organization of Islams, as has already been mentioned, had existed here before as well. An initiative group was formed in order to form a regional structure of the IPV on its basis. The group, having transmitted the texts of the Charter and Program of the IPV and the minutes of its sessions to the Dushanbe city executive committee and the military commandant of the capital, as well as the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, set its founding conference for 6 October 1990. The day before that date, however, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet reported to the initiative group that the creation of a regional structure of the IPV, as well as any other party of religious nature, was prohibited in Tajikistan. The founding conference scheduled by the Islams for October 6 was held nonetheless at the village of Chortut in Leninskiy Rayon near Dushanbe, with five hundred delegates and guests present. The failure to obey the authorities brought administrative punishment to the IPV activists in Tajikistan—fifteen people were fined.[3]

The plan for the creation of a unified regional structure for the IPV for all of Central Asia arose initially, according to V. Sadur, but the leaders of Tajik organizations were against it, since they did not wish to be in the same organization with Uzbeks and other Turkic peoples, owing to their anti-Turkic sentiments.

Be that as it may, the reputation of the Islamic forces in Tajikistan increased considerably with the appearance of the regional structure of the IPV, even given the fact that it remained in semi-legal status.

The symptoms of the impending break-up of the USSR were felt by many in the local areas long before December of 1991. Not only the official nationwide structures, but even unofficial ones such as the IPV, began to weaken and even collapse. The leaders of the regional structure then made the decision to create an independent party—the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan.

Its first congress, with 650 delegates and 310 guests participating, was held on 26 October 1991 at the Palace of Political Buildings in Dushanbe. It officially converted the republic organization of the IPV into the IPVT, adopted a party Program and Charter, elected a Presidium of seventeen people, and set about electing a chairman and first and second deputies. These positions were filled by M. Khimmatzod, D. Usmon and Saidibrakhim Gado respectively. The domullah (Muslim scholar) Amriddin[4] was elected chairman of the Control and Audit Commission. The IPVT was registered with the Minister of Justice of independent Tajikistan as an independent party (the date of registration, unfortunately, is unknown to me) soon after the congress.

The leaders of the IPVT, having received an official mandate, took steps to make their role in the sociopolitical life of Tajikistan more active and appeared more frequently in the mass media for that purpose. The first deputy chairman mullah Kiyemiddin—one of the activists of the IPVT and an instructor of the caziyat at the Islamic Institute, who had held the post of commander of the National Guard and, according to witnesses, had widely incorporated in it the symbols of the Iranian guards of the Islamic Revolution—began to gain more and more renown. Aligning themselves on many issues with the Rastokhez nationalistic movement and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT), the leaders of the IPVT strove nonetheless to pursue a sufficiently independent policy. The representative of the IPVT, for example, was present only in the capacity of an observer at an anti-government rally in January of 1992 that was initiated by those organizations. The leaders and members of the IPVT took very active part, however, in a rally opposed to the regime of President R. Nabiyev in March of that same year. In May IPVT formations took part in clashes with government troops and the Kulyab militias that supported them, and then in the civil war that started in the Vakhsh valley.

One might ask the question of the sources of financing for the party, in light of its official recognition and increased activeness. Materials for a full answer to that question are patently insufficient, but it is reliably known that the IPVT owned extensive plantations of opium poppies in Karategin that were one of the most substantial—if not the most substantial—channels for replenishing party coffers.

In the middle of May 1992, after the tempestuous events in the capital, a coalition government was formed in which D. Usmon became the deputy prime minister. He repeatedly tried in that position to halt the bloodshed in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast and reconcile the hostile parties, which, evidently, irritated other leaders of the IPVT. Someone among his colleagues in the party even accused D. Usmon, in the summer of 1992, of supposedly being an informant for the KGB. These accusations did not cause him any great harm, since public opinion was diverted from those kinds of rumors by the events of the civil war. He suffered much more from the war itself; all of his relatives living in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast were slaughtered by enemies from the Islamic-Democratic opposition.

A group of advocates of the IPVT in Karategin, in one of the regions of the largest influence of the party, proclaimed the Garm Islamic Republic in the fall of 1992. The principal figures in this political act, according to Tajik government sources, were field commander Rizvan (Rizvon) and mullah Azam, who held the founding conference of representatives of the population and tried to convince them that such Muslim countries as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia were ready to render all-round assistance to the Garm Republic. Rizvan and Azam went into hiding after government troops entered Karategin in February 1993.[5]

Many of the rank-and-file members of the IPVT participated in operations against the "reds"; it cost some of them their lives, but some of the fighters were able to get away to Afghanistan. Three to five thousand Tajiks, chiefly young people, are completing combat training under the aegis of this party at special camps in the northern Afghan provinces of Kunduz and Tahor. The relatives and countrymen of both the leaders and the rank-and-file members of the IPVT, primarily Karategins, have found refuge in Afghanistan as well. It may be assumed that the overall quantity of refugees is close to 60,000 people.[6]

The authorities, in order to slow the rise in the influence of the IPVT, decided to condemn its activity under the procedures stipulated by law. Criminal proceedings were brought at the beginning of January 1993 against D. Usmon, as well as A. Turadzhonzod and DPT Chairman Sh. Yusuf, under the charge of fomenting civil war and destroying the operating rhythm of enterprises with multi-day rallies.[7] The collegium of the Supreme Court banned the activity of the IPVT on the territory of the republic on June 21. The DPT, Rastokhez and the Pamir Lali Badakhshon society met the same fate, charged under Article 21 of the Law on Public Associations, in particular of creating their own armed formations and trying to overthrow the constitutional order. It was these parties and movements, in the opinion of the members of the Supreme Court, that had started the civil war in Tajikistan.[8] The Supreme Court in August of that same year sentenced IPVT Presidium member Adzhik Aliyev to death, and party members Mamder Nazimov and Radzhab Atovullayev to three years imprisonment at a penal colony.[9]

Despite the ban on the activity of the IPVT and even (according to information I obtained from DPT Deputy Chairman Abdunabi Safarov) its disbanding in connection with the joining in emigration of the Islamic Revival Movement, this party remains an important organizational force for opposing the Dushanbe government. Groups of its fighters, which in structure reflect the family-clan structure of local society, are constantly crossing over the Tajik-Afghan border and operating actively on the territory of the republic.[10] It also influences the situation in the country through its own ideological principles as well. This is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that the opposition government of Tajikistan in exile has named itself the Council of Islamic Revival, and that it is headed by one of the eminent Islams of the country, until recently the editor-in-chief of the newspaper of the Muslim spiritual administration of Tajikistan, MINBARI ISLOM, Said Abdallo Nuri, who not only was never before a member of either the IPV or the IPVT, but even had, according to V. Sadur, serious differences of opinion with both organizations.

The radio station "Sadoi Mudzhokhed" ("Voice of the Mujahedin") began regular broadcasting from Tahor province on 4 July 1993, propagandizing, to all appearances, the ideas of the IPVT as well. Work is underway to create a television studio.[11]

Structure and Composition of the IPVT

The IPVT, in its organizational structure, combines both modern and traditional features; it is similar in that regard to many of the socio-political organizations that exist in the Muslim East.

The foundation of the party is the low-level organizations that its charter calls "primary stages," the functions of which include accepting applications to join the IPVT, considering issues of expulsion from its ranks, and electing the leaders of the cells. The fact that the primary organization of the IPVT unites the members of the party according to their place of residence[12] makes it possible to conclude that the real foundation of the party is the neighborhood commune-mahallahs that exist in the places of traditional settlement of the Tajiks and that coincide to a great extent, both in the village and in the cities, with the tribal communes (patrimonies), the avlods. These neighbor-clan communes clearly constitute the structural bulwark of the IPVT in the Second Section of the Matchinskiy Rayon in Leninabad Oblast, where refugees from the major village of Obburdon and the small settlements adjoining it settled in compact fashion after their resettlement from the mountainous regions at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, preserving their indigenous mahallah and avlod divisions. It may be assumed that an analogous combination of the organizational structure of the IPVT and the traditional neighborhood-avlod settlement of the Tajiks also took shape in the village of Obodi, currently virtually within the outlines of the ancient city of Ura-Tyube, a rayon center of Leninabad Oblast. The mosques served as the center of activity of the IPVT in both the one case and the other, aside from the traditional points of settlement of the population: the new mosque of Muhammed Ikbal in Obburdon, and the ancient mosque of Mavlono Usmoni Chorkhi, reconstructed by the local leadership of the IPVT, in Obodi.

The intertwining of the organizational structure with the mahallah-avlod settlement of the Tajiks was also typical of the party structure in the regions of compact habitation of the Karategins in Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab oblasts, which, as is well known, proved along with Matcha and, particularly, Karategin to be the primary territorial base of the IPVT. The delimitation between the intrinsic party members, on the one hand, and their relatives, in-laws and neighbors, on the other, seems to have become unclear as a result of such a party-traditional structure. It turned out that an avlod, several men of whom belonged to the IPVT, was considered to support the party entirely. The explanation for the instances of mass murders of the relatives of IPVT members that were reported to the author of these lines by the chairman of the Leninabad party organization, U. Fayzullayev, should clearly be sought in this.

The structure of the primary IPVT organization in the Third Section of Matchinskiy Rayon of Leninabad Oblast proved to be different; most of the inhabitants, especially the older ones, were inclined against opposition organizations. There were just fifteen people in the local cell of the IPVT—young people from various families and avlods connected by neighborly relations across their small homeland, the large village of Paldorak in in Old Matcha and the small surrounding villages, and they settled in the new location according to their affiliations as well.

And finally, one more type of organizational structure is represented by the city organization of the party in Khodzhent, subdivided into several primary cells. About 300 people, in the words of the chairman of that organization, A. Kadyrov, joined and who were accepted according to a strictly individual principle. They almost all probably belonged to various city neighborhoods, avlods and families, comprising a larger scattered community than the cell in the Third Section of Matcha. Small groups of two or three refugees from one and the same neighbor or clan communities, judging from everything, took shape within the framework of the Khodzhent organization. The organizations of the IPVT in the major cities—Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tyube, Kulyabe—were evidently also structured along the same lines.

Three principal types of primary organizations of the IPVT are thus delineated: one coinciding with the neighbor-clan social structure and virtually indivisible from it; one corresponding only partially to the neighbor-clan ties; and, a dispersed one, in which the ties with the mahallah and the avlods have been weakened. Structures of this type, of course, rarely exist in real life in pure form and, to all appearances, they have engendered many transitional and mixed types.

The principal, traditional form of interactions among Tajiks (both men and women) are the gashtaks or gaps (there are other names as well), special regular assemblies of the inhabitants of a single neighborhood, profession or sphere of activity that were conducted according to a defined ritual and are without fail accompanied by a meal. The members of one gashtak, according to mores, are obligated to support each other in various life situations. This or a similar form founded on analogous traditional institutions for political-agitation work has been characteristic of the social movements of the peoples of the East in modern and contemporary times (not to mention medieval times) and was practiced, in particular, by the participants in the Muslim reform movement of the Jadids[13] at the beginning of the 20th century. It is also known to many of the contemporary Muslim religious-political organizations of the far abroad.[14]

Insofar as the primary organization of the IPVT coincides to this or that extent with the traditional commune or gashtak, it naturally became the organizational form of activity and interchange among the members of the party as well. Party bodies at all levels—including the Presidium, whose members reside in various locales—are known to assemble regularly and sequentially with each other for the discussion of political, organizational and ideological issues of party life. The members of the IPVT, according to my information, have also taken part in conventional, "non-party" gashtaks, trying to strengthen their influence on their neighbors. This practice evidently corresponds to the party charter, one paragraph of which says that the primary organization "brings party policy to the populace."[15] The gashtak as a form of organizational work for the IPVT allows the party leadership to pass their decisions and ideological principles along promptly to the rank-and-file party members, seeking their *de facto* cohesiveness on a communal basis, actively influencing non-party relatives and neighbors. One may state confidently that the institution of the gashtak has been preserved in this party under the conditions of emigration as well.

The gashtaks in the IPVT, according to information available to me, are conducted as follows. The assembled are seated around a cloth spread on the floor with food, the dastarkhan, and read the Koranic "Fatiha" sura and prayers in Tajik. They then hold a joint meal, discussing in detail various theoretical and practical issues and making these or those decisions, after which, having performed the ritual gesture of the "omin"—raising their hands and running them along the face—they part.

It becomes obvious from the aforementioned that the organizational structure of the IPVT is closely intertwined with the traditional communal institutions. Participation in the activity of the party by a full-fledged member is sometimes hard to distinguish from the activity of his relative or acquaintance who is not formally part of the IPVT, but has agreed to work with it. The charter provision that "the principle of individual membership lies at the foundation of the party"[16] should therefore be understood with a regard for these features.

The material available to me makes it possible to assert that the foundation of the leadership stratum of the IPVT comes from the learned class of the ishans—the heads of the Sufi mystical brotherhood orders that have traditionally enjoyed great influence among local Muslims. It is descendants of the ishan class who have constituted the foundation of the social forces that have opposed the dissemination of one version of Western culture, the Russian, opposing any social changes whatsoever, since the times of the Russian conquest of Central Asia. Researcher of the Bukhara Khanate D.N. Logofet described the mindset that reigned in their milieu as early as the beginning of the 20th century in this way: "...they (the ishans) are a well-organized force with which the Russian Government will clash in the Bukhara Khanate sooner or later, the more so as all of the leaders of the members of the societies, the Ishans and the Pirs, have an extremely hostile attitude toward everything Russian, with an enormous gravitation toward the neighboring Muslim states, led by Turkey and the small Muslim regions of India."[17]

The modernizing actions of the Russian administration undermined the influence of the ishans and the other Muslim spiritual classes. One author at the beginning of this century wrote, "The position of the ishans in society has been altered appreciably over the last half century. The people, who used to have a superstitious fear of the representatives of the ishan class, were now emboldened to judge the prominent representatives of dervishism, delineating among them, as an exception, people unconcerned with money and true hermits; the grabbers and feigned conscientious followers of the Sufi teachings were subjected to condemnation."[18] The ishan class reacted to the changes in their social position by taking the lead in mass Muslim movements against the colonial authorities.[19]

The opposition of the ishans to Soviet power was no less vigorous. Many of them were leaders of the Basmak groups, for which they were subjected to persecution. Some of the ishan clans nonetheless resorted to collaboration with Soviet power to the extent that it stabilized.

It is reliably known that the prominent IPVT figure in Khodzhent, Kureyshikhon Ibragimov, and the leader of the Matchinskiy Rayon organization, Abdurashid Fozil, are from the ishan class. The ishan origins of A. Turadzhonzod are also known. The chairman of the Khodzhent city organization, Adudulakhad Kadyrov, is the grandson of one of the ancestors of A. Turadzhonzod in the position of cazi, Abdulmadzhid Yusupov, maternally, and one of his ancestors on his father's side was a mufti, so he clearly is also related to the ishan class or to one of the other traditional spiritual classes.

The chairman of the Leninabad oblast organization of the IPVT, U. Fayzullayev, is a member of the class of traditional authorities (evidently also the ishans); his grandfather, in his words, secretly engaged in the teaching of Arabic to boys and the reading of the Koran, and was known as one of the greatest scholars of Islam in Tajikistan. The fact that all of the brothers of U. Fayzullayev, with the exception of the youngest, received higher education also points to the notability of his family. Only extremely notable families that had a permanent and significant traditional source of income, as other sources testify, could permit themselves that.

I do not have reliable information pertaining to the class affiliations of the chairman of the IPVT, Muhammadsharif Khimmatzod; according to some data, he comes from the ishan class, and according to other his birth is unknown, while he spreads the talk of his learned origins himself in order to increase his social prestige. It is entirely possible that the rumors of the unwarranted claims of M. Khimmatzod of learned origins are intentionally sown by the advocates of the Dushanbe authorities so as to discredit both the chairman of the IPVT and the party itself. That assumption is not a groundless one, since analogous rumors are being circulated regarding A. Fozil, although his affiliation to the ishan class is reliable. As for the class affiliation of the first deputy chairman of the party, D. Usmon, according to information at my disposal he is a descendant of a simple peasant, but it seems doubtful to me in view of the exceedingly large role of D. Usmon in the socio-political life of Tajikistan. I will risk supposing that the version of his "simple" origins is his personal and entirely calculated tribute to the democratic tendencies of the times.

The question of the social characteristics of the rank-and-file members of the IPVT is of no less interest. It is entirely obvious that in the rural locales—in Matchinskiy Rayon of Leninabad Oblast, Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab oblasts, and in Karategin—they are simple peasants linked by traditional (neighbor, countrymen, Murid) relations with representatives of the ishan clans heading these or other structures of the IPVT. It is also obvious that the cohesiveness of the population around the ishans made possible the resettlement of the inhabitants of the mountainous terrain into the plains that was carried out by the Soviet authorities in the 1930s-1950s. This resettlement, in and of itself a forced one, was also carried out in a very disorganized manner, and many people, especially old people and children, perished, since they were unable to adapt to the new conditions of habitation. Such a harsh life brought forth the traditional leaders—the former ishan clans—into key roles in society once again. How can one fail to recall here that in the comparatively recent past the village of Obburdon, the emigrants from which, as has been noted, comprised the backbone of the IPVT in Matchinskiy Rayon, was one of the centers of the Basmak movement in the civil war years.[20]

The mass base of the party in small cities such as Ura-Tyube was, to all appearances, the urban residents partially employed in agricultural work, but chiefly in the traditional trades, trading and small industry. Among the party members in Ura-Tyube, according to U. Fayzullayev, were many physicians and engineers. They possibly joined the party not owing to traditional, far-flung ties, but rather out of to conviction and their own political and moral choice. In the large cities such as Khodzhent, where the dispersed type of organization predominated, a significant share of the members of the IPVT were workers in trade. The chairman of the Khodzhent organization, A. Kadyrov, directed my attention to that.

The information at the disposal of this researcher thus makes it possible to conclude that the foundation of the IPVT comprises people who have remained solidly in the system of traditional—albeit somewhat transformed during Soviet times—social ties. This conclusion seems valid in relation to both the rank-and-file members and the leaders of the party. There are also small groups of marginals with weakened traditional ties in its ranks, who made an independent choice in favor of the IPVT. This situation in the party understandably corresponds entirely to the general nature of contemporary Tajik society, founded precisely on social ties of a traditional nature.

Ideological Principles of the IPVT

The ideological platform of the party is recorded in its founding documents—the charter and program—as well as in other materials published in the newspapers NADZHOT, PAYEMI KHAK and other periodicals issued in Tajikistan in 1991-92. I will limit myself in this article to an analysis of the charter and program. Islamic ideological postulates that are entirely natural for a party that represents itself as a part of the contemporary Tajikistan Islamic movement predominate in both documents. Suffice it to say that both documents begin with the traditional Muslim literary phrasing—"in the name of kind and merciful Allah."[21] The organization is defined in the charter as follows: "The Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan is a socio-political organization based on Islamic faith, consisting in faith in One God and in the prophetic mission of Muhammed, and with it worship and prayer to Allah."[22] The goal of the activity of the IPVT is phrased thus: "the moral revival of the citizens of the republic, and a political and moral awakening aimed at the incorporation of the fundamentals of Islam into the life of the Muslims of the republic."[23]

Party ideologists emphasize, on the one hand, that the model for the socio-political order of the country for them is a just society structured on a foundation of the Islam of the prophet Muhammed, the continuers of the cause of which were his closest successors, the just caliphs.[24] This provision of the IPVT program would seem to testify to the fundamentalist ideology of this organization. The advocates of Muslim societies, however, are known to feel that the "spoiling" of the Muslim religion began immediately after the end of the rule of the just caliphs.[25] The IPVT program states, on the contrary, that the crisis of the Muslim societies ensued only when the "colonizers and enslavers set foot on the land of the Islamic countries."[26] The ideological leaders of the IPVT assume, at the same time, that Islam is a national treasure of the Tajiks, and their national traditions "in no way differ from Islam and do not contradict it."[27] The "fruits of the achievements of the efforts of Muslim clergy, and especially the caliphate grouping that is widespread and active in our homeland,"[28] serve as the ideological underpinnings of the IPVT, along with the Koran and the Sunna.

These provisions of the program indicate, from my point of view, the fact that the concepts of Muslim fundamentalism are applicable to the ideology of the IPVT with large reservations. Its ideology is sooner of a traditionalist nature, Islam understood as a fusion of the dogma set forth in the Koran and Sunna and Islamicized popular traditions that, strictly speaking, are entirely in conformity with the socio-historical realities of contemporary Tajikistan. The ideological principles of the program are very closely connected with the traditionalist nature of the organizational structure and social composition of the party.

The question of what social order the IPVT seeks to establish in the event it and its allies in Tajikistan should triumph is an extremely interesting one. The party, on the one hand, is seemingly striving for the creation of a society founded on the fundamental provisions of Islam. The program states, for example, that "The IPVT proceeds equally from divine inspiration, both in the realm of the intrinsically religious and in the sphere of culture, civilization and everyday life and politics, as well as in all life matters, and does not recognize any law that contradicts the Shariat."[29] The fundamental documents of the party stress repeatedly, at the same time, that it operates exclusively through legal methods, conforming to secular (at the time, Soviet) legislation.[30] The society for the creation of which the party is fighting is described in its program as "just, humanitarian and democratic."[31] The leaders of the IPVT emphasized repeatedly in personal conversations with the author of these lines that the IPVT does not seek the immediate establishment of an Islamic state, but rather the introduction of a system of democratic rule within the framework of which, on the one hand, Muslims will have every opportunity for Islamic educational work among the population and, on the other, the Tajik people will be able to make their own choice, after a certain time, either for or against an Islamic state.

This kind of ideological principles is most likely a bow to political fashion and the worldwide tribute to democracy as the supposedly sole possible and fairest system for organizing society under modern conditions. They clearly do not reflect the actual aspirations and inclinations of the Islamics, who are to all appearances assuming the establishment of the patriarchal orders that existed during the times of the Bukhara emirate in one form or another. The adoption of democratic slogans by the IPVT leadership testifies to a significant modernization of the social awareness of the Tajiks. Since the basic ideology of the IPVT and the social psychology of its members is traditionalism, in my opinion, the criticism by the ideologists of the party of the communist doctrine and the practice of building socialism in the USSR as a whole and in its Asiatic republics is extremely symptomatic. They accuse the communist ideology of the Soviet model of inflaming class hatreds, undermining the moral foundations of society, and spreading false and impossible promises. The ideological leaders of the IPVT see the cause of the collapse of the communist system in the USSR in the fact that it contradicts human nature.[32] That criticism of the theory and practice of communism would seem to be a reaction of the traditionalist circles of Tajikistan, as represented in the IPVT, to the socialist modernization of their country under Soviet power.

The IPVT "opposes nationalism, chauvinism, and international conflicts"; this conforms entirely to the principles of Islam. Party ideologists, at the same time, are not indifferent to the problems of the development of national culture, and favor the protection of the national interests of Tajikistan as they understand them.[33]

Such nationally oriented provisions of the IPVT program documents are associated with the common traditional sentiment of its ideology. They have made it possible to collaborate ideologically and politically with the other socio-political forces of Tajikistan—the DPT and the Rastokhez—that have taken national-democratic stances.

* * *

We have been considering one of the most important Islamic organizations that has operated on the territory of the CIS and is still able, despite its defeat, to have a significant influence on the course of events both within Tajikistan itself and in the other Muslim regions of the former USSR. Interest in the IPVT, however, can be explained by more than this alone. It is also the fact, in my opinion, that this party is similar to many other socio-political organizations of the CIS and the Muslim regions beyond its borders. It relies first and foremost on traditional social ties and relations—family-clan and neighbor (mahallahs), and uses traditional institutions—the gashtaks—in its organizational structure. Another influential Muslim organization—Adolat (Justice), which operated in Namangan, one of the important centers of Uzbekistan and a major city of the Fergana Valley in 1991-92—was also known to be based on a mahallah-kishlak (neighborhood-village) structure. Specialists suppose that the Fergana Valley is the most explosive region of Uzbekistan, where Islamic sentiments are the strongest. If the fate of Tajikistan should befall that country, the flame of civil war would to all appearances burst out right in Fergana.

The IPVT is moreover headed by products of the traditional privileged class of Tajik society—the ishans. This is also an exceedingly typical feature of the Islamic organizations of the CIS. The leaders of the Dagestan faction of the former all-union Islamic Revival Party, for example, are known to have originated from the traditional class of muslim scholars, most of them descendants of Shamil, the leader of the mountain inhabitants of the Caucasus in the 19th century, an Avar by nationality. It may be assumed that organizations analogous to the IPVT in the CIS are becoming one of the channels of social influence of the traditional learned classes on Muslim society.

These circumstances, from my point of view, doubtless testify in favor of the autochthonous origin of the IPVT and the fact that the party arose by virtue of local economic, socio-political and cultural causes, and is not the product of the activity of some foreign intelligence services and other "hostile forces" as is assumed, for instance, by the Russian commentator Sergey Kurginyan.[34] The name "Wahhabites," which was sometimes used by the authors of features in both the press of the CIS and in foreign periodicals, is thus also completely inapplicable to the advocates of the IPVT.

The ideological doctrine of the IPVT is a distinctive fusion of traditionalist and modernist ideas, testifying to a certain modernization of those social segments whose interests that party represents. Although the question of the existence of the IPVT remains an open one, its organizational and ideological principles could prove topical for future Islamic movements not only in Tajikistan, but in the other Muslim countries of the CIS as well.

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